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Embassies in U.S. Refuse Payment of $3.8 Million

LD0311114493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0250 GMT 3 Nov 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Loshchilin]

[Excerpt] Washington, 3 Nov—[passage omitted] The Israeli diplomats were only in sixth place on the list of the main foreign violators of the strict Washington regulations for car parking. The list is headed, with an impressive lead, by staff of the embassies of the republics of the former USSR, who have incurred a debt to the local authorities of no less than $3.8 million. For the time being they are refusing to pay this sum, despite the adoption of the new American law which affects them directly and the threat to deprive car owners of certain privileges of diplomatic license plates. This attitude is based on the fact that the Washington authorities are not allocating even a minimally adequate number of parking places for cars belonging to diplomats from the new independent states. For instance, the pocket-handkerchief-sized site provided for this purpose in front of the Russian Embassy can take five cars with difficulty, while the embassy has a fleet of 40.

"A whole year ago the Moscow mayor's department put a new parking site at the disposal of the Americans. We do not understand why the people here cannot reciprocate and act in the same way," said press counsellor of the Russian Federation Embassy Vladimir Derbenev. "We think that to solve this problem it would be advisable to hold meetings between representatives of the mayors' departments of Moscow and Washington, and also, possibly, consultations between the heads of the foreign policy departments of the United States and Russia."

UNPROFOR Commander Cot Interviewed

PM0211142193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 3

[Interview with General Jean Cot, commander of UN Protection Forces, UNPROFOR, in former Yugoslavia, by correspondent Colonel Aleksandr Oliynik; place and date not given: "Blue Berets and the War in the Balkans"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's files: Jean Cot was born 6 April 1931. He has served in the French Armed Forces since 1958. He is a graduate of the Ground Forces Military Academy and the French Military Command College. He has served in various command and staff posts in North Africa, Algeria, and Germany. He took command of the 1st Army in 1990. He has been in his present post since July 1993. He has been awarded the Croix de guerre and the Legion d'honneur.

[Oliynik] General, to what extent are you personally satisfied with the progress of the peacemaking operation on the territory of former Yugoslavia?

[Cot] It is common knowledge that it is being carried out with great difficulty. The Blue Berets are not fully carrying out their mandate, and the main reason for this is that all the sides involved in the conflict—Serbs, Croats, and Muslims—try to exploit the UN forces' mandate in their own interests and to make use of the forces sometimes to achieve their own ends. It is one of my main tasks to do everything to ensure that the politicians have no grounds to accuse the Blue Berets of acting in the interests of one of the opposing sides.

[Oliynik] It is known that Croatian President Tudjman has repeatedly stated that he is dissatisfied with the Blue Berets' actions and he has proposed that the the UN forces' mandate be split into three parts, that three mutually independent commands be formed, and that their powers be extended to include the use of weapons in carrying out peacemaking operations. What is your position regarding splitting up the mandate?

[Cot] I have had a conversation on this score with Mr Stoltenberg, cochairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. I opposed splitting up the mandate. The territory of Yugoslavia is now a single theater of military operations, and a single staff and single commander should operate here.

[Oliynik] What, in your view, is Russia's contribution to resolving the Balkan crisis?

[Cot] I will not talk about the political aspect of the Balkan crisis; that is the business of statesmen. However, there is no doubt that the countries of the West do take most serious account of Russia's stance, which amounts, as is well known, to the fact that force in resolving the Balkan conflict should be excluded and that threats of the use of force are pointless, as they are counterproductive—although I personally do not agree with that at all—and that it is essential to find a political solution. Such a solution does seem to have been found—the Geneva package, which has already been signed by the Croats and the Serbs. It is now up to the Muslims. Big problems will arise immediately after the signing in full of the Geneva agreement dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina up into three ministates, and we will not be able to manage without an additional contingent of troops. I and the commander of the troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be happy if an extra 50,000 NATO troops, including U.S. and Russian Armed Forces, were to appear here in the very near future.

[Oliynik] Are you sure that the Muslims will nevertheless sign the Geneva package in full despite the decision of their parliament?

[Cot] In my view, a catastrophe will ensue if the package is not signed, and if the Muslim side starts a "tug-of-war" in order to get greater territorial concessions from the Croats and the Serbs they will bear all the responsibility on their shoulders. It seems that the Muslim leader, Mr. Izetbegovic, is beginning to understand this; moreover, during the meeting of the parties to the conflict aboard the British aircraft carrier Invincible the sides were able

to resolve the key issue of granting the Muslims access to the Adriatic. I think that the signing of the Geneva Treaty will happen very soon, and I am more concerned not so much about its signing as about its implementation, for which an additional contingent of troops will be required.

[Oliynik] Incidentally, regarding NATO troops, judging by Western press reports you are the only Blue Beret commander who has unreservedly accepted the NATO plan for military support for peacemaking operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and sided with those who favor strong-arm methods for suppressing the war in the Balkans. How does this square with the Blue Berets' peacemaking mission?

[Cot] I, as a military man, consider that unless the UN forces start making resolute and effective use of force against the violators of the truce agreement the war in the Balkans will continue for a long time yet, and the commitment—at UN request—of a 50,000-strong grouping of NATO forces, including tanks and other equipment, half of which will be made up by Americans, will act as guarantor of the implementation of the agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are not giving up hope that a four-battalion-strong Russian contingent will form part of those forces. However, I do not think that the United States and Russia will send their troops to Bosnia imediately—they will wait and see how events develop here.

[Oliynik] However, what is to be done about the UN reputation? After all, you know what is happening in Somalia, where the American troops initially decided on a strong-arm method to resolve purely political problems.

[Cot] Those questions are for politicians, not for me. I repeat, I will not hesitate when force has to be used for the Blue Berets' safety and against those who violate the truce agreement.

Russian Foreign Ministry Wants CIS Peacekeeping Fund

LD0311205093 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Russia has called for the creation of a voluntary fund to support peacekeeping activities in the territories of the former Soviet Union.

There is no doubt that a peacekeeping force is needed to douse the fires of conflict in the territories of the former USSR. Hostilities are now prevalent in these territories. At present Russia alone bears the full burden of funding peace missions, but is it only Russia that is interested in putting the fires in war zones, like the Caucasus or the borders of Tajikistan and Afghanistan out? Shouldn't other countries help in these efforts?

According to a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the time has come to put peacekeeping operations onto a qualitatively new basis. And this is the main aim of the call for the establishment of a voluntary fund for peacekeeping activities. Mikhail Demurin of the Russian Foreign Ministry has this to say.

[Begin Demurin recording, in Russian fading to English translation] The concept grew out of the fact that Russia is the only country involved in all the peacekeeping operations in the territories of the former Soviet Union, and in almost all cases, we finance such operations single-handedly.

By the way, such peacekeeping missions are an integral part of the problem of regional and global security and stability.

It has been suggested that to establish the fund under the aegis of the United Nations, but not at its expense, the fund could operate with the contributions of interested governments, international and regional organizations. Peacekeeping missions by governments in former territories of the former Soviet Union could be carried out with money from the fund. Peacekeeping operations would have to be put under certain conditions however: Agreement by interested sides, with UN endorsement, and regular reports by countries involved in peacekeeping to the UN Security Council, as well as some other bodies. If all these can be arranged, peacekeeping in the territories of the former Soviet Union will attract international and legal status. Many more countries will be involved in its activities and Russia's financial burden will be lessened, and the accusation of an imperial tendency, often levelled against Russia, will become meaningless. [end recording]

CIS Executive Council Session Moved to 15 Nov

WS0411115793 Minsk BELAPAN in Russian 1600 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Unattributed BELAPAN report: "The Session of the CIS Executive Council Has Been Shifted"]

[Text] The session of the CIS Executive Council scheduled for 5 November in Minsk has been shifted to 15 November in Moscow. Ivan Korotchenya, member of the CIS Executive Council, has informed a BELAPAN correspondent that currently dynamic bilateral negotiations between the CIS members are being conducted. The upshot of these talks will define the destiny of a CIS economic union, and first and foremost of a CIS ruble zone. In particular, this concerns the talks between Russia and Kazakhstan especially after Kazakhstan has issued a statement that it will not enter the CIS ruble zone. In addition, according to Ivan Korotchenya, a 10-day break between the supposed and the shifted dates of the CIS Executive Council session will make it possible to thoroughly develop any documents to be discussed at the regular session. These documents mainly concern the implementation of a pact on the creation of an economic union.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 4 Nov

LD0411071693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0453 GMT 4 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS—The Russian military doctrine is an integral part of the general security concept of Russia which is being worked out now, political observer Anatoliy Stasovskiy of the military "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" newspaper writes on Thursday.

Explaining the essence of the doctrine, he writes that it "formulates the goals and the main contents of the policy aimed at ensuring military security, classifies internal and external military threats and sets the tasks of the state in counteracting those threats".

The election slogan of the Russian Communist Party is "Labour, People's Power, Justice", leader of the party Gennadiy Zyuganov told the "PRAVDA". "The Communist Party proposes a programme of restoring civic peace and lawfulness, of returning the country onto the path of civilised development", he said, adding that the party list includes 182 candidates.

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, commenting on the election campaign, predicts that the Russia's Choice bloc, most evidently, will repeat at the upcoming elections the 1990 success of the "Democratic Russia" movement. In the existing legislative conditions this mean a predetermined victory, the daily said and added that the major aim of the election bloc is to appoint Yegor Gaydar as prime minister and to make reformist Finance Minister Boris Fedorov chairman of the Central Bank.

The same newspaper published an article of noted politologist Andranik Migranyan headlined "Authoritarian Regime in Russia, What Are the Prospects?". The author believes that "neither the regime of Gorbachev, nor of Yeltsin were democratic".

"I call them phases of the collapse of the totalitarian system with a continuing crisis of management, of legitimacy, absence of accord on basic values among the major political forces in society", he writes and adds that the absence of the former parliament, of extremist parties and organisations, the emergence of new possibilities for the executive authority to mount control over mass media create for the president and the government conditions for a painless decrease in social tensions.

Political observer of the newspaper AIDYN MEKHTIYEV warns that if the president of Azerbaijan fails to stop Armenian offensive into the republican territory "another destabilisation of the situation in Azerbaijan would be hard to avoid".

Dwelling on Georgian developments, the newspaper said that major difficulties arise because of the problem of refugees who number 430,000.

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA urges authorities to disclose the death toll of October 3-4 events. "A month after the Moscow tragedy we know neither the number of casualties, nor their names. One can live without this truth, but it is impossible to feel as a human being", it said. To avoid similar tragedies in future it is necessary "to distance ourselves from the heat of politics, from politicians who do not know their people and play with them dangerous military games", it added.

U.S. Nuclear Strategy Still Based on Reagan Directive

PM0411115793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 3

[Manki Ponomarev article: "United States Fears 'Nuclear Threat'"]

[Text] A few days ago I wrote about U.S. nuclear strategy and the possibility of its being revised (see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 October), but then I only had scrappy reports at my disposal on this subject and mainly directed my attention to an article by the well-known U.S. military commentator Geoffrey Smith published in THE WASHINGTON POST. Now more official information has appeared.

I have learned in particular that President Bill Clinton some time ago gave orders for an interdepartmental group of experts to be formed with the task of preparing recommendations regarding the quantity of nuclear arms "needed to maintain the country's security." This group includes representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, which is responsible for producing nuclear weapons, the National Security Council, etc.

Late last week Pentagon boss Les Aspin held a special news conference. He confirmed that the United States is embarking on a "fundamental reappraisal" of its nuclear policy and strategy in order to define new approaches to the organizational development and application of the nuclear forces. A study will be carried out to this end and should be completed by next spring. The study will focus on the structure and size of U.S. nuclear arms, their role in ensuring the country's security, problems of maintaining nuclear weapons in a state of combat readiness, as well as to curb the proliferation of mass-destruction weapons. Particular attention is to be devoted to reviewing the targets for nuclear-missile attack.

In this connection I am bound to recall that U.S. nuclear strategy today is still determined by Presidential Directive 13, signed by Ronald Reagan back in 1981—at the height of the Cold War. Corresponding plans were drawn up on the basis of this directive, including around 40,000 targets for nuclear attack on the territory of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. Since then, Aspin admitted, "the world has undergone a fundamental change," but U.S. nuclear strategy has not undergone any considerable change. It is not a matter of sluggishness on the part of the Pentagon or the National Security Council. The point is, the defense secretary believes, that the United States is facing "a new nuclear threat."

What kind of threat? According to the Pentagon boss, it is primarily a question of disquiet over the future of the "nuclear arsenals in the former Soviet Union," some of which "could end up in less reliable hands than before," as well as fears that new nuclear states will emerge as a result of movements of the armaments and the brains behind them.

The United States has no other option than to take all this disquiet and danger into consideration, and not only take them into consideration, but be ready to act without balking at using nuclear weapons. As far as one can judge, the whole review of U.S. nuclear policy and strategy will ultimately boil down to that.

U.S.-Russian Experiment Planned at Protvino Accelerator

PM0311175893 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 2 Nov 93

[By Alkesandr Korovkin; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] These scenes were filmed not in the Moscow subway although the 20-km tunnel constructed in Protvino is comparable in size to the Moscow underground rail system. One of the most expensive devices of fundamental science is being constructed here—an accelerator and accumulator complex on the threshold not of nuclear but quark power engineering. Scientists link great hopes with the construction of Protvino: The first Russian-American experiment, Neptune, is already planned.

[A. Vasilyev, Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy department chief] Premises for it are already almost complete: a very large underground gallery and the experiment will study an accelerated proton beam of up to 600 billion electron-volts with a gas target. [passage omitted]

Talks Held With Kazakhstan on Monetary Zone

PM0311143393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 93 First Edition p 2

[Ivan Zhagel report: "Ruble Zone of Discord"]

[Text] The two-round talks between representatives of Russia and Kazakhstan on questions of a single monetary area, which have just ended in Moscow, have so far yielded no results. This was the conclusion that could be drawn from the outcome of the press conference given by Daulet Sembayev, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kazakhstan, in the republic's embassy 29 October.

At the Moscow round of talks the Russian side put forward what were effectively new proposals. It agreed to give Kazakhstan cash for six months, but only if the sums are formulated as a state debt, which naturally will have to be serviced. In addition to this, Kazakhstan will transfer its gold and currency reserves to Russia. And if it proves possible to carry out all the conditions for the unification of the monetary systems within the six months and this unification does in fact take place, then the allocated sums will be converted into an interest-free credit.

Judging by the reaction of the Kazakhstani delegation at the press conference, you could see that Russia's partners may not accept such terms. However, D. Sembayev said,

it is for the Kazakhstani Government and parliament to decide this, and obviously decisions will follow next week, given the complexity of the cash situation.

However, D. Sembayev noted, the Russian side has also proposed another option—to help introduce an interim national currency in Kazakhstan which would exist until the unification of the monetary systems. But, he noted, it will be hard to generate trust among the population in some kind of interim currency and conduct economic transformations successfully with its assistance.

Gerashchenko Comments

LD0211203293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1736 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia Viktor Gerashchenko thinks that economic conditions in Russia and Kazakhstan do not differ so much as to prevent the two countries from finding a common approach to the existence of the ruble zone. Answering a question from INTERFAX he admitted, though, that economic reforms in the two countries differ. He also claimed that the ruble in Kazakhstan is much weaker than in Russia. He accounted this to the strength of the Russian economy, the limited foreign currency reserves of Kazakhstan and other factors.

"Nevertheless a common approach to the functioning of the ruble zone is possible, though it should be said frankly that for some time Russia is going to carry a greater burden than Kazakhstan", the country's chief banker said. He went on to say that the question of forming the ruble zone is political and social, rather than economic.

Gerashchenko accounted the difficulties of forming the zone to the need for notable changes in the legislation, budget policies and taxation of member-countries as well as to the financial state of government-owned companies, customs policies and the growth of exports.

Chernomyrdin Meets Kazakh Counterpart

LD0311154093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1344 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Viktor Chernomyrdin and Sergey Tereshchenko, the heads of the Russian and Kazakhstan Governments, held talks in Moscow today. Our observer Valeriy Kiosa has the details:

[Kiosa] These talks were expected with great interest arising from the recent statements by Kazakhstani officials on the problems of creating the ruble zone.

Following the talks, Sergey Tereshchenko said today that Kazakhstan would introduce its own national currency by the end of the year. This decision is explained by the fact that Kazakhstan is in no position to fulfil the conditions laid down by Russia concerning the unification of the two monetary systems on the basis of the ruble. In order to succeed, Kazakhstan needs, in particular, a hard currency reserve of $650 million, which this state does not have.

Now Russia and Kazakhstan have to work out a mechanism of cooperation in the new conditions and ensure a relatively painless separation of the two monetary systems. This is all the more important because economic relations between Russia and Kazakhstan are notable because of a very high level of integration.

Kazakhstan has also asked Russia to make 10 billion new Russian rubles available to underwrite non-trade payments—pensions, official trips, communications, and so forth.

Viktor Chernomyrdin said that all the main decisions were arrived at today. It is essential to do everything possible not to hold in check, but to develop, economic ties. The Russian premier stressed that Kazakhstan's decision to introduce its own currency does not contradict the treaty on economic alliance, which says that the participating countries may use either the Russian ruble or their own currency. The future will show which option is more viable. One must not anticipate things too much, stressed Viktor Chernomyrdin. The establishment of the economic alliance must be preceded by a thorough elaboration of a civilized mechanism for cooperation.

Prime Ministers Discuss Currency

LD0311211993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By Vladimir Perfilyev; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Perfilyev] The Republic of Kazakhstan will have its own currency by the end of the year. This was perhaps the main news from the meeting between Russian and Kazakh delegations that took place today in Moscow. Talks were held between government heads Viktor Chernomyrdin and Sergey Tereshchenko. Taking account of the fact that about 60 percent of Kazakhstani production goes to the Russian market and taking into account also the interests of pensioners, the communications services, and the payment system between enterprises, the government heads signed the appropriate protocol and agreements on trade and payments.

[Chernomyrdin] Ties between us are so strong, very strong, in many spheres. There are very strong ties in the sphere of technology between Russian and Kazakhstani enterprises today and we cannot let ourselves fall behind the times.

[Tereshchenko] Unfortunately, over the period since the introduction of the new money, our monetary systems have seriously diverged with the result that we are simply unable to fulfill the proposals for merging our monetary systems made by the Russian side.

[Perfilyev] The Kazakhstani prime minister refused to say where the republic's new money will be printed, though I can say that it will not be in Russia.

'Opinion' Columnist Cited

MK0311104593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 3

[Vitaliy Portnikov report under the "Opinion" rubric: "Kazakhstan Is Leaving Ruble Zone. Smooth CIS Mechanism Is Getting Distorted"]

[Text] The Kazakhstani leaders' decision to leave the newly born "ruble zone of a new type" and to introduce a national currency may have come as a surprise to observers. Here is the most simple and logical explanation. After Yegor Gaydar's return to the Russian Government, the cabinet preferred economic priorities to political ones—this is why the former Soviet republics found the exchange of cash rubles at a rate of 1:1 to be simply unprofitable, or even dangerous for the Russian economy and the propped-up ruble exchange rate. Economic prerequisites tend to be followed by political conclusions, and Kazakhstan in this case does not appear to be an accidental victim of Russia's economic circumspection and its own sluggishness in pursuing economic reform.

These conclusions, however, readily fit only the traditional pattern of "good" and "bad" republics within the CIS. The "good" ones, which have sought integration within the CIS, have customarily been headed by Russia and Kazakhstan, or Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan Nazarbayev. The actual pattern of intracommonwealth relations, however—particularly among the advocates of integration—has never been simple or characterized by genuine friendliness. Whereas a relatively open game was played with regard to Ukraine or Turkmenistan, the republics that called for unity have vigorously pulled the "integration blanket" toward themselves, as they tried to achieve palpable benefits from both these appeals and the introduction of a common market and a common currency system. Evidently, for the states that decided to put off "shock therapy" the proximity to the Russian economy was a necessary prerequisite for keeping their own subsidized industries afloat. At the same time, a search for new partners and new markets was under way...

The first signs of troubles in Russian-Kazakhstani relations emerged after the well-known initiative by the prime ministers of the three Slavic republics on setting up an economic alliance. Kazakhstan was not among the sponsors of this idea, and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin, pulling no punches, explained to journalists why: Kazakhstan seeks to form an economic alliance with other countries, including Turkey, Iran, Pakistan... The incident was smoothed over, not without help from Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who came to Moscow... The crack in bilateral relations was only camouflaged, however, not narrowed. It has recently become evident, as has the CIS' deep crisis, which CIS members do not even try to disguise any longer. "Time is out of joint," relations among members of the alliance of the former Soviet republics no longer fit Procrustes' bed—the familiar pattern of a match between the "integrators" and "disintegrators." In the future, it is not fine words, but strength and shrewdness that will matter.

In a separate development, a message came from Tashkent yesterday saying that Uzbekistan would work out its own strategy for introducing a national currency and would not take part in the "ruble zone of a new type."

Chernomyrdin To Visit Austria, Denmark 6 Nov

'Important Accords' Expected

PM0211102793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the general heading "Center of Attention"]

[Text] Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will be paying a three-day official visit to Austria Saturday 6 November. He will be holding talks with Austrian leaders. The signing of a number of important intergovernmental agreements on economic cooperation between Russia and Austria is planned.

Trip Previewed

LD0311192593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1331 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin leaves Thursday morning [4 November] on three-day official visits to Denmark and Austria.

The visit to Denmark is timed for the 500th aniversary of the establishment of relations between the two countries. Chernomyrdin will attend a plenary meeting of the chambers of the Danish parlament in Copenhagen on November 4. Intergovernmental Russo- Danish negotiations will be held in the afternoon. The delegations of the two countries will be headed by Chernomyrdin and Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. Bilateral documents are expected to be signed, particularly the declaration on the basic principles of relations between the Russian Federation and Denmark—"Another 500 Year of Friendship and Peace", an intergovernmental agreement on the encouragement and mitual protection of capital investment, and an agreement between ministries of the two countries on cooperation in agriculture. Russo-Danish agreements on cooperation in archive-keeping and on cooperation in culture, education and science may also be signed.

On November 5 Chernomyrdin will visit the mainland part of Denmark—Jutland, and will visit a number of enterprises there. Queen Margrethe the Second is going to give a luncheon in honour of the Russion premier ... the same day. Chernomyrdin will participate in the inauguration of the historical-archive exhibition devoted

to the 500th anniversary of bilateral relations in the Copenhagen town hall. Later Chernomyrdin will have a meeting with representatieves of Danish business circles. On November 6 Chernomyrdin will visit Helsingor, Hillerod, Ringsted. On the same day he will leave Denmark for Austria.

During the official visit to Austria on November 8 the Russian premier will hold negotiations with Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. Bilateral agreements on commercial and economic cooperation, on the air services, and a protocol on scientific and technological cooperation are expected to be signed. On the same day the head of the Russian Government will place wreaths at the monument to fallen Soviet soldiers who gave their lives in battles for Austria's freedom. Chernomyrdin also plans to have a meeting with Austrian business people. On November 9 he will meet with President of the National Council Heinz Fischer and with Austrian MPs.

Late in the evening on November 9 Chernomyrdin is expected to be back in Moscow.

Departs for Denmark

LD0411072193 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0700 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Excerpt] As ITAR-TASS has just reported, Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, left this morning for three-day official visits to Denmark and Austria. [passage omitted]

Arrives in Denmark

LD0411092493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0841 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Copenhagen November 4 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin arrived on a three-day official visit in Denmark on Thursday [4 November] at the invitation of Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen.

The visit is timed to coincide with the 500th anniversary of the establishemnt of relations between Russia and Denmark.

Prospects for Lithuanian Leader's Visit Viewed

LD0311175893 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Tomorrow's meeting of the Lithuanian and Russian presidents in Moscow is regarded as a working visit by the Russian Foreign Ministry. Informed officials have stated that an agreement on cooperation between the ministries of internal affairs of both states, an agreement on Russian military transit from Germany through the territory of Lithuania, and an agreement on river, sea and air transport are to be signed.

The Russian Foreign Ministry regards with skepticism the possibility of signing tomorrow an agreement on social guarantees to Russian servicemen pensioners residing in Lithuania, an agreement on transit road transport through Lithuania, and a trade and economic agreement between the two countries. The opinion is prevalent in the Foreign Ministry in Moscow that the Lithuanian side is not ready for these three agreements.

A Baltic News Service correspondent was told at the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow that Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas will also meet representatives of Russian industrialists and businessmen.

Yeltsin Meets Brazauskas in Kremlin

LD0411103593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Nov—Boris Yeltsin, president of Russia, met Algirdas Brazauskas, president of Lithuania, in the Kremlin today. This is the first official meeting between the Russian president and Algirdas Brazauskas since the latter's election to the presidency of Lithuania.

It seems that there is a long-established understanding between the two presidents. At the beginning of today's meeting Boris Yeltsin recalled that during the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in October 1989, when the Lithuanian Communist Party said it wanted to be independent of the CPSU, the present Russian president was the only person to support this stance.

Chernomyrdin Visit Planned

LD0411114093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1022 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Nov—The presidents of Russia and Lithuania today agreed that Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin will arrive in Lithuania on 15-16 November to sign a package of agreements. This was reported by Lithuania's President Algirdas Brazauskas following his meeting with Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin.

Algirdas Brazauskas said the agreements are mainly in the trade and econonic area. They include a document on transit through Lithuania of Russian troops and equipment being withdrawn from Germany, as well as other cargoes.

Viktor Chernomyrdin's arrival in Lithuania, said the Lithuanian leader, "will be a positive step in the development of bilateral relations."

"We have adhered to and will continue to adhere to a policy of maintaining very good relations with Russia," the Lithuanian president stressed.

Brazauskas on 'Very Good' Relations

LD0411134493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1028 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS— "We have adhered and will adhere to the course of maintaining very good relations with Russia", Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas told reporters after meeting his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin on Thursday [4 November].

The two leaders agreed that Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will pay a visit to Lithuania on November 15-16 to sign the package of agreements which mostly deal with trade and economic issues. They include a document on transit via Lithuania of Russian military equipment withdrawn from Germany, according to Brazauskas.

The visit of Chernomyrdin will become "a positive step in developing bilateral relations", the Lithuanian president said.

Brazauskas said that his visit to Moscow opens a new stage of relations between the two countries and added that presidents of two other Baltic states—Estonia and Latvia—also want to improve relations with Russia.

"It is wonderful when such a big state as Russia fulfils its obligations before a small country as Lithuania", Brazauskas said referring to the Russian troops pullout from his country and added that the withdrawal "passed very properly, tactfully, without spoiling relations with the Russian Defence Ministry and those units which remain in the (neighbouring) Kaliningrad region" of Russia.

Dwelling on the possibility of Lithuanian membership in NATO, Brazauskas said that "the issue has become very actual in central and eastern Europe of late and Lithuania is among those states which look for the best variant of collective security not only in its region, but in Europe in general".

Brazauskas Comments

LD0411124393 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 4 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The first official meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Algirdas Brazauskas following the latter's election as president of Lithuania took place today. As is known, Lithuania is the first of the states of the former USSR that Russian troops were withdrawn from. This became one of the steps towards an improvement in relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, a number of unsolved problems have piled up. Following the talks the Lithuanian leader replied to correspondents' questions.

[Begin Brazauskas recording] We are sticking today to a policy of maintaining these very good relations. We agreed specifically to invite Chernomyrdin to Lithuania 15-16 November to sign a whole package of agreements on various issues, mainly of a trade and economic nature, including transits, transit to Kaliningrad Oblast, and the transit of troops and equipment from Germany via Lithuania—this is a fairly large amount—and many others which are very vital to both sides. I think Chernomyrdin's coming to Lithuania is also a positive step in the improvement of our joint relations. [end recording]

Yeltsin Press Service Statement

LD0411144193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1300 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 4 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—The press service of the Russian Federation president has issued the following official statement:

"Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas held a working meeting in Kremlin today. The presidents of Russia and Lithuania spoke in favor of developing bilateral relations on the basis of good neighborliness, equality and mutual benefit. Yeltsin noted that it was necessary to settle significant matters in Russian-Lithuanian relations, in particular the question of communications between Kaliningrad Oblast and the rest of Russia through Lithuania, the procedure for entry and exit between the two countries, and some other problems.

The presidents decided that agreements on the most pressing matters would be reached between Russia and Lithuania in the near future. Yeltsin and Brazauskas agreed on improving the negotiating process."

Official on Border Problems With Lithuania

WS0311150093 Kaliningrad KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 93 p 2

[Report on interview with Y. Khlebnikov, representative of the Kaliningrad Oblast Administration for International Affairs, by Second Rank Captain Y. Golovin, senior officer of the Baltic Fleet press center; place and date not given; published under the "Pressing Interview" rubric: "Border Condition"]

[Text] How to enter (or cross) Lithuania today (and tomorrow)? Recently, this issue has been the most frequent topic of telephone calls to the Kaliningrad Oblast Administration for International Affairs. To its official Y. Khlebnikov, who is in charge of the "border condition" in relations between the Russian enclave and the Baltic States, this problem is a headache.

"Everything began," recalls Y. Vladimirovich, "with the Lithuanian Government resolution No. 660 of 27 August 1993 'On the Introduction of Visas for Citizens of the CIS, the Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova'.... Its two articles are of particular interest to the concerned people, including the inhabitants of our oblast. First: When entering Lithuania as of 1 October, citizens of the aforementioned states must have valid passports; that is, foreign passports. Second: Until 1

November of this year, citizens of the Russian Federation—permanent residents of Kaliningrad Oblast—can enter the Republic of Lithuania without visas on domestic passports bearing a notation of their residence. Everything seemed smooth on paper, while in practice problems have not been reduced, but vice versa. For example, what about mutual visits of the oblast and Lithuanian inhabitants to one another? What about civilian, railway, and car transit?"

[Golovin] One more question: What about those who not only live but also serve in the oblast, and who have no notation of residence, because they are not supposed to have it?

[Khlebnikov] Alongside other issues, this problem was put forward by the Russian delegation which also included our representatives for negotiations with the Lithuanian delegation. The talks began immediately after this resolution had been issued. The first round of talks with the participation of the oblast delegation took place on 9 September in Vilnius. Another round was held on the level of the Foreign Ministry representatives on 16 September in Moscow.

The approach of the Lithuanian side toward the problems of our oblast was rather loyal. Lithuania stated that the oblast inhabitants would enjoy the privilege of a visa-free entry into or transit through it not only until 1 November but also until the end of this year—even before the signing of agreements. The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry went quite far on the issue of Russian citizens' transit through Lithuania to our oblast. Its officials proposed the following: A reduction of train stops on Lithuanian territory to a minimum, and the application of border and customs control only for passengers who are disembarking. By the way, this option also met our hopes....

[Golovin] Was all this embodied in documents?

[Khlebnikov] No, it was not. No one could sign anything, because this was not a government delegation. The first round of talks in Vilnius was only to become familiar with the problems....

[Golovin] What about the Moscow round?

[Khlebnikov] Due to a lack of organization at our Foreign Ministry, our oblast delegation was late for this round. One official from the Oblast Administration arrived in Moscow by accident. He participated in the negotiations at our request. Therefore, the talks did not address the respective interests of the oblast, although Lithuania presented some options of its own.

[Golovin] However, there was one more round....

[Khlebnikov] Yes, and it was very imposing. On 6 September in Vilnius, the oblast delegation met and negotiated with a group including the Lithuanian prime minister, and the heads of the Foreign, the National Defense, and the Trade and Industry Ministries. Our goal was to obtain some guarantees that the inhabitants of our oblast will have no obstacles in entering or crossing Lithuania. The Lithuanian prime minister gave us only verbal guarantees. No definite mechanism was worked out then.

[Golovin] This must have been done in the last round of negotiations that took place on 14-15 October in Vilnius, including the issue of servicemen.

[Khlebnikov] The answer is both yes and no. We raised this question. According to the director of the Consular Department at the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, Lithuania has only about 200 families of Russian servicemen. Since almost all of them have foreign passports, this matter is considered closed.

Considering the military transit, the condition remains the same—servicemen need foreign passports (service passports—"the blue ones"—would be acceptable). Those who serve in our oblast and want to go to Lithuania probably need some document from their housing and communal services proving their place of residence in addition to their identity cards.

[Golovin] What was the result of the last round of talks?

[Khlebnikov] Considering the time constraint—we had only two days—the parties coordinated the "Provisional Rules of Mutual Travels of Citizens of the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation." In addition to the issues included in the aforementioned resolution No. 660, these rules also touch upon certain new aspects.

Regarding all Russian citizens entering Lithuania, an invitation certified by services of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry Migration Department will be equalled to a visa until 1 June 1994.

Permanent residents of our oblast will be temporarily able to visit Lithuania for a 30-day period without visas on domestic Russian passports bearing a notation of residence.

Regarding railway transit, we have coordinated two destinations where passengers (excluding those who are disembarking) will be exempt from the border and customs control. These are the Moscow (Kena-Vilnius-Kaunas-Kybartai) and St. Petersburg (Turmantas- Vilnius-Kaunas-Kybartai) destinations.

The situation in car transit remains the same—all drivers and passengers need foreign passports. Lithuania may introduce transit visas for them on 1 November.

[Golovin] Who signed these old-new "Provisional Rules..."?

[Khlebnikov] No one. Formally, they will come into force after the two Foreign Ministries exchange relevant notes. For now, we are intensively coordinating them with our various institutions, including the railway.

[Golovin] Let us summarize. Is the border condition still "borderlike," that is, unpredictable today? Is it not

secured by anything except the well-known resolution, verbal agreements, and wishes?

[Khlebnikov] Unfortunately, that is the case. The competence of the participants in the last round of negotiations was insufficient for signing anything. Deplorably, the position of the oblast on all these issues differs not only from that of Vilnius but also from Moscow's stand....

Instead of a postscript: When this interview was already prepared for the press, the Baltic Fleet commander received a letter from Lithuanian Defense Minister A. Butkevicius. It was dated 10 October and contained several "additional" responses to the questions put to our interlocutor.

I am quoting: "As of 1 November 1993, foreign citizens and stateless persons are allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of Lithuania for the purpose of visiting their families or taking their property only on valid foreign passports. Beginning with 1 November 1993, the entry of the aforementioned category of persons will be permitted only with visas or respective invitations. Visas to these persons can be issued at border crossings as an exception by permission of the National Defense Ministry. Invitations (visa equivalents) will be issued at police migration services according to the families' place of residence."

The letter does not mention the citizens (including servicemen) of the Russian Federation residing in Kaliningrad Oblast.

Does the border condition remain borderlike?

Kozyrev States Conditions for Baltic Troop Withdrawal

LD0411110593 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 0435 GMT 4 Nov 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" Program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] According to Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries can be accelerated. We would like to remind you that the Baltic states where Russian troops still remain, Latvia and Estonia, are speaking of concluding the withdrawal within two months. Kozyrev did not mention any deadlines, but he stressed that guarantees of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in these countries and the provision of the servicemen in Russia with accommodation are the conditions for the withdrawal.

Kozyrev Favors Economic Cooperation With Eastern Europe

LD0311150493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1358 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Russia's diplomatic efforts, aimed at developing relations with central and east European countries will "take us nowhere", if they are not supported by economic cooperation with those countries, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev believes. He spoke today at a session of the Foreign Policy council at the Russian Foreign ministry.

In his opinion, Russia is obviously failing to use to the full the favourable conditions, that have taken shape on a political level. Moreover, he is positive that there is objective interest in countries of that region in the restoration of economic relations with Russia.

Kozyrev outlined the main directions of activities in that sphere. These include, in the first place, the implementation of the existing bilateral agreements, the quest for new forms of business cooperation, the use of potentialities of the "tripartite" cooperation between western Europe, eastern Europe and Russia (with the participation of other CIS member states). He stressed that it should be equitable partnership, and not "an attempt to resolve one's own problems at out expense by getting money from the west and selling to Russia the goods that it does not need."

Speaking about cooperation, Kozyrev pointed to the need for encouraging and finding new forms on the level of Russian regions, including through regional structures created with Russia's participation, for example, the organization for cooperation of countries of the Baltic and Black Sea basins.

Shokhin Warns Russia May Default on Payments to London Club

LD0311173893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1632 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent Oleg Deyneko]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Nov—Unless the consultative committee of banks, which is seeking to deny the Russian Federation [RF] sovereign immunity, changes its stance, Russia will refuse to make payments on what it owes to the London Club, Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy prime minister in the RF Government, told a news conference today.

The refusal of the Russian delegation to attend the meeting of the banks' consultative committee in Frankfurt-am-Main on 3-4 November is an indication that his statement is seriously meant. As we know, Russia is supposed to pay the London Club $500 million by the end of the year.

Aleksandr Shokhin said further that Kazakhstan saw the introduction of its own national currency as being more in line with its interests than the other options proposed by Russia at talks on bringing the monetary systems closer together.

Aleksandr Shokhin stressed that Kazakhstan's introduction of a national currency will not preclude future work on preparing the monetary systems for a merger in the

future. Russia will assist Kazakhstan in its transition to its own currency and give preferential credits. It has been decided to speed up talks on creating a zone of free trade and customs union between Russia and Kazakhstan.

Also, the deputy prime minister said that with Belarus, which has a transitional currency, Russia is trying out a "classical" model of merging monetary systems.

Germany To Resume Providing Credits 'This Year'

LD0311210893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2054 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennady Kulbitsky]

[Text] Bonn November 3 TASS—The Government of Federal Germany intends to resume this year the provision of guarantees of credits extended to Russia to pay for the purchase of goods in this country, a spokeswoman for the Federal Economy Ministry announced today.

Negotiations are now underway with the Federal Finance Ministry on the allocation of three to four billion marks for the purpose next year. The negotiations concern not only Russia but also other commonwealth countries.

Ten percent of this amount can be provided ahead of schedule, already this year, to enterprises located in Germany's new (eastern) states which are developing trade with Russia, the spokeswoman said.

Bonn had decided to halt credit guarantees on goods to Russia last summer fearing high risks associated with further crediting of the Russian economy, according to Minister Guenter Rexrodt. Other reasons for the move were Germany's own financial difficulties and the delay of Russian's payment of interest on earlier credits.

An agreement on rescheduling Russia's and the former Soviet Union's foreign debt signed in Bonn at the end of September played a great role in unfettering the further development of relations between the two countries. After the signing of the agreement Russia paid back part of the debt (500 million marks) and pledged to keep repaying the rest at regular intervals. The move was acclaimed in the Bonn government circles.

More, Bonn has come to believe that the present stabilization of the political and economic situation in Russia is here to stay.

Country Urged To Review Foreign, Security Policy Objectives

MK0311124093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 2

[Sergey Babusenko report under the "Diplomacy" rubric: "There Is Something To Think About. Rational and National Elements in Russia's Foreign Policy"]

[Text] The Foreign Policy Council of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry will begin its deliberations today. Changes that we have been witnessing recently in the world, particularly on the European continent, have brought about new military strategic and geopolitical realities. Moscow, which in many instances had initiated these processes, is facing the need to review drastically not only its national interests, at least because Russia's geographical boundaries have now been determined more specifically, but also its place and role in a new political and geographical landscape. The latter has admittedly been changing so fast that there is actually something to think about. For instance, how will the redrawing of the subregion's geographical map affect Russia's security? At the same time, a snowball of problems, including, first of all, unspecified borders, political instability in a number of neighboring countries, and the presence of Russian-speaking minorities in some of the newly independent states, make it essential to chart a course out of the maelstrom as soon as possible. Otherwise, these problems will acquire international dimensions, and Moscow will inevitably be involved in their settlement.

Clearly, processes under way in the region should be not only comprehended, but also, if possible, channeled in accordance with Russia's interests. Alas, for the time being this cannot be achieved always and everywhere. At the same time, the prudence of the Foreign Ministry on Smolenskaya Square is only understandable. In a sensitive matter of acquiring appropriate clout in the region—while it is being restrained by the risk of appearing to be pursuing "imperial interests"—not all means will be justified.

Russia has already felt the vector of the Central and Eastern European countries' drive toward the West. Striving is one thing, however, but eliciting a corresponding wish from the continent's western part is quite another. Evidently, the process of integration is slowing down, and Russia could and should benefit from this as much as possible. A chain encompassing West Europe, Central and East Europe, and Russia is not only a necessary precondition for achieving stability in the region, but also a path toward removing "the regionalist syndrome" from the future political palette, a syndrome that has manifested itself among East Europeans (the Vysegrad Group of Four, the Carpathian Euroregion) and threatens to bring to life conflicting groups, mutual barriers, and mechanisms of economic and political dumping.

Correction to Item on Offer To Join NATO

PM0311154993

The following correction pertains to the item subheaded "Offer To Join NATO Viewed" published on page 6 of the 25 October Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT in the Russia International Affairs section.

page six, column one, article three, make sourceline read: Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Oct First Edition pp 1,3 (changing "ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA" to "IZVESTIYA")

Political Issues

Government, Federation Leaders Discuss New Constitution

Yeltsin Addresses Meeting

LD0311150393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1353 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 3 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin made an opening speech at today's meeting with the leaders of the component parts of the Russian Federation. The president's press service has issued the text of the speech:

"Esteemed leaders of the component parts of the federation, our conference today has a special significance.

"The work on the draft of a new Russian constitution has been going on for three years now. We have all taken some part in this work and we know how difficult and even dramatic it has been.

"It is not just a matter of political storms. Sometimes more harm was done by excessive concentration on routine work, by endless coordination, by the desire to take into account all nuances and shades of opinions without exception. And every time the sense of proportion failed, the draft got worse.

"And still we managed to avoid drowning the draft in endless discussions and debates. Now the text is ready. Today I can say with confidence that most of those provisions that caused fundamental differences of opinion have on the whole been agreed.

"At the same time there are issues that I think have to be submitted for your examination. Our task today is to find solutions. And on 10 November the draft will be published. This will be a month in advance of the referendum, as required.

"We have used up all the time allotted for working on the draft.

"The first issue that is currently causing arguments and disagreements is whether ministers and vice premiers should have the right to work at the Federal Assembly.

"I could formulate an even broader question, so that it covers leaders of executive authorities in the republics and regions of Russia.

"I don't think there is any point in citing the arguments of the supporters and opponents of such an arrangement. They are well known. New 'pros' and 'cons' could be cited ad infinitum. What is needed now is a decision and I ask you to adopt it. My opinion is that they should be allowed for the first term of office.

"Second. The problem of equality of the subjects of the federation.

"It has come about that the republics today have much greater rights than krays and oblasts. Federalism has, as it were, so far affected only our republics, whereas the remaining components of the federation still live in a unitary state.

"This can be explained. The republics were the first to breach false federalism and the first to lay the path to true autonomy. Now, krays and oblasts have embarked on this path.

"One way or another, we will in practical terms arrive at equality of all components of the federation. This is a requirement of the times. Moreover, I am convinced that sooner or later this principle will be written into the constitution.

"You must make up your minds. I am in favor of the text as it exists in this draft.

"Third. This is an issue related to the previous one. The working bodies of the Constitutional Conference recommend that the words sovereignty and sovereign state be removed from the text of the constitution.

"There are weighty arguments: recognition of any region's status of sovereignty signifies a confederative rather than federative state structure. In particular, this also presupposes the right of secession from the confederation at any time.

"This threat is of concern to our citizens and makes the whole process of making the country a federation suspect.

"The president of the Russian Federation is the guarantor of its integrity. I support the right of nations to self-determination but I have to make one reservation, that this excludes the right to secession from Russia.

"I hope that republican and regional leaders are also in favor of a powerful democratic state - an integral Russian Federation, single Russia, namely for the sovereignty of the whole of Russia.

"In submitting a new draft constitution to the referendum, we must adopt a clear and unambiguous stance on this issue..

"Finally, the fourth question which we must resolve - whether or not to include the text of the Federative Treaty in the constitution. May I stress here that the question is not in whether the Federative Treaty as such will exist or not. Its existence is not in doubt. The problem lies in something else - whether it has an independent legal significance and its main principled points are included in the constitution, or its entire text becomes a part of the constitution.

"I am looking forward to your views on these four problems."

Yeltsin Comments on Constitutional Court

LD0311160293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1521 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Anna Melnikov and Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—The overwhelming majority of the participants in a meeting of heads of Russian constituent republics and regions held by President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on Wednesday [3 November] approved the draft new constitution.

Summing up the results of the two-hour meeting, Yeltsin said the federative treaty will not be included in the constitution and will remain as a separate document. These are two basic documents of Russia's statehood. Both of them will be working documents, he said.

The president supported the proposal to reelect the members of the Russian Constitutional Court. Those judges who worked honestly may be reelected again, he added. He suggested dropping from the constitution a provision stipulating that the Constitutional Court judges cannot be replaced. He called for setting up a working group which will include two lawyers, two representatives from each constituent republic and as many from regional administrations, the heads of the both chambers of the Russian constitutional assembly and Vice-Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray. The group will finalise the draft, taking into account the new proposals.

"If they do not come to an agreement tomorrow, the decision will be adopted by the president," Yeltsin stressed, adding that the draft constitution should be published in all newspapers on November 10.

Presidential Administration Head Sergey Filatov told journalists after the meeting that the working group will discuss only one question—on relations between the members of the federation. The group also includes the Presidents of Karelia Viktor Stepanov and of Sakha-Yakutia Mikhail Nikolayev, as well as Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and head of the Leningrad Regional Administration Aleksandr Belyakov.

Constitution 'Basically Approved'

LD0311214593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The text of Russia's draft new constitution was basically approved today at Boris Yeltsin's meeting with leaders of components of the federation. Summing up the discussion, the president spoke in favor of the principle of electing the Federation Council and the Federal Assembly, rejecting official appointment to it. He also emphasized that the Federation Treaty had to remain a separate document alongside the constitution.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Sergey Suntsov] The leaders of the republics came to Moscow with the firm intention of championing their right to sovereignty. They proceeded from the view that the president still had time to heed the opinion of the leadership of the republics.

The viewpoints of the working group preparing the draft constitution headed by Sergey Filatov and of the leaders of the republics diverged fundamentally. Tatar President Mintimer Shaymiyev:

[Shaymiyev] When the question is posed, or rather, when doubt is cast on the republics' sovereignty, that gives rise to my attitude to the draft constitution. The Russian Federation must consist of sovereign republics, not components.

[Suntsov] Sergey Filatov, the group's leader:

[Filatov] Strictly speaking, sovereignty of the republics within the Russian Federation means the creation of a confederation and the (?collapse) of the federation.

[Suntsov] Addressing those present at the meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stressed: The draft constitution is ready. It should be published on 10 November—in other words, exactly a month before the referendum. All controversial matters should be resolved at the meeting. The Russian president highlighted four groups of questions on which a common position had to be worked out: combining work in the executive and legislative branches of power; the Federation Treaty; the equality of the components of the federation; and, of course, the sovereignty of the republics. Turning to that acute matter, Boris Yeltsin said:

[Yeltsin] The president of the Russian Federation is the guarantor of its integrity. I support a nation's right to self-determination, but I must make one reservation: the exception of the right to secede from Russia. [audience interrupts] What? Are we just playing about? Do you understand? While submitting the draft new constitution to a referendum, we must adopt a clear and unambiguous position on this question.

[Suntsov] During the meeting it proved possible to agree on all matters except the problem of the republics' sovereignty. Working groups were set up to coordinate positions. If that turns out to be impossible, the Russian president has the last word.

Sergey Shakhray, a member of the commission, thinks that Russia needs time to achieve genuine democratic federalism.

[Shakhray] It is hopeless to resolve that problem by an attempt at voting, by the raising of hands or by force. We must reconcile ourselves to a lengthy period of the grinding-in of these two different systems of national-state structure. [end recording]

Chernomyrdin Comments

LD0411112693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0900 GMT 4 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Kalinovskiy] The working group set up today during the conference between President Yeltsin and leaders of the Russian Federation's subjects is to find agreement on one single issue: the correlation between the rights of the Federation's subjects. As is known, the new draft Russian Constitution was approved in general at the conference and will be published in the press on 10 November, a month before the referendum. If the working group fails to find consensus on republican sovereignties, the Russian president will have the final say.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent N. Chernyshova] What did the government and the president feel when they encountered such disagreement at yesterday's meeting with the Federation's subjects and lack of a unified approach?

[Chernomyrdin] I don't think this was unexpected either for the president or for ourselves. We knew about their mood and the position of each of them. So the issue has been agreed, on the whole, almost in the version that was presented. Well, at least everybody has a clear picture. It would be undesirable that someone reserves an individual opinion or wish. After all, we are speaking about Russia's Constitution. A constitution cannot be expected to emerge easily.

[Chernyshova] So what is the upshot, a federation or a confederation?

[Chernomyrdin] A federation, only a federation. I think that Russia deserves more than becoming a confederation. We are convinced that it is easier for Russia to survive and rise to its feet as a federation, when we are all a single family. [end recording]

[Kalinovskiy] Viktor Chernomyrdin gave this interview to our correspondent before leaving on official visits to Denmark and Austria.

Further on 2 Nov Council of Ministers Meeting

Chernomyrdin Addresses Session

PM0411130393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 4 Nov 93 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report on Premier Chernomyrdin speech to 2 November Russian Federation Council of Ministers session: "Viktor Chernomyrdin: Economic Transformations Plus Strengthening of Statehood Is Formula for Government's Actions"]

[Text] Highlighting the main points of the Council of Ministers' work in the period since the previous enlarged session, the head of the government stressed that the government action program for 1993-1995, approved and supported by the president, which was adopted at that session fully retains its importance. The mechanism for implementing its first stage is being elaborated and has already been launched. Over this period of less than three months a great deal has changed, and changed radically, in this country. The president's edict has dissolved the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Dyarchy, which had threatened day by day to undermine and break down Russian statehood, has been ended. Elections to the Federal Assembly are scheduled for 11-12 December. The process of adopting the country's new constitution has been accelerated.

It is dangerous to have irresponsible politicians in any state, the prime minister stressed. All the more so in Russia—as the events of 3-4 October showed. On the eve of the new elections it is particularly important to remember that.

The abrupt turnaround in the country's political life has fundamentally changed the conditions under which the Council of Ministers operates and has made a number of major amendments to the nature and methods of its work.

First. The executive and the government have gained **new responsibility** for everything that takes place in Russia. We now need to take on many of the functions of the former soviets before the election of the Federal Assembly and local representative organs of power.

Second. **New opportunities** have opened up for the development of democracy, the achievement of civic harmony, the further reform of the Russian economy, and the strengthening of statehood. The government has a duty to consistently implement the reform course elaborated in accordance with the president's instructions and not to stray from that course for the sake of the irresponsible promises which certain politicians are so generously making during these weeks in the run-up to the election.

Third. The firm political will of the country's leaders is turning into an effective factor for stabilizing society. **Both the president and the government are united in their program goals and aims. Russia has clear prospects for development.**

The prime minister expressed his concern about the manifestations of party differences [mnogopartiynost] within the government, where different electoral blocs and movements are now represented. He proposed to his colleagues that political rivalry dictated by the election campaign should remain outside of the government. Russia's interests and those of its people require coordinated work.

Viktor Chernomyrdin formulated as follows the government's task for the forthcoming period (both before the elections and after them in collaboration with the future Federal Assembly)—not only to further advance economic transformations but to help the president through

its everyday work to recreate the institutions of state, relying on the norms of the new constitution. The head of the government sees this formula as expressing the main purport and the main content of the government's role in reviving the country.

In order to get a clearer idea of where we are headed, we need to understand where we are. Describing the position of the Russian economy, Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed that it is in a state of unstable equilibrium. GDP over the past three quarters has been 11 percent down on the same period of 1992, industrial production is 16.5 percent down, and capital investment is 7 percent down. Negative trends have persisted in the financial sphere too. We have been unable to halt inflation, which, following its "record" 30-percent rise in August, fell in September to 21 percent, and, by current estimates, will also be around 20 percent in October. But it is very noticeable that the dynamics of the average weekly inflation indices are falling—they were 5.3 percent in August, 4.9 percent in September, and 4.5 percent in October (and this despite the liberalization of bakery product prices). The rate of decline in gross output in the food complex and in agriculture as a whole has been halted. It will not exceed 5 percent in 1993 (having been 9 percent in 1992). The grain harvest (dressed weight [v vese posle dorabotki]) will be around 102-103 million tonnes. Some 2 million tonnes more grain than was the case last year has already been purchased in Russia as a whole and laid in for state stocks.

The government believes that there is no reason to overdramatize the situation—as some "experts" from certain political parties, foundations, and social movements are so wont to do. The economy will not collapse. The Russian economy has clearly defined market outlines, and those outlines are proving far firmer than any of us had expected.

The head of the government concluded that the new market system in Russia has become a reality. And millions of our citizens are living and working in that reality. But this means, first, that we are all living largely in a different country, and, second, that the market system which we are creating and will be developing is the main factor in stabilization.

Problems relating to the population's living standard are of particular social importance. According to the premier, certain trends toward stabilization are evident here.

Talking about the new aspects of the current government's work **—the priorities and mechanisms of economic and social policy—** Viktor Chernomyrdin highlighted the **provision of financial stability.** The Finance Ministry has now virtually completed its clarification of the Russian Federation budget figures for the fourth quarter and for 1993 as a whole. This has been done on the basis of a detailed examination of budget relations with the regions and the indexation of budget revenue and expenditure. The federal budget deficit for the fourth quarter of 1993 is being set at 5.5 trillion rubles [R] and at R17.0 trillion for the year as a whole—or 10 percent of GDP. A tough self-imposed limitation has been laid down—the budget deficit covered by Central Bank of Russia lending should not exceed R4.66 trillion in the fourth quarter. The rest of the deficit will be covered by the issue of state securities. If the outlined financial stabilization measures prove feasible, we can hope that there will be no new sharp surge in the money supply before the end of the year.

The government is deliberately further reducing state spending and repealing previous decisions to increase spending in the budget system unless such spending is backed by actual sources of funding.

At the same time, a range of coordinated measures to protect the ruble and prevent any sharp swings in its rate has begun to be implemented. With a view to "squeezing" the money supply, the government has begun to abandon soft loans and budget subsidies for them. The raising (as of October 1993) of the Central Bank discount rate (to 210 percent per annum) will also work in this direction. Control over the issue of centralized credit resources is being stepped up—this will be entrusted to the Government Commission for Credit Policy. Around 80 percent of these resources are currently distributed via the commission.

Talking about financial policy, Viktor Chernomyrdin touched on an issue which, as he put it, has become a subject of unscrupulous speculation. This is a reference to recent loans to agriculture. Their allocation to the Roskhleboprodukt [Russian Grain Products Corporation] and the processing industry does not indicate any change in the government's financial policy. Judge for yourselves. More than R1 trillion has been lent at 210 percent interest—in other words, by no means at the Central Bank's preferential rate. These funds are intended to pay off the state's debts for output already delivered by the peasants and to complete necessary purchases of grain and oil seeds.

The health of the budget will be improved by radically reducing centralized imports and eliminating import subsidies.

Over the past few weeks the government has been working intensively on budget reform, which it is planned to implement in 1994. The main thing here is to separate the federal and regional budgets. It is proposed that we proceed on the basis of stable normatives for distributing taxes such as personal income tax, excise duties, value-added tax, and a number of others. The rate of enterprise profits tax included in regional budgets will be set by legislative acts issued by the Federation components. They will also set additional local taxes and duties.

An innovation in the budget reform is the **transition from a unitary to a federal budget system.** Within this framework "strong" regions (on the basis of unified normatives for the division of taxes) will be able to enact

full-fledged budgets. The stream of requests and demands to the center will be correspondingly reduced. We will keep total subsidies at the 1993 level for certain regions whose budgets get a high proportion of payments from republic coffers. On the one hand, they will have to learn to live according to their means. On the other hand, they will have to seek ways to form reliable local sources of income. The transition to the new budget system is also designed to ease the tension in regard to the attempts to establish without prior arrangement a so-called single-channel system for the regions to remit their taxes. Sensible solutions have now been found with Tataria, Bashkortostan, Sakha-Yakutia, and a number of other regions. It is our job to strive to ensure that they are fulfilled by all parties. The government does have the potential to do this. This potential is defined by the presidential edict "On Measures To Observe the Russian Federation Legislation on the Budget System."

In regulating the monetary and credit sphere the government forms a united front with the Central Bank of Russia. It is planned to reduce the monthly inflation rate to 15-17 percent by the new year, to 10 percent by the end of the first quarter, and to 5 percent by December 1994.

Questions of improving the **system of settlements in the national economy** have had an important place in the government's everyday activity of late. The president has signed a corresponding edict. This edict envisages the expedited introduction of bills of exchange (financial and commercial bills). This is a decisive step away from talk about concepts of "solving" the nonpayment problem toward an effective system of settlements and the organization of payments.

One of the most important areas of the government's activity is the implementation of **privatization.** It can already be said that this process has become irreversible. Some 81,000 of our 267,000 state and municipal enterprises have been privatized, and 58,700 of these are in the small business sphere. Popular privatization is developing quite dynamically. Almost 38 million checks have currently been returned to the state. Of these, 14 million were by closed subscription, and 24 million by check auction. Over the past year 8,200 of the 13,900 enterprises on the state register for compulsory flotation have been privatized.

Yet in many cases this form of privatization, as the premier put it, has, regrettably, been formal in nature. A considerable proportion of privatized enterprises have not yet really gotten involved in work and have failed to embrace market relations. I am sure that life will force them to and teach them how to get by. There is no way back, we must find the strength and ability to adapt to new conditions and move ahead. Everyone has a great many questions about privatization. The forthcoming discussion of the Russian State Committee for the Management of State Property proposals under the draft State Privatization Program will help to answer them. This document should be coordinated with Federation components and submitted to the government by 1 December this year.

The "axes" around which the program is based are to increase the volume of privatizations by way of property checks and to ensure state control over the activity of enterprises and installations carrying out state [obshchegosudarstvennyy] tasks. This is a differentiated approach to privatization—in other words, there will be fuller consideration than there was in the past for regional and sector features, moving the "center of gravity" of privatization to the regions. And, finally, consideration will be given to environmental factors.

The **work to reform the agrarian sphere** is of great importance. It is no exaggeration to say that historic steps have been taken in this direction over the past few days. The presidential edict "On the Regulation of Land Relations and the Development of Agrarian Reform in Russia" opens a new chapter in our history. Henceforth the state guarantees the protection and inviolability of private land ownership. Citizens and corporate bodies owning tracts of land will be entitled to sell them, inherit them, give them away, mortgage them, lease them, and so forth. Under the edict, we will finally, as of 1994, abandon the legacy of compulsory grain requisitioning—mandatory targets for the delivery of agricultural produce to the state. Rural commodity producers will thereby be given a free hand and the potential for exporting agricultural produce will increase. At the same time, the sections of the edict devoted to the transformation of kolkhoz and sovkhoz property do not even hint at forcible action or a new "reverse collectivization." The edict allows for agricultural enterprises of all forms of ownership to make a smooth transition to the marketplace.

The elaboration of the edict was not easy, it generated a sharp clash of opinions. Practice will show the timeliness and necessity of this decision by the president. And the decision has been greeted hopefully by the peasantry—above all, the private farmers, who are still working under extremely difficult conditions. The legal base for agrarian reform clearly lags behind the demands of life, and, evidently, new steps in transforming agrarian relations are urgently needed.

The government is actively "taking stock," reviewing already adopted **federal programs,** and amending the priorities of its **selective [selektivnyy] structural policy.** We are now obliged to provide real money and reliable sources of funding for all programs. Otherwise we will merely exacerbate expectations which we will be unable to justify. Allowing this to happen would mean making savings by deceiving people.

Problems in the **social sphere** are constantly at the forefront of the government's mind. Funds have been found to support science. The salary backlog owed to workers in the budget-funded sphere has been reduced. In connection with the deregulation of bread prices,

advance compensation payments are being made to the less well-off. The other day the president signed an edict on compensation payments to pensioners in connection with the increase in the cost of living.

On the government's recommendation the Russian Savings Bank raised the interest rates payable on the population's accounts by one-third. I am sure that this will significantly help to protect citizen's hard-earned savings against inflation.

The main provisions of the government's social policy will be clearly set out in the Declaration. The Declaration will be reinforced by a whole set of presidential edicts and Council of Ministers decrees. The basic guideline for the implementation of social programs will be such indicators as the subsistence minimum.

In the sphere of **policy toward the incomes** of the population this will mean first of all linking the minimum wage and pensions to the subsistence minimum. We shall use that calculation when determining grants for the needy. Aid will become more targeted. It will be organized in response to applications from the most needy citizens.

According to the government's estimates next year may be critical in the sphere of employment. "Concealed" unemployment is already in the range of 7-10 million right now. The structural reorganization of the national economy—and this is inevitable—makes this the main problem. For the government this means drafting a set of measures to provide social support for people in regions of mass lay-offs, providing incentives for the creation of new jobs, retraining opportunities, and so forth.

On the whole everything that the Council of Ministers has done in recent months and is doing today fits one way or another into the government's Program for the Development of the Reforms and the Stabilization of the Russian Economy. The government's work plan for 1993-1994 presented for discussion today forms the basis of the mechanism for implementing stage one of the program. The rapidly changing situation in the economy and in society as a whole has made it possible and necessary to include some addenda to the Program in the work plan, accelerate the implementation of some measures, and postpone others, which is perfectly normal.

The results of the development of the Russian economy for the first three quarters of 1993 show that the reform has already passed the important and surely the most difficult stage. The more than 18 months of strenuous work have created all the preconditions for achieving a decisive breakthrough in the sphere of financial stabilization, controlling inflation, and halting and reversing the slump in production and investments. There are qualitatively new problems ahead: The structural reorganization of the Russian economy, the modernization or eradication of inefficient production units and loss-making capacities, and the possible growth of unemployment.

The political conditions have been created in the country now for giving an additional impetus to the reforms and thus implementing them in a more organized way. The time for "shock therapy" is over and we have no scope for drastic movements. The room for maneuver is extremely narrow and this factor must be taken into account by any government. Only systematic, stable, and consistent work in all areas of the economic reform can have a really tangible effect.

The government's efforts to improve the economy and implement the reform are inseparable from the building of a **new statehood.** The solution of urgent political and state problems is an essential condition and indeed a precondition of the formation of a new economy because restrictions are being removed, as is the brake inherent in the very structure and nature of the old authorities which have been hindering healthy and natural economic development.

Which questions are paramount here? First and foremost the problems of Russia's development as a federative state and the mutual relations between the federal authorities and the regions. Second, the transformation of the whole system of local self-government in Russia during the phased constitutional reform. Third, the necessary changes to the structure and methods of work of the executive, including its power structures. Fourth, the creation of the legislative and legal basis of the reformed economy. Fifth and finally, the formation of a full-fledged representative branch and the preparation and holding of the elections to the Federal Assembly.

I would like to talk in particular about the relationship between the federal government and the **regions.** This is surely one of the "hottest" topics today, especially in the political and economic spheres.

The government and the federal authorities must not have "favorites" or "scapegoats" in their relations with the regions. And consequently we will unswervingly observe the constitutional principle of the equality of the components of the Federation and respect your sovereign rights, including in the socioeconomic sphere. Clearly this "model" of relations must be enshrined in the corresponding normative acts which develop and augment the future Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The successful implementation of the government's regional policy is largely connected with the pooling of the efforts of all the components of the Federation. The rules of conduct in the single economic area must be elaborated and observed, and artificial barriers and restrictions on free enterprise must be scrapped. The strengthening of economic federalism is one of the main problems facing Russia today. We are creating an efficient mechanism for the transfer of powers from the federal level to the regional and ensuring the real equality of the components of the Federation in the economic sphere.

Many of the problems existing here must be clarified by the Federal Assembly and reflected in the new Constitution. However, the government is already stepping up cooperation with the regions on a whole range of questions of collaboration right now, including in drafting the 1994 budget, the structural reorganization of the economy, and so forth. In accordance with the president's edict of 26 October, measures are being adopted to provide guarantees for real local government.

Leaders of the executive at local level must understand: The whole burden of responsibility rests on you now. While the qualitatively new organs of local self-government are being formed there is virtually no one to share this responsibility with. Apart from the federal authorities and the government, of course.

There must be major changes to the executive not only at local level, of course, but here in the capital, too. The government's work must become more purposeful, and all its structures—ministries, departments, and the Council of Ministers apparatus—must work as a well-oiled mechanism. This, of course, will require definite structural improvements and the clarification of the functions of this or that tier, especially the Economy Ministry, and a number of sector state committees.

The bulk of this work, of course, will have to be done next year, when the Federal Assembly begins to operate. But proposals on these problems must be prepared right now. The task, one whose significance cannot be overestimated, is to give the public fuller information on the work of the government and on what the reform means to every Russian. The most important role in the solution of this task belongs to the mass media. But we must understand that the days of "the quota system" and of "priming" the press have gone forever. The fourth estate demands respect.

The government considers this demand to be just. It supports an active, open, equitable, and critical dialogue with journalists and with all the mass media. A dialogue which would help to activate the process of the reforms.

A special mention must also be made of the activity of the **power ministries**. The Russian Armed Forces today are entering a qualitatively new period in their development. The Russian Federation Military Doctrine has been prepared for the president's ratification. It reflects the questions of the protection of a broad range of vitally important interests of society and the state. The Army's future is a problem closely linked with the economy. It is of fundamental importance that the military doctrine makes it possible to elaborate and implement long-term programs for the production of arms and equipment and form a state order for defense which is especially relevant to enterprises that have undergone conversion. The government is taking specific steps to resolve a problem of paramount importance for the Armed Forces—stepping up the social protection of servicemen and members of their families.

There are also major problems in the sphere of **strengthening law and order** and the fight against crime. A number of changes are needed to the existing legislation, specifically with regard to new types of offenses and especially in the economic sphere. Of course, it is necessary to strengthen the material and manpower base of the fight against crime.

In foreign economic activity the strategic goal remains Russia's full-scale integration into the world economy.

Speaking about policy with regard to "neighboring foreign countries," Viktor Chernomyrdin assessed as an historic event the signing of the treaty on the establishment of the Economic Union of CIS States. Its aim is the formation of conditions for the stable development of our countries' economies and the phased creation of a common economic space within whose framework goods, services, capital, and manpower will circulate freely.

The specific feature of the government's work before the end of 1993 is to prepare a decisve change in the formation of **the legislative basis of the market economy**, which is proceeding extremely slowly at the moment. Recently an important step was taken in that direction: The Government Presidium largely approved the draft main section of the Russian Federation Civil Code, which determines the basic principles of economic activity. The experience gained in recent years shows that the laws on property and on enterprise and entrepreneurial activity need immediate amendments and additions. The norms of those laws are contradictory and out of date, and act as a brake on the economy.

When engaging in legislative activity today we are essentially working with an eye to the future Federal Assembly and laying the foundations for its legislative work. At the same time we could considerably accelerate the introduction of progressive legal norms in our economic practice by introducing some of them via presidential edicts and government decrees.

The premier warned against an obsession with legislation. For example, at the Ministry of Fuel and Energy they are preparing 15 laws simultaneously: separate laws on oil, gas, coal, peat, energy supply and energy saving, a law on energy policy, and so forth.

The government is not going to make a decision on the necessity of adopting a given act simply because it has a fine-sounding title. The Justice Ministry has been instructed to define its position on how we are to shape our future work in providing normative backup for the reforms. There must be a **program** of legislative work, not just periodical discussions on urgent measures.

This also applies to the government's own norm-creating activity. The Council of Ministers receives an endless stream of all manner of proposals and drafts without any estimates or feasibility studies, without being coordinated with anyone or anything, and without the knowledge of ministers or heads of administrations. Apart from those who are supposed to work on them it is also

the case that deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers are also beginning to prepare them, and this means that they have no time for long-term work. Then some authors of these papers take offense when the apparatus holds up a given draft. But this is because the documents have been compiled any way people see fit.

As for the fate of the government's plan of measures approved on 23 February this year, the premier noted that out of the more than 100 measures envisaged one-fifth have already been excluded on the suggestion of the same ministries which submitted them because it turns out they do not require a Council of Ministers decision or were completely unnecessary. What kind of action program is this?

The premier expressed his concern at the party differences [mnogopartiynost] which have emerged within the government, in which various electoral blocs and movements are represented today. The premier advised his colleagues that political rivalry dictated by the election struggle should remain outside this government. The interests of Russia and its people require cohesive work.

The government's responsibility is also determined by the scale of the tasks which it has to resolve. And those tasks are indeed colossal: After all, we are building a new fatherland, a new Russia. It is vitally important for us today to concretely define and implement our Russian national state interests. And they are being implemented primarily in the form of radical transformations of the economy. There is no alternative to the revival of the country on the basis of the market, modern technologies, and domestic and world experience.

Our national [obshchenatsionalnyy] idea, which may be called the "great Russian dream," is to restore to Russians the status of being a master. We have been talking about this for a long time, repeating those words time and again, but for some reason things have worked out badly in practice. Now there is a reliable foundation for the embodiment of the principle that "everything needs a master"—it is the growing stratum of real property owners and the changing psychology of the Russian worker, who is ceasing to rely on chance or the all-powerful state and is begining to believe in himself and his own strength and ability to work.

Our people must become and are becoming the true masters of Russia's land—a thrifty and dilligent master who is concerned to multiply its wealth and protect its freedom, dignity, and honor. The whole work of the president and the government is aimed toward this, and that is a why we are creating Russia and its statehood anew.

Russia, the Fatherland, the people. Recently we have been hearing these words particularly often. That is understandable. The elections to the Federal Assembly and the referendum on the draft new Russian Constitution are on the agenda. This is far from a run-of-the-mill democratic procedure, this is a test of faith in the future of the reborn Russia for all of us. That is why these sacred concepts of ours must not be treated lightly in the election struggle among the different political forces.

Historical experience shows that in years of trial and in the face of danger the wise and great people of Russia stand firm and become united. That time has now come. It is not the fate of individuals that is being weighed in History's scales right now but the fate of Russia, Viktor Chernomyrdin said in conclusion. That is the real price of everything that we must and are obliged to do together today.

Economic Issues Stressed

PM0311150793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 1

[Vladimir Khrustov' report: "Stabilizing the Economy and Reducing Social Tension Were the Tasks Discussed at the Session of the Grand Council of Ministers"]

[Text] An enlarged session of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government was held at the Kremlin yesterday. Its participants analyzed the socio-economic situation in the country and discussed measures to implement the first phase of the Russian Council of Ministers-Government "Development of Reforms and Stabilization of the Russian Economy" program for 1993-1995.

Boris Yeltsin opened the session by saying that Russia has been living in a "fundamentally new political situation" for a month now.

The period of dyarchy is over, he stressed. All the country's vital systems have been preserved and are operating without interruption. The extremely dangerous process of wrecking the Russian state system has been halted. We have managed to stop its pernicious consequences from spreading to the regions of the Russian Federation. Through our common efforts we have prevented the splitting up of Russia itself.

People have seen for themselves, Boris Yeltsin went on, how dangerous the so-called "romance of revolution, the logic of violence and blood," is. The most important thing now is to fully evaluate and exploit the new opportunities which have emerged in the country. The October events have opened up new prospects for implementing economic transformations and given a powerful boost to constitutional reform and deep transformations of the Russian state system.

A report was delivered to the session by Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The following took part in the work of the Council of Ministers: members of the government, leaders of central organs of federal executive power, leaders of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation, and representatives of trade union organizations, associations of entrepreneurs and banks, and the mass media. The session analyzed the socioeconomic state of the country, sectors, and regions on the basis of the results of

work during the first nine months of the year. Special attention was paid to financial stabilization, measures of social support for the population, the implementation of the state privatization program, the development of a market infrastructure, the progress of agrarian reform, the improvement of economic collaboration between the center and the regions, and the development of cooperation with countries near and far.

The country's economic situation in 1993 remains difficult: GDP fell by 11 percent over the nine months compared with the same period last year, industrial output by 16.5 percent, and capital investment by 10 percent. The level of inflation was high, reaching 30 percent in some months.

However, in the opinion of experts, the situation in the national economy cannot be described in uniform terms. By the fall of 1993 the basis for financial, monetary, and credit stabilization and consequently for checking the inflationary process had been laid. Despite the pressure exerted on the government by ministries and the regions, they have rejected the option of letting enterprises mutually offset their debts by boosting the money supply. Soft loans were abolished as of 1 October, which creates the prerequisites for reducing inflationary pressure on the budget. The liberalization of prices for coal, oil, and grain has been continued.

These and other measures (particularly the reduction of import subsidies) have led to a strengthening of the position of the ruble and the stabilization of the ruble-dollar exchange rate. Provided this policy is maintained, specialists expect an acceptable budget deficit level (no more than 10 percent of GDP) and the reduction of inflation to 15 percent per month by the end of December.

The fact that the country is really switching over to market relations and that the outlines of Russia's new economy are taking shape is of fundamental importance. The nonstate sector of the economy, where 42 percent of workers are now employed, is playing an ever-increasing role. The new tax system is functioning and value-added tax has become a stable source of state revenue. For all its drawbacks, the ruble has been retained as the sole means of payment. The process of privatization and the flotation of enterprises is actively under way and a stratum of property owners and a real stock market are being formed.

Participants in the session discussed the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government 1993-1994 action plan to implement the first phase of the government's "Development of Reforms and Stabilization of the Russian Economy" program. During discussion of the document special attention was paid to creating conditions conducive to speeding up economic reform and reducing tension in the social sphere.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Carries Yeltsin STERN Interview

PM0311165993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1, 4

["Answers to questions from STERN magazine" by President Boris Yeltsin: "B.N. Yeltsin: If Only the Force of Argument Is Not Replaced by Force of Arms"]

[Text] [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 1. Khasbulatov and Rutskoy, former supporters of yours who later became bitter enemies, are sitting in jail. Do you feel you have won?

[Yeltsin] In general Khasbulatov and Rutskoy are not the point. Everything is far more complex than personal relationships. Although I regard treachery as one of the basest human vices. The greatest tragedy is that they betrayed the trust that voters and Russian history itself had shown in them.

It pains me that for the sake of retaining power these former leaders of Russia rejected our proposals for a peaceful solution to the crisis and provoked armed conflict. They found themselves in the same camp as the most extremist and essentially criminal groupings. The tragedy of the events of 3-4 October in Moscow is that the adventurism of the Khasbulatov-Rutskoy grouping almost pushed the country into civil war. I think there is no need to go into what this would have meant for both Russia and Europe.

Unfortunately we did not have legal mechanisms for resolving major contradictions in the sphere of power. All attempts to create such mechanisms ran up against sharp opposition from the Supreme Soviet and the Congress.

As a result dyarchy arose in Russia. On the one hand there was the president and the government, who were supported by the people in the referendum. On the other hand, there were the deputies and the constitution, which the deputies had tailored to their own short-term interests.

The dyarchy had reached such a pitch that it threatened the country's national security. I was obliged to take the most resolute measures—dissolve parliament and the Congress and schedule elections to the Federal Assembly, Russia's parliament. These measures were certainly forced upon us, but the president had no choice.

The peaceful development of the political process was interrupted for a short time 3-4 October. We do not see the suppression of the armed revolt as a victory. It cost many lives. There were no victory fanfares, nor could there have been any. There was mourning. Nevertheless, we managed to avoid the worst case—the threat of civil war was averted from Russia. The constitutional process has now resumed, and the reform of representative bodies is under way, along with analysis of everything that happened, of course.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 2. How influential are the radical communists and nationalists in Russia today?

[Yeltsin] The events of early October showed that these forces have no stable social base of any significance. The whole world noticed that in the days before the revolt there were neither strikes nor big rallies in support of the opposition. And this is despite the fact that the former Supreme Soviet, local soviets, and a number of political organizations did everything possible to provoke actions of civil disobedience. This failed. It was perhaps this political impotence that prompted the leaders of the former Supreme Soviet and the former vice president to stage the armed revolt. The plan was based on lightning actions: the armed seizure of key points in the capital—the mayor's office, the mass media, the Kremlin—in line with the October 1917 scenario. It was adventurism.

At the same time there is another thing which cannot be disregarded. Ultra-radicals of the communist-fascist persuasion had managed to get into a position where they felt that they were the masters in the former Supreme Soviet. They seriously reckoned—if not on the support of at least a part of the Army and the law-enforcement agencies—then at least on getting away with it because they would not intervene. The events of early October showed that there are groupings in Russia, including in state structures, which are prepared to form an alliance with extremists. This is a dangerous phenomenon.

There is only one conclusion to be drawn—in no circumstances must the danger posed by communist-fascist forces in Russia be underestimated. They are still capable, if not of reviving, then at least of causing considerable harm to both the country and its citizens. This is the most important lesson we have learned from the events of 3-4 October.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 3. During the night of Sunday-Monday the Army hesitated for quite a long time before coming to your side. Do you rule out the possibility of a military putsch in the future?

[Yeltsin] Even if such a possibility is zero, we simply do not have the right to rule it out. We do not have the right to relax. If we allow feelings of total forgiveness to come back, if certain organizations in Russia were to again prepare almost legally for violence, if there is again delay in adopting a new constitution stipulating precise civilized procedures for resolving contradictions of power, the events of early October could recur but in a more serious form.

Now on the subject of "hesitation" in the Army. There has been a great deal of speculation about this. I would like to clarify this matter. In the Army as a whole there was no hesitation. But in terms of its participation in resolving the conflict, there were indeed problems. There was no difficulty about formally issuing the order. As supreme commander in chief I am entitled to do this. But that night, before giving the order, I had to be 100 percent sure that this order would be carried out. Precisely and in full. I had to be sure that the slightest possibility of the Armed Forces going beyond a strictly delineated framework of operations would be absolutely out of the question.

An armed revolt is not a theatrical production. It is at moments like these that both the best and the worst human qualities are displayed. And I also had to take this into account.

And there is another important factor. In such an emergency situation there is always a great danger of a split in the power structures. A chance, unpredictable factor could have proved fatal. All these circumstances had to be taken fully into account before giving the order. And, of course, the procedure governing the actions of the Army units moved into Moscow had to be defined. Getting this work done took a certain amount of time.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 4. When will the presidential election be held—simultaneously with the elections to parliament in December or in June, as you proposed? Why precisely this timing?

[Yeltsin] My position on this matter remains unchanged. There is no way a power vacuum can be tolerated—and this is precisely why I am opposed to simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. It would be irresponsible to subject stability in Russia to new trials.

Therefore there will be parliamentary elections in December and presidential elections on 12 June 1994—six months later. During this period the new parliament will gain experience and will be able to find its feet. And—an important point—to adopt the laws necessary for the presidential elections.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 5. What kind of political system does Russia need? A Western-style democracy?

[Yeltsin] Of course Russia needs a democratic system.

It is important that the specific form of democracy matches the national traditions of the people inhabiting the country and the historical path it has traveled. I am opposed to abstract theoretical schemes. I am convinced that Russian democracy will have a considerable number of the features inherent in other democratic countries but will also differ from them in many respects.

The main thing is to ensure that Russia's democratic system has immutable legal, political, and moral mechanisms preventing the revival of totalitarianism in our country.

Russian democracy must match the scale of Russia—an enormous and diverse country of many faces inhabited by big and small peoples.

And, of course, the human dimension of Russian democracy will be of particular significance. Personal dignity was trampled in our country for too long. And a very great deal has to be done to revive it and ensure real human freedom in Russia.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 6. Your critics accuse you of being dictatorial. How would you answer them? Why was the ban on newspapers and parties necessary?

[Yeltsin] I am accused of irresoluteness and insufficient toughness on the one hand and virtually of suppressing criticism and dissent on the other. Often these accusations come from one and the same source.

It is astonishing that now that the state of emergency in Moscow has been lifted and all parties and publications which did not besmirch themselves by participating in the revolt again have the opportunity to operate legally, a section of the public abroad has gotten the impression that there are censorship measures of some kind and restrictions on pluralism. In actual fact censorship was in existence for only one or two days before it was abolis[illegible].

We fear neither criticism nor opposition. Furthermore, the free elections on which we are pinning such great hopes are inconceivable without it. Russia has painfully come to realize the disastrousness of the consequences of totalitarian uniformity and denial of choice and absence of debate. God forbid that the force of argument should be replaced by the force of arms!

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 7. Will Poland or Hungary be able to join NATO?

[Yeltsin] Every state has the right to decide how it should safeguard its security—by participating in a military-political alliance or some other way. I said this during my visit to East European countries. We also have this right, of course. Russia is in favor of an all-European security system. East-West confrontation is a thing of the past. The main danger facing Europe today is is inter-ethnic conflicts. A simple quantitative expansion of NATO will not resolve the task of eliminating these conflicts, in my view. In this connection B. Clinton's "partnership for peace" initiative seems interesting to me. On the U.S. president's instructions I was informed about this by Secretary of State W. Christopher, who visited Moscow. This is a constructive idea. Russia is ready to make its contribution to its elaboration.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 8. How could Germany and the West in general provide specific assistance to Russia?

[Yeltsin] Such assistance has been and is being provided, and Germany has always been in the forefront here. We are grateful for this.

Of course, no one is going to resolve our problems for us. We are shouldering and will continue to shoulder the main burden of overcoming the crisis. I would like to clarify that what matters to us is not so much assistance as equal rights in trade to those enjoyed by other states. It is very important to remove as swiftly as possible the discriminatory restrictions imposed by COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] and international trading organizations—after all, Russia is not a communist country, we are carrying out fundamental changes in the economy and moving rapidly toward the market. We need to trade on the same terms as others. This would be the best support for Russia.

We are taking the necessary measures to ensure that business people come to Russia to open up its extremely rich market. We need investment. At the same time we understand business people's misgivings and wariness. In this connection it is very useful (and, incidentally, the practice of relations with Germany clearly shows this) to create investment guarantee funds.

Of course, Russia's financial position is affected by the problem of the debts inherited from the Soviet Union. We are repaying some of them, and on others we are holding talks on rescheduling payments. Restructuring of the debt is a very important sphere of support for Russia.

And, of course, we are sincerely grateful to Germany, the West, and the entire world community for their political and moral support during the difficult days of late September and early October this year. Russia is part of the community of democratic states, and it was important for us to see for ourselves once again that the world is on the side of Russian democracy.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 9. When are you going to visit Germany? What would be the aims of this visit?

[Yeltsin] Chancellor H. Kohl's invitation to visit the FRG, which he extended on Baykal this summer, was accepted with thanks. It remains to agree a date in the light of the development of the situation and to prepare thoroughly for the visit. We have plenty to discuss—bilateral relations, the course of reforms in Russia, and the situation in Europe and the world.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 10. Which of H. Kohl's qualities do you most appreciate?

[Yeltsin] I have firm contacts with Mr. H. Kohl and I confess that each meeting with him leaves me with good and warm memories.

What I like above all about Helmut Kohl is his profound understanding of Russia and its role in Europe and in the world. We have always received firm and unequivocal support from the German chancellor at the most critical moments. I saw this yet again during our telephone conversations during the dramatic events in Russia.

I value the German leader's sincere commitment to the ideals of democracy and invariable solidarity with the course of the Russian reforms. I believe it is thanks to Mr. H. Kohl that Russian-German relations find expression in practical and specific collaboration.

I make no secret of the fact that I am impressed that Helmut Kohl is always amicable, open, and polite and displays German thoroughness and organization.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 11. Your American counterpart keeps fit by jogging, but what do you do for the sake of your health? How do you fill the few minutes of spare time you are given?

[Yeltsin] As a young man I did a lot of various kinds of sport—skiing, track athletics, gymnastics. My favorite form of sport was volleyball. I played a lot, and with some success.

Now I am keen on tennis. In general I think that everybody should take part in sport. It not only makes you feel good, it increases your capacity for work.

Of course, I try to get out into the country as much as possible. I love fishing. Admittedly, that takes a lot of time and, as always, time is short.

I derive tremendous vitality from contact with my grandchildren. I simply could not imagine life without them.

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA] 12. Who is an example to you?

[Yeltsin] When it comes to statesmen, reformers are close to my heart. There are many such people in Russian history. I think the name of the Russian emperor Peter the Great, who did much not only for Russia but also to bring about rapprochement between our states and dialogue between our peoples' cultures, is well known in Germany. I greatly respect Prince Yaroslav the Wise, an outstanding statesman in ancient Rus—the unifier [sobiratel] of Russian lands.

But nevertheless my main model and authority, my strictest and fairest judge, and the kindest and dearest person was my mother. I feel this particularly keenly now she has died.

Yeltsin Attends Church Ceremony

LD0411095893 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0900 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] The festivity of consecration of the Cathedral of the Icon of the Madonna of Kazan, restored on the Red Square, began today with a piece of news that made all Orthodox people happy.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin arrived to take part in this festive event. Aleksey II, Patriarch of Moscow and all the Russias, met him at the cathedral gate, accompanied by representatives of the clergy.

The president said that a decision had been adopted to return to the church the objects of worship confiscated during the revolution: the Icon of the Madonna of Vladimir and Rublev's Holy Trinity. They will be stored in special containers, in conditions necessary to preserve them.

Press Service Distributes 'Text' of Vagrancy Edict

LD0311200893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1020 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 3 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—The press service of the president of the Russian Federation has distributed the text of Boris Yeltsin's edict "On Measures for the Prevention of Vagrancy and Begging," signed on 2 November:

"With the aim of rendering social, medical, and other help to people without a fixed place of abode or residence, and to ensure the medical and epidemiological well-being of the population and strengthen social order, I decree:

1. That until the adoption of the relevant legislative acts by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Council of Ministers—Government of the Russian Federation, the bodies of executive power of the republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs and towns of federal status, are to implement measures for the prevention of vagrancy and begging.

2. The Council of Ministers—Government of the Russian Federation, jointly with the organs of executive power of the republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs and towns of federal status, are to reorganize in 1993 and the first half of 1994 reception and distribution centers of the organs of internal affairs for people detained for vagrancy and begging into centers for the social rehabilitation of those people to give them social, medical, and other help.

Social rehabilitation centers are also being set up by the organs of executive power of the republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs and towns of federal status.

For the time being, until the social rehabilitation centers are set up, the legal status and functional purpose of the reception and distribution centers of the organs of internal affairs are to be maintained.

3. The placing of people occupied in vagrancy or begging in the social rehabilitation centers is permitted by approval of the procurator for a period not exceeding 10 days. Where it is established that a detained person is a citizen of another country, the organs of internal affairs are obliged to report the detention to the relevant embassy or consulate.

4. To entrust: the internal affairs bodies with identifying persons engaged in vagrancy and begging, detaining and delivering them to social rehabilitation centers, establishing the identity of those detained, and also ensuring public order and the protection of the above-mentioned institutions; the healthcare bodies with carrying out the medical examination of these persons and sending them for treatment; the social protection services with sending these persons to the social protection bodies and also

with establishing the grounds and procedure for paying them pensions and allowances; the Russian Federal Employment Service with finding them jobs or determining the payment of unemployment benefit.

5. Within a period of two months, the Council of Ministers—Government of the Russian Federation is to: draw up and approve a standard provision on centers for the social rehabilitation of persons engaged in vagrancy and begging, and also proposals on the procedure and grounds for medical examination and treatment of the sick among those engaged in vagrancy and begging; define the procedure for financing these institutions and the conditions under which their employees are paid; draw up a uniform set of rules for registering persons engaged in vagrancy and begging.

6. To submit the decree of the president of the Russian Federation "On Measures to Prevent Vagrancy and Begging" for examination by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

7. This edict comes into force on signing.

Working Group Plans To Reform Security Ministry

MK0411090093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Hold the Front Page!" column: "A Detailed Plan on Dismemberment of Security Ministry Ready"]

[Text] MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has managed to obtain a document of the working group for the reformation of the Russian Federation Security Ministry drawn up in the Russian president's administration.

The working group believes that "the main objective of the state security services' reform should be transforming them, on the one hand, into an effectively operating counterintelligence service, and on the other, into an informational, analytical, and forecasting service providing the country's top leaders with the necessary information...."

This is proposed to be achieved through a rigorous purge of the Security Ministry's central staff and its territorial bodies. Special attention during the certification should be paid to former staffers of the Fifth Service (fighting dissidents). Incidentally, the present security minister, Nikolay Golushko, worked for the Fifth Service for a long time. The fired officials should be replaced with the agency's internal resources and democratically oriented members of the state apparatus.

It is also proposed to take the power structures, particularly the border troops, completely out of the Security Ministry, and to retain only such power subunits that are essential for the tackling of operational tasks in extreme circumstances; to scrap the Security Ministry's investigative organs and hand over their functions to prosecuting organs; to look into withdrawing from the Security Ministry subunits combating organized crime and corruption; and to narrow down the sphere of actions and cut down on the personnel of military counterintelligence.

The working group also considers it necessary to review the methods and practices of agent work. Namely, to cut to the minimum the recruitment of agents on the basis of incriminating materials, intimidation, or bribes.

Reform of Ministry Denied

LD0411121093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1055 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 4 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—The center of operational information of the Russian president's administration has refuted rumors about the reforming of the country's Ministry of Security. In a report from the center received by ITAR-TASS today, it says: "On some mass media they have persistently been whipping up rumors about the existence of some sort of working group to reform the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, which has purportedly been set up in the Russian president's administration. In doing this they cite a mythical 'document' containing 'the aims of reforming the Ministry of Security' and 'proposals for a rigorous purge of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Security and of its territorial bodies'.

"The center of operational information of the Russian Federation president's administration has been authorized to officially state that no such working group to 'reform' and 'purge' the Russian Federation Ministry of Security has existed in the administration of the Russian president, nor does it exist. The dissemination of fabrications of this type, may, in the view of the Russian president's administration, promote instability in society and in the security bodies, and cannot therefore be regarded as anything other than a blatant political provocation which has nothing in common with the actual variety of tasks being tackled both by the Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin as well as by his administration," it says in the report.

Justice Minister Favors Integration With Other Bodies

LD0311184393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1120 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] The present status of the Russian Ministry of Justice and its position in the system of law-making and enforcement do not meet the requirements of democracy. Procurators' offices and bodies responsible for public order should be part of the ministry. The interior ministry could also be integrated with the Ministry of Justice or be accountable to the Justice Minister. The opinion was expressed by the Minister of Justice Yuriy Kalmykov in an interview for Interfax.

He said that the status of his ministry should be raised and Russia should return to the classical pattern that exists in all countries, except former socialist ones.

The pattern existed in Russia before 1917, Kalmykov stressed. The Minister of Justice in those days was also the Prosecutor General and was in charge of the police, places of confinement and to a considerable extent—the functioning of the judicial system. "All that should be brought back," Kalmykov said.

The system of law-making in Russia, in his opinion, also required certain changes. Today a big share of laws and regulations are being drafted by the government because it has the right of legislative initiative. However, Kalmykov said, without the involvement of the Ministry of Justice, ministries often adopt regulations which contradict legislation.

New Deputy Foreign Minister on Personnel Problems

PM0311160593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Article by Konstantin Eggert: "No Prospect of Purge in Foreign Ministry, But Cadre Policy Will Change"]

[Text] The "eminence grise" will be wielding the "iron hand" to establish order—such rumors are rife in Moscow diplomatic circles following the appointment of Sergey Krylov, head of the Foreign Ministry executive secretariat, as deputy minister in charge of cadre matters, among other things.

Many are inclined to regard Krylov's promotion as confirmation that Andrey Kozyrev intends to stay in charge at Smolensk Square after the Federal Assembly elections and therefore that he means to bring cadre policy into line with his own ideas of what the Foreign Ministry should look like.

"All the talk about an 'iron hand' and impending purges is conjecture," he said in conversation with your IZVESTIYA correspondent. "Actually, I have my own ideas about what kind of cadre policy we should have. Having worked in the ministry for 22 years, I am entitled to my own opinion."

Krylov's career is untypical: Although he has been in the diplomatic service for nearly 25 years his foreign tours are nothing to shout about. They amount to less than five years in total: Three years in Zaire in the early seventies and less than two as a minister-counselor in Lisbon in 1990-1992. Krylov has spent the bulk of his career in the Foreign Ministry secretariat, first under Gromyko and then under Shevardnadze. He was recalled from Portugal in 1992, whereupon he took charge of the work to reestablish the executive secretariat. Our interlocutor has not yet transferred his duties as secretariat head to anyone—a successor has not been appointed yet.

One very important problem the new deputy minister will be enountering is the loss of cadres. In 1993 10 percent of the diplomatic personnel left the Foreign Ministry. "The youngest and most capable people under 35 are leaving and most of them are going into business," Krylov lamented. "A generation gap is developing, and this is particularly dangerous in the diplomatic service, where continuity and the passing on of experience maybe play a bigger part than formal training."

You cannot criticize those who are leaving: The pay of a department chief, with all the increments for rank and length of service, is less than 100,000 rubles [R]. According to the deputy minister, more than 50 posts in embassies abroad will be made available as an incentive to young diplomats. People will take turns, occupying these posts for three months at a time.

Krylov is convinced that relations with the former Union republics are a priority for Russia: "For us, Ukraine is more important than France. I put this view to my French colleagues and, you know what, they agreed."

The deputy minister intends to help create a situation where the best people are working in the CIS sphere. "The era of scrambling to plug holes is past," he believes. "Obviously no one is going to be desperate to go to Tajikistan. For that very reason we are devising a procedure whereby diplomats who have served in former Union republics will obtain advancement and tours in 'prestige countries'."

An advocate of the recruitment of outside people, above all expert analysts, Krylov also promises to prevent the ministry from becoming a gravy train for the proteges of "the high and mighty": "Working in the secretariat, I heard many requests from influential people to fix someone or other up—but always in a good post, in a good country. Peope like them do not want to get their hands dirty."

Krylov is unprejudiced in his approach to political appointments—"it is normal practice." He believes, though, that you have to maintain a certain cadre balance in the Foreign Ministry, preserving what the deputy minister describes as a "healthy conservatism": "We are in a time of rapid change and strong personalities. But Russia has foreign policy interests that are not dependent on short-term considerations. The Foreign Ministry also has to attend to them."

Poltoranin Denies Conflict With Shumeyko

LD0411093193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0803 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS—Mikhail Poltoranin, a close ally of President Boris Yeltsin and head of the Federal Information Centre, denied reports that a conflict had emerged between him and First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko, who was also appointed the information minister.

"We were and remain like-minded persons, people from one team", he told TASS on Thursday [4 November].

Shumeyko earlier blamed Poltoranin for claiming he was unaware of plans to introduce censorship after the armed opposition rebellion in Moscow. Shumeyko said Poltoranin was informed about the plan.

A presidential decree on the reorganisation of the Federal Information Centre has been prepared and it is now the president "who is to choose along which way mass media will develop", Poltoranin said, evidently referring to whether his centre or the information ministry will have the upper hand.

But Poltoranin believes in his success. "Today there are no barriers for the strengthening of the centre and the creation of a material base for the development of mass media", he said. The Federal Information Centre came under bitter criticism of the former parliament which attempted to disband it.

Poltoranin said that his main task is to explain the provisions of the draft constitution to the people. "It is especially important that every Russian is acquainted with the main consitutional principles before December 12" when a referendum on the constitution is to be held, he stressed.

Poltoranin, who runs for parliament together with the Russia's Choice bloc, said that in case of a victory the bloc will form a government capable of continuing economic reforms and ensuring stability in the country.

Shumeyko Urges End to 'Unlawful Actions' Against Trade Unions

LD0311205693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1542 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—There have been a number of unlawful actions against elective trade union bodies in a number of regions of late. This is said in a letter circulated on Wednesday [3 November]. Vladimir Shumeyko, first Russian deputy premier, sent this letter to heads of the administrations of subjects of Russia. Shumeyko noted there had been attempts to confiscate trade union property, to evict trade union bodies from their premises, to impose the domination on regional branches of the social insurance, to close trade union newspapers.

"In accordance with law, trade unions are independent organisations. There should be no unlawful actions against trade unions, their elected bodies, press organs and trade union property," the letter says. Differences should be settled through negotiations, and, whenever needed, can be taken to court.

TV Seen Manipulated by Government, Defense Ministry

MK0311130093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 45, 7 Nov 93 (signed to press 2 Nov) p A2

[Dmitriy Pushkar report in the "Television" column: "Who Is Storming Ostankino and Why?"]

[Text] The patriots' long-standing dream—to place an editor in military uniform in the TV studio, for the sake of which they have besieged, condemned, and picketed Ostankino for two years—has been borrowed by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has come by documents pointing to an attempt to create a new weekly program at the Ostankino TV Company. It should come on the air in December, replacing the current program called "Poligon" ["Test Site"]. The program was to be controlled by the defense minister. The list of editorial personnel had also been drawn up. Well-known journalist Mikhail Leshchinskiy, an author of highly professional reports about the Soviet limited contingent forces' building schools and arranging flower beds on the territory of Afghanistan, was to be appointed its head. His wife, journalist Ada Petrova, and another five or six people were to work side by side with him.

In the last four months Mikhail Leshchinskiy, who held the post of chief editor of the military programs section, has not prepared a single report of his own or taken part in accepting already made programs, your correspondent was told in Ostankino. The subordinates had to do without the boss.

The decision to create its own departmental program was born in the Defense Ministry on the last day of last summer—this is the date of Pavel Grachev's letter to Viktor Chernomyrdin. The minister writes that everything is going swimmingly: the program will be prepared by the Defense Ministry's Central TV and Radio Broadcasting Station. In mid-September a reply from the president's office was delivered to the TV and Radio Company. The document read: "To V. I. Bragin. Please decide the matter positively." A week later the Russian TV and Radio Company was addressed by Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin. The program was already included in the December schedule but apparently it will not be aired in the form designed by the Defense Ministry. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's correspondent was told in Ostankino military programs editorial office that Federal Information Center head Mikhail Poltoranin objected to the idea but even so, the program has been planned for 19 December.

Yet even what has happened is enough to understand the mechanisms of controlling TV. It appears that a department may ask for half an hour a week for its own programs. One vice premier will allow and another will ban.... Under this logic, the "Chelovek i Zakon" [Man and Law] programs, for instance, should be taken over by the Internal Affairs Ministry.

'Very Modest' Results Achieved by Federation Committee

PM0311145793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the general heading "What Are Ministries 'Producing'? We Continue Our Reports

on Election 'Gifts' to Russian Citizens From Officials": "State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs: Struggle for Peace or Premises?"]

[Text] On being appointed to the post of chairman of the Russian State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs, Sergey Shakhray said that the organization should focus on establishing national consensus in Russia and a genuinely federal system. It is hard to dispute the current success in this area, although it could have been greater.

Exactly a year has passed since the first shots were fired in the North Caucasus, and the war which had previously raged outside Russia began to singe its borders. Some 60,000 refugees forced to leave their homes in the course of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict are still without food or a roof over their heads. Armed bandits roam the state-of-emergency zone, and meanwhile neighboring Chechnya either praises or threatens Moscow—depending on the political advantage to be gained. The republic's status remains unclear, the arguments about it have not gone away.

This is only a small part of the range of highly complex interethnic problems which staff at the State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs are called upon to address. But, when asked about their everyday concerns, they reply at length mainly about the lawsuit with the State Committee for the Management of State Property over disputed buildings. They add that the number of departments is growing and that their payroll is being swollen by prominent academics. They list their conferences and sessions. That is their approach—the "good old way," regardless of the bloodshed and human suffering.

The formerly prevalent bureaucratic boilerplate about "certain work that has been done" on the basis of the notorious expenditure-based principle shows that the State Committee has been working its fingers to the bone. But it would be more accurate to judge it by its results—and these are very modest. The North Caucasus has not has not become any quieter over the past year, and the hopes the local residents had been pinning on the federal authorities are fading. But calm and serenity still reign at the State Committee. Even though it would be better if the opposite were the case.

It became known the other day that Sergey Shakhray, the head of the department, has taken unpaid leave in order to partipate in the election campaign. A "rudderless" State Committee is unlikely to operate any better. Party interests have once again taken precedence over state interests, and it will be ordinary people—who still hope that peace will return to their land—who have to pay the price.

Abdulatipov on Equality of Federation Components

MK0311102593 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 4

[Oleg Medvedev report under "Federation Components Status Leveled Up" rubric: "Ramazan Abdulatipov Maintains Republics' Specifics"]

[Text] As KOMMERSANT-DAILY reported last week, the Constitutional Conference left open the question about the equality of Federation components. Today Russian President Boris Yeltsin will discuss this problem with republic leaders and administration heads of krays, oblasts, and autonomous formations. Yesterday in an exclusive interview with KOMMERSANT-DAILY, a viewpoint on this issue was presented by Ramazan Abdulatipov, first deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee on Federation and Nationalities Affairs [Goskomfederatsiya], a body whose jurisdiction includes matters of federative organization.

According to Mr. Abdulatipov, those who demand the republics' full equality with krays and oblasts disregard the importance of the nationalities question and the historical specifics of the formation of the Russian state: "It is impossible to ignore the national and political aspects of the republics' existence. Many peoples populating the Russian republics, prior to their incorporation into Russia, had their own statehood. These peoples came to Russia not to destroy their statehood, but to protect it within the framework of a larger state."

Goskomfederatsiya's first deputy chairman believes that the issue is "more about form than content." In content all Federation components should be equal. But the republics, in contrast to the krays and oblasts, should have certain state trappings. "The more the krays and oblasts approximate the republics in form, the further the republics will distance themselves from Russia," Mr. Abdulatipov said. The trend toward the republics' "dissolution" is dangerous.

Mr. Abdulatipov pointed to a certain artificiality of the problem of equality or inequality of the regions: "This fuss is created by the local bosses. Someone wants to be called parliament chairman and to enhance his personal status."

As for the real correlation of the rights of the republics on one hand, and of the krays and oblasts on the other, such Federation components as, for example, St. Petersburg, have more rights and privileges than Kabardino-Balkaria or Karachayevo-Cherkessia.

If someone is unhappy with the volume of his rights and powers, this question can be resolved in a conflict-free manner within the framework of the Federation Treaty. "As is known, there are three versions of the Federation Treaty," Mr. Abdulatipov said. "But each variant has an article which says that any Federation component and the federal power bodies, on mutual agreement, may

delegate additional powers to each other. Such an article is specially provided for—against the contingency that the issue of equality should arise. I, for one, predicted that this issue will emerge." Given such an article in the Federation Treaty, Sverdlovsk Oblast had no need to proclaim itself the Urals Republic in order to acquire an independent budget. It could simply have used the corresponding provision of the Federation Treaty without aggravating the situation.

Presidential Aide on Federal Structure

MK0311131593 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 45, 7 Nov 93 (signed to press 2 Nov) p A9

[Interview with Anatoliy Sliva, deputy chief of the Russian Federation president's State Legal Administration, by Olga Bychkova; place and date not given; under the "Federation" rubric: "Once a Burgomaster Comes.."]

[Text] "As far as I know, none of the programs of the current, restless parties, which vie for seats at the new parliament, includes even a brief account of their ideas with regard to federalism or local self-government," Anatoliy Sliva, deputy chief of the Russian Federation president's State Legal Administration, remarked in an interview for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. "But if they give short shrift to these problems, what are their 'democratic' names worth?"

[Bychkova] The October events have changed lots of things, including the authorities' declarations on Russia's federal structure. The idea of the Council of the Federation as originally formulated has vanished, executive structures are being bolstered, the principle of the separation of powers has come under review... To what do you think this sudden change of course can be attributed?

[Sliva] Advocates of the monopoly on authority and people who stand for its reasonable decentralization on the basis of federalism and local self-government have always existed. After the October events, however, a new balance of forces came about. Those who argue for a return to the monopoly on authority have been given a realistic chance. This does not mean that it is a 100 percent chance, but this trend is gaining ground. They say now that federalism is not our path. It was not invented overnight, however: elements of federalism had existed even before the last emperor's abdication. Without them we will start to force everyone into Procrustes' bed once again.

Many things will depend on the government. We can formulate the question as follows: What kind of government do we presently have? A federal one? Does it protect citizens' rights at the local level? Or is it unable to pronounce such words at all? Why is it that the privatization program, for instance, does not have a section on the division of municipal property?

[Bychkova] To what do you attribute this?

[Sliva] To the fact that there are strong trends among the federal executive authorities toward governing everyone and everything, to poke their nose into every crack. They have been doing this instead of raising the question of changing the method of distributing budget revenues, the tax structure, and territorial reform... A unitarian government? It turns out that this is true, albeit deplorably so.

[Bychkova] In the past few years there have been plenty of blueprints for local government reform...

[Sliva] Yes, the idea of reviving local self-government emerged back in 1988—at that time they tried to link it with the soviets, but realized that these things are incompatible. Later, when talking about self-government reform they have always kept in mind the soviet system. These days we have to resolve the most complex problem, which has not merited even a comma in legislation—the problem of the country's administrative-territorial structure. The grass-roots authorities should clearly be oriented toward the basic needs of their territories; they should do the managing, adopt their charters, their rules... It is a local self- government chief—whether a burgomaster or a headman, but not a chief of administration—who should be responsible for all this. So far, unfortunately, we have to appoint people to these posts from above in order to retain governability at the transitional stage.

[Bychkova] There is always a temptation to stick with a more primitive model—without elections—in order "to retain governability." In this event, the transitional period may drag on endlessly...

[Sliva] Paradoxically, switching to a more democratic model is, in my view, impossible in present-day conditions without centralization or the federal authorities' monopoly on power. The central authorities stand as the only guarantor capable of protecting the territories from both federal and local bureaucrats.

We need an appropriate structure—a kind of state committee (as a matter of fact, the president has already ordered that this matter be taken care of). We need independent research groups, a special fund, scientific structures after all in order to work out municipal or local self-government policy. As a matter of fact, we do not have a term like this.

After the presidential edict on reforming local authorities was issued, we have been receiving calls from all of Russia. Staffs and commissions are being set up, drafts being written. I know that in Bashkortostan, in Tatarstan, and in Tuva they have been searching for their own forms. Once regional parliaments are elected, I think, they will also come to grips with local self-government reform. We will not be able to carry it out even in five years' time, though—too deep layers will have to be upturned.

'Zemstvo' Movement Holds Inaugural Congress

LD0311224393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2122 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Kostromina]

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS—An inaugural congress of the Russian "Zemstvo" movement was held here on Wednesday [3 November].

"Zemstva" is the name given to Russian elective local authorities introduced in Tsarist Russia in 1864. They were responsible for educational issues, health care, road construction etc. Their decisions were subject for approval by the respective governors.

Organizers of the movement include the Russian Foundation of Culture, the International Foundation of Slavonic Literature and Culture, the Union of Small and Medium Cities of Russia and other public organizations.

The "Zemstvo" movement brings together "representatives of various social groups, who come out for a rebirth of this form of a true self-government," said chairwoman of the organizing committee of the movement Yelena Panina.

We count on the provinces, which managed to preserve the moral ideals of our ancestors, rather than on the federal government, she emphasized.

Representatives of over 100 cities, oblasts and Russia's autonomous republics took part in the congress.

Khasbulatov Over 'Depression,' Presents Testimony

PM0311154193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "News from Lefortovo: Tobacco Is Khasbulatov's Thing..."]

[Text] One of Ruslan Khasbulatov's former entourage said during a conversation with your KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent that the ex-speaker's period of depression seems to be over.

It turns out that Ruslan Imranovich has already had his first visit from journalists—foreign ones, of course.

Rumors of the former speaker's alleged drug-withdrawal symptoms are only partially corroborated. According to our interlocutor, over the last few years R. Khasbulatov has only used fine choice brands of pipe tobacco, and that luxury is not provided in Lefortovo—which might have been one of the reasons for the ex-speaker's bad state.

R. Khasbulatov is currently energetically providing investigators with testimonies—nothing is as yet known about their content. It is quite possible, however, that we will be able to read these statements in STERN or DER SPIEGEL in the near future.

Whereabouts of 'Fascist' Barkashov Discussed

PM0411102993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition p 8

[Article by Yevgeniy Bovkun and Aleksey Chelnokov: "While the Fascist Leader Poses, Political Investigation Can Do Nothing"]

[Text] Aleksandr Barkashov, ringleader of the pro-fascist "Russian National Unity" organization, seems to be laughing at the law-enforcement organs. Recently he posed for the video cameras. (In a 15-minute monologue Barkashov let it be known with much bombast that his time is "yet to come.") Then the other day the specter of the Russian fuehrer appeared in Bonn...

Meanwhile, according to information from a confidential source, the fugitive fascist was "lying low" in a dacha near Moscow. Recently it was even claimed that he had been seen in Moscow. Your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told by someone close to Barkashov's entourage that their leader is not even considering leaving yet. Clearly he feels that he is safe. So what is the reason for the powerlessness of the official organs which have been setting traps for around a month now but have been unable to catch this world-renowned blackshirt?

"Unfortunately we are reaping the harvest of the seeds that were sown several years ago," the Russian Security Ministry's Moscow Directorate complained. "The system of political investigation was essentially dismantled at that time. The gathering of information on radical political movements is in a sorry state. So the Security Ministry has no information about the secret headquarters of Russian National Unity or the links that its leaders have."

At the Russian Federation General Prosecutor's Office they were even more succinct: Operations are being conducted to track down A.P. Barkashov on suspicion of [involvement in] armed clashes.

Well, it seems that Barkashov, having shaved off his mustache and changed his hairstyle, can now rest easy after his martial labors. (Incidentally I have learned that Barkashov's video is now being offered to foreign agencies at $150 a minute.)

At police headquarters in Bonn we asked for information about the rumors of a joint rally by Russian and German neofascists and were told:

"The Free German Workers Party, the National Political Exiles Aid Organization, the Young National Democrats, the 'Vikings,' and certain other right-wing extremist groupings submitted an application to stage a public event, which was due to take place on 30 October in Bad Godesberg, where mass demonstrations are often held.

"The application stated that some guests from Russia—members of 'Russian National Unity' headed by

Aleksandr Barkashov—would take part in the rally and subsequent demonstration outside the Russian Embassy."

Bonn Police Chief Dierk Henning Schnitzler banned the march. But why should Barkashov be in the FRG? Because the organizers of the march intended to disseminate anticonstitutional ideas under the slogan "Against party bans in the East and the West and for a national and free Europe." But since over 3,000 right-wing extremists were supposed to take part in the action, and they are highly aggressive people who do not balk at the use of violence, there would have been a threat of a clash with the population. There would also have been a danger to the foreigners living in Bad Godesberg, and that in turn would have damaged the FRG's reputation.

At the press department of the Foreign Ministry in Bonn it was stated categorically that an official visit to the FRG by Barkashov is impossible. They are aware here of the aims that he is pursuing. Staffers at the department contacted the German Embassy in Moscow and were given an unambiguous answer: They have not issued Barkashov with a visa to enter Germany.

"Could Barkashov enter Germany illegally?" we asked one police officer.

"In theory yes," he said. "After all, you know that the borders are controlled less rigorously now. But rest assured that if we catch him he will be in for it."

Retribution Demanded for 'All' Guilty Deputies

PM0311170793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 1

["Open Letter to Russian General Prosecutor" signed by N. Burnashova, A. Grishina, Z. Morozova, A. Zakharov, T. Zhadanov, and others ("176 signatures in all"): "Let All Who Promoted the Bloody Tragedy Get What They Deserve"]

[Text] Esteemed General Prosecutor!

We Muscovites are confident that the Russian Public Prosecutor's Office is doing everything to establish who is really to blame for the bloody events in Moscow 3-4 October. But we cannot be silent when we see that the principal and most immediate perpetrators of the tragedy remain unpunished and are even aspiring to seats in the new parliament. These are the former people's deputies of the former Supreme Soviet who, playing at their political games, did not notice in their excitement that the political game had turned into a bloody one.

It was the "get-togethers" of deputies that served as the detonator of the explosion. The blood spilled in October was the result of the destructive work which many deputies had long been carrying out systematically in congresses and sessions of the Supreme Soviet, outside the "White House" through the channel of the National Salvation Front, and in rayon soviets where Anpilov, Baburin, and others "psyched up" half-drunk youths even back before the April referendum.

Threats to "defend the positions of the Supreme Soviet, gun in hand" were heard repeatedly (everyone recalls the speeches of M. Astafyev and others). Aggressive mobs proclaiming bloody slogans were repeatedly organized on the streets and squares of Moscow under the leadership of extremist deputies (Konstantinov, Baburin, Isakov, Chelnokov, Sayenko, Pavlov, Urazhtsev, and Zyuganov, the communists' leader).

Blood was spilled 1 May 1993 on Leninskiy Prospekt. The deputies' immunity saved the organizers of the carnage from being called to account: The deputies did not hand over "their own." Threats continued to be heard, and after the president's edict no. 1400 deputies adopted a law on shooting the president's supporters and confiscating their property.

Ipso facto those deputies who attended the last Khasbulatov-led congress created a "legal" basis for the coming bloodshed, and provoked it. The deputies themselves perhaps did not themselves shoot (?) or kill (?) anyone, but it was they who were the ideologues and instigators of what happened. It was in the bowels of the Supreme Soviet, under the cloak of the Constitutional Court, that the strategy of the fascist-Bolshevik coup was elaborated. This is why deputies did not stop at the "minor" bloodshed (Terekhov's two victims on Leningradskiy Prospekt and the blood on Smolensk Square 2 October)—they had to stay put and await the major bloodbath. Sitting in the "White House," the ex-deputies hoped to hold onto power even at the price of bloodshed. They could not fail to have seen the hundreds of fascist gunmen (we are sure that the arrival of the "Dniester" detachment was the direct result of the visits of Baburin and co. to the Dniester region) pacing the corridors, the arms being handed out to anyone who chanced to be there, the mining of the premises, the destruction of the compromising documents, and the preparation of the Molotov cocktails (and where is the proof that it was not they themselves who made them?).

Deputies who remained in the "White House" were by no means hostages but the direct ringleaders, accomplices, and patrons of the crime.

We Muscovites appeal to you, esteemed General Prosecutor! Surely our justice does not allow deputies, having received millions in "smart money," to avoid lying in the bloody bed which they themselves made.

The memory of innocent victims and elementary justice demands the punishment of **all** deputies who did not leave the "White House" before the start of the bloody events: We have paid too dear a price for the deputies' "sit-in."

Of course, the scores of dead cannot be restored to life, the torrents of tears cannot be dried, but deputies are obligated to redeem the huge material and moral damage inflicted on society. Let them pay for as long as they live!

Or will we, the taxpayers, again pay for the bloody games of the ex-deputies from our threadbare pockets?

There has not yet been time for sentences, or even charges, to be pronounced, and already calls have been heard for clemency toward the vanquished. What kind of country is this with its inverted notions?! How can there be any question of clemency to the murderers and their stooges who planned this mass slaughter? What, are we to let everything sink into the sand again, as with the State Committee for the State of Emergency? No, this must not be allowed! Let all who promoted this bloody tragedy get what they deserve!

So that the bloody events shall never more be repeated in Russia.

[Signed] N. Burnashova, A. Grishina, Z. Morozova, A. Zakharov, T. Zhadanov, and others (176 signatures in all)

Moscow Security Chief on 3-4 October Events

PM0211145993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Yevgeniy Savostyanov, head of Ministry of Security Moscow and Moscow Oblast Directorate, by Igor Andreyev and Valeriy Yakov; place and date not given: "October Putsch: Special Service Viewpoint. IZVESTIYA Correspondents Talk to Yevgeniy Savostyanov, Head of Ministry of Security Moscow and Moscow Oblast Directorate"]

[Text] [IZVESTIYA] Yevgeniy Vadimovich, thousands of people came to the White House to support its defenders. The parliament has a fair number of supporters all over and outside Russia. Recent events have hardly radically changed these people's views. Might there be another upsurge in activity by the armed opposition in hiding?

[Savostyanov] Clearly a repeat of their activity is inevitable. After all, the events were virtually a repeat of the drama of 1991, although with their own nuances. Then supporters of the State Committee for the State of Emergency took around four months to come to their senses. This process will now be expedited by the coming elections and a repeat performance should be expected in 6-8 weeks, but there will be no mass terror in the country if only because terrorism and a desire for bloodshed are utterly alien to our people.

[IZVESTIYA] If that is true, how can you account for the mass aggression shown by demonstrators when breaking through the cordon on Smolensk Square and during the assault on the mayor's office? Or did this behavior come as a surprise to you, and do you still believe in the masses can be peaceful?

[Savostyanov] We kept a constant eye on the situation, and there were no surprises for us until 3 October. We saw the events of 23 February 1992 as the first alarm signal, when convoys of demonstrators first clashed head-on with organs of law and order. The disturbances were organized by "Working Russia" and the National Salvation Front in violation of a tradition since 1988 of not entering into conflict with the militia, no matter how trenchant the slogans and the size of the demonstrations.

There was bloodshed on both sides on 23 February. It became clear that we were heading for an escalation of violence.

We then paid particular attention to monitoring the actions of the organizers of the disturbances and to documenting the events. We hoped that it would prove possible to use this data in an investigation, institute criminal proceedings, and take action against the organizers.

[IZVESTIYA] Is one to understand your documenting events as compiling a definite photographic record not only of the organizers but also of active participants in these acts of aggression? Were they recorded for a photographic file or was this considered political investigating [sysk]?

[Savostyanov] I would not call this investigating. One must take note of one important detail here. Until 1 May 1993 everything that happened in Moscow was categorized as contempt for organs of law and order, a breach of public order, and so on. That is, the instigators did not come under our jurisdiction, but that of the militia and the prosecutor's office; we only handed them information. We also gathered together a fairly extensive photographic library on the participants.

Blatantly popular disturbances occurred 1 May. We then became directly involved in the investigation.

[IZVESTIYA] If there is a photographic library, if the "activists" were under surveillance, how was it that the person who ran down Militiaman V. Tolokneyev in his truck 1 May has still not been identified, flushed out.

[Savostyanov] He may have been a new face, although the backbone is always the same, but there were also usually new people swarming around—sympathizers, idlers, rabble.

[IZVESTIYA] Roughly how many of the people who regularly took part in clashes before October 1993 were involved in these events? Did you have an idea of what the organizers were planning this time?

[Savostyanov] I have already said that the backbone usually remained the same—forming around 50 percent of the mob. For 18 months now there has been no increase in the number of people involved. We had a good idea of the mentality of these people and their leaders; we were perfectly well aware that during the fall and spring this group would become more emotional and aggressive: Psychiatrists are familiar with this phenomenon.

We had information from on high, so to speak, from maintaining contacts, particularly after 21 September, with Khasbulatov's and Rutskoy's entourage. We also met with other prominent figures in the White House.

[IZVESTIYA] Did you predict the drastic deterioration—including the use of arms—that occurred 3 October?

[Savostyanov] That was probably my major mistake: I did not think that Rutskoy would urge people to use arms. I thought that he still had at least a modicum of statesmanlike personal responsibility. No, I did not foresee that euphoria at his success would turn his head to such an extent. I previously had a meeting with Barannikov and Dunayev. I was staggered by Dunayev's notion of the situation. He claimed that it was only his and Barannikov's personal prestige that restrained the country from a political strike in support of the men holed up in the White House, and that, had it not been for them, the whole country would have been paralyzed, but people who came here (to the Ministry of Security's Moscow Directorate—Andreyev and Yakov) for talks and, it cannot be denied, to exchange information would also have been surprised at their certainty that all Russia was behind them.

[IZVESTIYA] You probably not only used this information yourself, but also sent it to certain consumers. In what form—as bare fact or in the form of an analysis report with recommendations? Did you take its consumers into consideration when making decisions?

[Savostyanov] The information was conveyed to the Ministry of Security and the staff led by V. Pankratov, head of the city internal affairs administration. It was conveyed forthwith and, as is always the case in these circumstances, quality was sacrificed to speed.

As for forecasting events, that is a difficult question. Let me cite the following example: Events 3 October developed in such a way that it was clear that intensive work on the part of investigation teams would be required that day and the following night. That was why at around 1330 hours I summoned all investigators from home. On the other hand, neither I nor the mayor's office (where the staff was located) considered the scenario of Rutskoy calling people to arms. All sources reported that people in the White House were aware that weapons were not needed. Anyone who started a bloodbath would stand to lose. Although the option of bloodshed could not of course be discounted and all our actions should have been tailored in a concrete, serious manner to meet such a turn of events.

[IZVESTIYA] How was it that even actions that were scheduled were not carried out?! It was after all decided to step up the guard on the most important installations, but for some reason they were all left without reliable protection...

[Savostyanov] We do not guard the installations in question. Let us be frank: We simply do not have the forces for that.

[IZVESTIYA] Gunmen in stolen automobiles and buses drove across the whole city to Ostankino and no one even tried to stop them, and there were no guards at Ostankino... Did the Russian Ministry of Security overlook this?

[Savostyanov] You have to consider the moral factor—the unwillingness to wage hostilities in the city. Three telephone centers were seized, the Moscow Military District's special departments building was attacked and weapons seized, and the Customs Committee and TASS attacked. This is all quite serious, even from the directorate's viewpoint. When they attacked military counterintelligence, they demanded that it send cables to all its organs in order to monitor the units' fulfillment of Rutskoy's and Khasbulatov's instructions. This was not just a dramatic episode, but a fairly substantive one.

This escalation in aggression in the city made it necessary to formulate countermeasure tactics. I thought that at this moment we should not have gone after the tentacles spreading around the city, but attacked the actual lair. That was my personal view, and I voiced it.

[IZVESTIYA] What prevented the mob being checked in the initial stages? After all there are ready-made tactics used by other countries' police forces when they try to prevent an aggressive mob coming into direct contact with a cordon and use special means..

[Savostyanov] At the entrance to Smolensk Square the demonstrators were bombarded with "Cheremukha" [crowd control gas] and we learned an unpleasant fact: We thought that shots would be fired and people would disperse in alarm. Shots were fired once, twice, three times... And what of it? Our personnel were also in the mob and they said their eyes did not even sting. That is "Cheremukha" for you...

[IZVESTIYA] How can you describe the militia's actions at that time—confused?

[Savostyanov] You cannot use just one word. "Vityaz" took control of the installation being guarded in a matter of minutes and did everything in the proper manner. But there were other personnel who found themselves in the absurd position of putting up unarmed resistance to armed bandits and were captured. Militia stations received the order to engage in all-around defense and guard their weapons. And that was the right thing to do at that moment... The crucial factor was their primarily mental unwillingness to fire on people. How can you overcome that most serious of barriers? The militia found itself in a very difficult situation—it was faced with a mob among whom there were women and children...

[IZVESTIYA] At that time did you have information about the mood in the Army? The option of its being enlisted had not been ruled out after all.

[Savostyanov] The mood in the Army was very stable, but there were no operational plans for enlisting the Army. The question had to be resolved from scratch.

[IZVESTIYA] Did you know how many arms there were in the White House?

[Savostyanov] Yes, we knew about the protection department's regular-issue official weapons. We knew how many and what kind of weapons the White House had bought and stored since August 1991. We also had information about the weapons that it received via other channels.

It was quite obvious that the White House leaders were losing control over the gunmen with every day that passed and that the role of field commanders was increasing more and more noticeably. The political leadership was losing its influence and ultimately had no control at all. Thus, there was a growing danger that there would be a military rather than a political solution to the conflict.

[IZVESTIYA] At that time everyone was talking about the Dniester Region guardsmen, the Riga OMON [special-purpose militia detachment], and gunmen from Abkhazia who had rushed to the White House to defend it weapon in hand. What did security organs do to stop them?

[Savostyanov] We certainly knew that they were coming, but what is a gunman? On what grounds should we detain him if he is traveling without weapons? And the White House was only cordoned off during the last few days; before that anyone could go there. We knew the kind of man Anpilov is and we could not detain him for several years.

[IZVESTIYA] OK, prior to that you did not have any formal grounds, but what about after Ostankino? Makashov's gunmen attacked the television center with weapons in hand and there was bloodshed! Then they calmly crossed the whole city back to the White House and no one tried to arrest them. Even Makashov. Where was your "visible presence" [naruzhka]? Or did they miss their opportunity again?

[Savostyanov] Given the confusion and disorder reigning in the city at that time, there were a host of shortcomings on both sides. But the main thing is that we and the militia forces are not geared to working in combat conditions, more precisely to civil war. And tell me just how could my "visible presence" (two men with pistols) arrest a group of blackguards armed with assault rifles? No one tried to arrest them because another tactic—defense—was still being practiced. The city authorities and the government had not yet made the decision to brutally suppress the revolt, although a state of emergency was announced at 1600 hours.

[IZVESTIYA] You know how many armed people left the White House during and after the assault. What prevented them being arrested?

[Savostyanov] Virtually no one left with weapons (the editorial office has other information—Andreyev and Yakov). These were the methods used—we conducted initial screening, checking documents and asking some questions. We detained around 1,200 people. After they had answered questions and presented their papers, they were released. Barkashov's men also left, disguised in civvies, while Barkashov himself probably presented fake documents. And it is not certain that he did not leave the White House on the eve of the assault. I think that it is a mistake to conduct screening in a simplified way.

[IZVESTIYA] What comment could you pass on the story that events took place in accordance with a scenario formulated by the president's side: White House defenders were allowed to embroil themselves in a bloody incident, City Hall and the Mir Hotel were deliberately surrendered, the road to Ostankino was cleared, and they were given a chance to begin an assault on the television center in order to thus justify in public eyes the toughest measures against the parliament?

[Savostyanov] That is too sophisticated. In actual fact lack of coordination, disorder, and chaos were rife. Even had it been planned and implemented in accordance with a previous plan, it would still not have been possible to achieve the political effect that actually obtained.

[IZVESTIYA] If you do not rule out a repeat of the events and are predicting possible activeness on the part of the quietened opposition, is that not grounds for more careful monitoring of these "activists"?

[Savostyanov] When I took up this post I said: In such an unstable society as ours the lengths to which any party may go are a total unknown quantity. We have a wealth of experience of political extremism, and if society wants to safeguard himself, it should instruct the specialists to monitor these parties. Today the law forbids us doing that.

In my view, it is society that should decide: Does it need the Ministry of Security, in what form, and to what end? The president has said that the system of security organs must be reformed, but he did not say how. And our personnel are once again in ferment, resignation statements are now coming in thick and fast.

To be frank, the Ministry of Security did not play its role in averting the events. The fact that we were prevented from doing so—legal bans, lack of power structures...—is another matter. Possibly the most important thing is operational personnel's intrinsic reluctance to "get into politics." The KGB was after all repeatedly berated for political bias, but let us be frank: Without this you cannot have a special service. Loyalty to any authority and indifference to the political orientation of the "high ups" are both its merit and its weakness.

Military Issues

Grachev, Other Officials Comment on New Military Doctrine

Grachev Outlines New Doctrine

LD0311073993 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 1700 GMT 3 Nov 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] On 3 November, a news conference for Russian and foreign journalists took place in the Russian Defense Ministry. It was devoted to Russia's new military doctrine, which was adopted yesterday by the Security Council and was approved by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev has outlined the content of the main provisions and specific features of the new military doctrine:

[Begin Grachev recording] I would like to say that this document is the first in the history of both the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Before this doctrine, we were guided by decisions adopted by various congresses, by party directives, and by government resolutions. Now all this is being concentrated in one single document entitled: The Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

This is a document of exceptional importance, and the discussion of this document was fully justified. At the same time, it is necessary to take account of the fact that the military doctrine is a specific document. In this context, it is necessary to dwell in somewhat greater detail on the content of its main provisions since the main provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation determine the role and the place of the military force within the system designed to ensure the security of Russia.

Representatives of all ministries and departments have taken part in its development. I would like to draw your attention to a number of the following special features of principal importance.

In the first place, Russia's military doctrine is underpinned by a new understanding of the country's security and represents an integral part of the concept of security of the Russian Federation.

Second, the military doctrine deals with the problems of using troops other than just the Armed Forces to ensure the country's security. Before this, all these troops were an integral part of the Armed Forces. Now, in accordance with the law of the Russian Federation on defense, the military forces are being divided. However, as the analysis of possibilities and the experience of all previous conflicts demonstrate, various forces and means can successfully fulfill their objectives only in close interaction with each other.

Third, taking into account the requirements attendant upon ensuring the country's security, the military doctrine proceeds from the state's real political, economic, and military potential.

Fourth, Russia's military organizational development is taking place in circumstances of moving toward a market economy, when the role of the Defense Ministry in forming and carrying out military and technical policies is being radically altered. [end recording]

Speaking about the structure of the new military doctrine, Grachev outlined in detail its political and military parts. In particular, he said:

[Begin Grachev recording] Now, more details about all these three parts. The political basis of the military doctrine reflects Russia's views on the use of the military force, armed conflicts and wars, the sources of military danger, and the causes of military conflicts. There are three key moments in this part of the doctrine.

First, the Russian Federation does not treat any state as its enemy. Second, the Russian Federation will not use military force against any state, except in cases of individual or collective self-defense and in combination with the guarantees of not using nuclear weapons against signatory states to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1 July 1968, which do not possess nuclear weapons. Third, nuclear weapons are viewed, first of all, not as the means to carry out military actions but as political means to deter aggression.

It is important to mention here that, together with traditional tasks such as deterring and repelling aggression, the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation also have the task now of carrying out peacemaking operations. These operations can be carried out following decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations, other collective security bodies, or in line with international obligations—first within the CIS framework, if this does not contradict the interests of the Russian Federation.

In the political foundations of the military doctrine, the state's tasks in the area of guaranteeing military security have been considerably extended. In peace time, these are the following: First, to maintain the country's defense potential at a level appropriate to existing and potential military threats, taking into account the country's economic potential and available human resources; to qualitatively improve the Armed Forces and other troops; and to ensure their combat and mobilization readiness in order to guarantee the country's military security.

The military foundations of the doctrine reflect views on the possible nature of wars and armed conflicts, the task of the Armed Forces and other troops, and the main principles and directions of their organizational development.

The actual military portion of the military doctrine is the foundation for drawing up a blueprint for the organizational development of the Armed Forces. Primary attention in this part of the military doctrine is attached to assessing the possible nature of military conflicts in modern conditions, to the strategic aims of using military force and the state's tasks in the defense field, to the procedure for using the Armed Forces and other troops, and to the main tasks and principles for the organizational development of the Armed Forces and other troops.

The military doctrine presupposes that the possibility of a world nuclear or conventional war being unleashed in the current period or in the foreseeable future has been considerably diminished, although not completely removed. Regional wars and armed conflicts present the main danger to stability and peace. The probability of their arising has increased in some regions.

The military doctrine states the principal aim of the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in armed conflicts and local wars as follows: a prompt localization of the source of tension and stopping the hostilities as early as possible, so as to create preconditions for settling the conflict by peaceful means, on terms corresponding to the interests of the Russian Federation.

With regard to wars on a larger scale, the military doctrine of the Russian Federation states the need to prepare the Armed Forces for conducting both defensive and offensive warfare under the conditions of a massive use of modern and advanced weapons, irrespective of the way in which the war may have been started and conducted.

The main points of the doctrine make it clear that the principal efforts in the building of the Russian Federation Armed Forces until 1996 are to be focused on tackling the following tasks: to form groups of forces on the territory of Russia in accordance with their purpose and goals; to complete the pullout of the Russian formations and units stationed outside Russia to its territory; to reduce the numbers of the Russian Armed Forces to the level prescribed; to continue the transition to a mixed system of manpower acquisition; and to complete research on providing a theoretical basis for the structure and force composition of the Armed Forces after 1995.

It is planned in the period of 1996-2000 to reorganize the structure of the Armed Forces, to complete the transition to a mixed system of manpower acquisition, and to complete the forming of groups of troops and forces and a military infrastructure on the territory of the Russian Federation. [end recording]

Russian Defense Minister Grachev has just spoken in our studio, explaining the main points of the new military doctrine. We will come back to this subject often in our program, and we hope that we will be able to dwell in more detail on the principal aspects of this important document.

Grachev Gives Details of Doctrine

PM0411110193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Nov 93 pp 1,3

[Anatoliy Stasovskiy report: "Russian Military Doctrine: New Understanding of Country's Security"]

[Text] A session of the Russian Federation Security Council held 2 November in the Kremlin and chaired by Russian President B.N. Yeltsin approved the "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine."

This document constitutes an integral part of the general concept for Russian security that is being formulated. It articulates the aims and the main content of the policy to ensure military security, as well as internal and external military threats, and spells out state's tasks to counter these threats. The core of the document is the doctrinal provisions laying down the political, military, military-technical, and economic foundations of military organizational development and the development, use, and support [obespecheniye] of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation. They have an explicit thrust and are oriented toward the steadfast and active defense of Russia's vital interests and security, the prevention of war and armed conflicts, and their elimination from the life of mankind.

The Russian president has signed an Edict on ratifying the "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine" and given instructions on implementing them and organizing the formulation of the Russian Federation's general security concept. The Russian president's press service reported on this.

Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian defense minister, held a press conference 3 November devoted to the adoption of the Russian Federation's military doctrine. During his introductory address, after stressing that representatives of all ministries and departments took part in formulating the military doctrine, the defense minister dwelled in detail on the content of its basic provisions.

It is advisable to take note, Pavel Grachev said in particular, of some of the following fundamental features:

One, Russia's military doctrine is based on a new understanding of the country's security and is an integral part of the Russian Federation's Security Concept.

Two, military doctrine encompasses problems pertaining to the use not only of the Armed Forces but also other troops to ensure the country's security. They were previously all part of the Armed Forces. Now, in accordance with the Russian Federation Law "On Defense," the military forces have been divided up. However, analysis of potential and experience of all conflicts shows that the various forces and weapons can only perform their tasks successfully in close collaboration.

Three, Russia's military doctrine, in view of the need to ensure the country's defense, is based on the state's real political, economic, and military potential.

Four, Russia's military organizational development is occurring amid the transition to a market economy when the role of the Defense Ministry in shaping and implementing military-technical policy is changing radically.

In terms of structure military doctrine comprises three interconnected sections—political, military, and military-technical.

The political foundations of military doctrine reflect the views of Russia's attitude to the use of military force, to

armed conflicts and wars, sources of military danger, and the causes of military conflicts.

There are three key elements in this section of the doctrine:

The Russian Federation does not regard any state as its enemy;

The Russian Federation will not use military force against any state except for individual or collective self-defense, in conjunction with guarantees of the nonuse of nuclear weapons against states party to the 1 July 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which do not possess nuclear weapons;

Nuclear weapons are regarded primarily not as a means of conducting military operations, but as a political means of deterrence against aggression.

It is important to note that, alongside the traditional tasks such as, for instance, deterring and repulsing aggression, the Russian Armed Forces and other troops have the task of carrying out peacekeeping operations. These can be carried out by decision of the UN Security Council, other organs of collective security, or in accordance with international commitments, primarily within the CIS framework, provided that this does not contravene the interests of the Russian Federation. The basic provisions of the military doctrine stipulate that the terms and possible forms of Russian participation in peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the United Nations and other international peacekeeping actions, as well as the procedure for interacting with other countries' contingents, are determined by the UN Charter, international agreements, and, of course, Russian Federation legislation.

Individual formations of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation can be enlisted to help Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs internal affairs organs and internal troops and also to help the population eliminate the aftermath of accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters.

The tasks of the state in the sphere of ensuring military security have been considerably broadened in the political foundations of the military doctrine.

In peacetime they are primarily:

to maintain the country's defense potential at a level appropriate to existing and potential military threats with consideration for the economic potential of the country and the availability of manpower resources;

to qualitatively improve the Armed Forces and other troops and ensure their combat and mobilization readiness, guaranteeing the country's military security;

to allocate as a priority appropriations for the most promising defense, scientific, and technological development projects in terms of ensuring the security and developing the economy of the country;

to ensure the rational conversion of military production;

to ensure the readiness of organs of state administration and the country's economy to mobilize forces and weapons during a period of threat and in wartime to perform defense tasks;

to interdict possible provocations and encroachments on the security of citizens and the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other vital interests of the Russian Federation.

The military foundations of the doctrine reflect the views of the possible nature of wars and armed conflicts, the tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops, and the main principles of and avenues of their organizational development.

The military section of the military doctrine is accordingly the basis for the formulation of the concept for the organizational development of the Armed Forces.

This section of military doctrine focuses its attention on assessing the possible nature of military conflicts in present-day conditions, the strategic aims of the use of military force, the tasks of the state in the defense sphere, and the procedure for the use of and the main aims and principles behind the organizational development of the Armed Forces and other troops.

The military doctrine presupposes that during the present period and for the foreseeable future the likelihood of a world nuclear or world conventional war being unleashed, although not eliminated completely, has lessened considerably. Local wars and armed conflicts pose the main danger to stability and peace. The likelihood of their arising in individual regions is increasing. This is fully borne out by the development of events in Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Dniester Region, Abkhazia, and Tajikistan.

The military doctrine defines as the main aim for the use of Russian Federation Armed Forces in armed conflicts and local wars the prompt localization of a seat of tension and the suppression of military operations at the earliest possible stage in the interests of creating the preconditions for settling a conflict peacefully on conditions that accord with the interests of the Russian Federation.

As for wars on a larger scale, the Russian Federation military doctrine notes the need to train the Armed Forces to conduct both defensive and offensive operations, in conditions of the massive use of present and future weapons [sovremennye i perspektivnyye sredstva porazheniya] in any scenario where war is unleashed and conducted. The Russian military doctrine avoids absolutizing any one category and method of waging combat operations. It gears command personnel and staffs to choosing, when repulsing aggression, precisely those forms, methods, and means of armed struggle that accord with its laws and the conditions of the prevailing situation.

One of the top-priority avenues for the organizational development of the Armed Forces is the creation of mobile forces capable of being rapidly redeployed [perebroska] to certain regions within the shortest possible time. They are designed to reinforce peacetime groups of troops in strategic regions and theaters of military operations, perform with them tasks in local and regional conflicts, and also ensure the deployment of Supreme High Command reserves.

The basic provisions indicate that through the year 1996 the main efforts in the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces are concentrated on performing the following tasks:

creating groups of troops (forces) on Russian territory in accordance with their designation and tasks;

complete the withdrawal to Russian territory of combined units and units stationed outside Russia;

reduce the numerical strength of the Armed Forces to the prescribed level;

continue the switch to a mixed system of manning;

complete research and development studies to validate the structure of Armed Forces combat personnel after 1995.

During the period 1996-2000 the following are envisaged: the reorganization of the structure of the Armed Forces; the completion of the switch to the mixed principle of manning; the completion of the creation of groups of troops (forces) and a military infrastructure on the territory of the Russian Federation.

A new element is the provision that the security interests of the Russian Federation and other members of the CIS may make it necessary to site Russian Federation troops (forces) and weapons outside its territory. Russian troops may be part of joint or Russian groupings and individual bases or installations.

The military-technical foundations of the military doctrine reflect the views of the aim and tasks of the state's activity in the military-technical sphere and the main avenues for the development of the defense industry complex, as well as military-technical cooperation with foreign countries.

The Russian Federation's main aim in the military-technical sphere is to equip and supply the Armed Forces and other troops in a timely fashion with effective arms systems, military and special equipment, and property in quantities necessary and adequate for the guaranteed defense of the vital interests of society and state.

What is more, the military-technical foundations of the military doctrine lay down the main avenues for the development of defense industry potential and military-technical cooperation with foreign countries.

In conclusion the defense minister pointed out that the basic provisions of the military doctrine can and must be refined on the basis of changes in political, economic, and military conditions. Doctrinal directives are essential for the completion of strategic and mobilization planning and to coordinate the efforts of all forces and means of ensuring Russia's military security. This document is the basis of the Concept for the Organizational Development of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and will help to coordinate the efforts of various ministries and departments in the interests of ensuring the country's security.

After his introductory address Army General Pavel Grachev answered numerous questions from journalists. The defense minister answered in particular a question from your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent by giving two instances, on the basis of the military doctrine, when the Russian Federation might use its nuclear weapons against a state that does not possess these weapons. These being in the event of an armed attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, or allies by such a state linked by alliance agreements with a nuclear state, and in the event of joint actions by such a state with a state that does possess nuclear weapons in carrying out or backing an incursion or military attack on the Russian Federation.

The defense minister stressed when answering questions that, apart from helping Russian internal affairs organs, the Russian Federation Armed Forces may be given the tasks of assisting border troops to guard the state border, helping other forces safeguard maritime communications, important state installations and economic zones, and combating terrorism, drugs trafficking, and piracy.

With regard to the numerical strength of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Pavel Grachev remarked that the adopted document says that the numerical strength of the Army must be adequate to rebuff aggression. The defense minister stressed that the Law "On Defense" was drafted not by the Ministry of Defense, but by the former Supreme Soviet. It enshrines the idea that the Army should comprise 1 percent of the country's population. But, Army General Grachev said, it turns out that this does not take into consideration either the economic aspect of the numerical strength of the Armed Forces or the political and geographical aspects. That is why the doctrine does not give a specific figure for the numerical strength of the Army. The defense minister emphasized that the reduction in the Armed Forces will be continued within sensible limits.

Grachev Questioned on Doctrine

PM0411122593 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 2

[Report by Igor Chernyak: "New Russian Military Doctrine: Both the 'Doves' and the 'Hawks' are Thinking About It"]

[Text] On entering the Russian Federation Defense Ministry building the journalists were drawn up in a long line and searched. The foreigners looked somewhat dismayed and pointed out that they are now even let into the Lubyanka without any fuss. They were going to attend Pavel Grachev's press conference on the adoption of a Russian military doctrine.

The defense minister stated that this military doctrine is the first document of its kind in the history of the former USSR and Russia: "We used to be guided by the decisions of congresses, by party instructions and government decrees, but now all this is changing." The doctrine comprises three parts: political, military, and military-technical. One might mention certain elements of it. First and foremost, unlike the former Soviet Union, which pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, Russia does not make such a pledge. The doctrine does say that the Russian Federation does not regard any state as an enemy, will not use military force against any state except for the purposes of individual or collective self-defense, and, moreover, will not use nuclear weapons against countries that are party to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. "But the text says nothing about those who possess them," Grachev said, shrugging his shoulders. He then observed that the United States had made no clear commitments on this score either, and he guaranteed that a single person, even a president, would not be able to use nuclear weapons.

The second element is the permissible use of the Army inside the country. Grachev rejected the suggestion that this thesis was incorporated in the doctrine after the 3-4 October events: "The foundations of the doctrine were devised a long time ago, and these events confirmed that we had taken the right route." The defense minister did not specify who decides that armed forces need to be used to "immediately localize possible armed conflicts inside the country" or to stop mass disturbances. He said: "Not me, though." As is well known, until recently a number of generals were opposed to the inclusion of this task in the text of the doctrine, however, to all appearances, their arguments were not taken into account.

Pavel Grachev's announcement that there is no mention in the doctrine of the planned numerical strength of the Russian Federation armed forces can be regarded as a kind of sensation. Whereas before, in accordance with the Law on Defense, it was planned to bring the number of servicemen up to 1 percent of the country's adult population, now it is acknowledged that the law was adopted without regard for the actual situation and it had to be disregarded. Curiously enough, the defense minister had formerly been very complimentary about the package of military laws and had spoken highly of the collaboration between the Defense Ministry and parliament and interested departments during their preparation. But now Grachev reckons that these laws were adopted in haste by people who were incompetent in military matters, and so everything that was previously adopted by the Supreme Soviet and that contradicted the doctrine will be reviewed by the new parliament.

The Russian armed forces are henceforth legally entitled to be outside Russia if the interests of both Russia itself and the other CIS countries so require, and also when participating in peacemaking operations.

The defense minister stressed that the doctrine was adopted at the Security Council, with 100 percent of its members participating, and they all certified that they accepted the final version, whereupon the president also signed it, so the doctrine will not be going through any federal assemblies or other forums. At the same time, he said that its basic provisions can be adjusted on the basis of a change in political, economic or other conditions.

Asked when the military doctrine would be published, Grachev replied that its text is marked "Not For Publication" and the taking of copies is prohibited.

The Russian defense minister reacted very strongly to those journalists who are predicting his resignation by 7 November. He pointed out that on 2 November both Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and President Boris Yeltsin had given their own assessment of the activity of the armed forces and therefore of the defense minister. According to Grachev, these pronouncements indicate that there are no grounds at all for talk of his resignation.

The army general also announced that he had not recommended officers and generals to participate in the election campaign. But the Russian Federation Defense Minister has few worries about the participation of soldiers, sergeants, and contract servicemen in it: Let them put their names forward—the generals do not intend to place any obstacles in their way.

Yeltsin Aide Outlines Doctrine

AU0311223693 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 29 Oct 93 p 8

[Interview with General Valeriy Manilov, deputy secretary of the Security Council, by Jan Rozdzynski; place and date not given: "Poles—You Have No Reason To Be Afraid"]

[Text] [Rozdzynski] There is much speculation surrounding the new Russian military doctrine. At what stage is the work on the doctrine? Who is working on it?

[Manilov] I do not want to talk about speculation. I hope that the speculation stems solely from ignorance and not from some conscious desire to pursue political games of some kind. Let us explain straightaway that there is no "doctrine," but only a draft "Basic Theses of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." It contains a comprehensive overview of the security of the citizen, society, and the state; the prevention of war; and the functioning of the Armed Forces. It is ready for signing by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. That will no doubt happen in the next few days.

Access to the document—until it comes into force—is restricted to a very narrow circle of people, the 14 members of the Security Council and several employees who are directly involved in work on the document. The content of the "theses" was discussed on numerous occasions and formulated over quite a long period of time. It was envisaged that they would be submitted to parliament for approval. In their present form, the "theses" relate to the transitional period in which our state finds itself and take account of new geopolitical realities.

[Rozdzynski] The Russian press estimates that the transition period will last five to seven years. Do the "theses" proceed from a similar assumption?

[Manilov] No. In the current domestic situation, no serious person is in a position to state precisely how long the transition period from the command system in all areas of life to a democratic system and Russia's new place in the international arena will take. Speaking figuratively, when Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov will consciously begin to observe new laws, think in new categories, when the changes are so far advanced that a return to the old order is impossible, then that period will be over. That is why the "theses" can be adjusted to possible changes in the political, military, and economic situations as well as the international situation.

[Rozdzynski] Will the "theses" allow for the possibility that Russia may join military blocs? For example, NATO?

[Manilov] The document does not state anything precise about that, but it does not rule out such a possibility. On the other hand, the basic assumption contained in it is that Russia does not intend to threaten any state, and that it will not seek to achieve political ends through the use of military force. That would indicate that we are opposed to closed military blocs, that we are opposed to the expansion of blocs that threaten other states. However, because the "theses" have an open character, they do not exclude the possibility of Russia joining international military- political organizations.

[Rozdzynski] Do the "theses" define Russian spheres of influence?

[Manilov] Every state defends its interests. As a power, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia practically has interests all over the world. However, we believe that they cannot pose threats to any state.

[Rozdzynski] Including the former republics of the former USSR?

[Manilov] We have interests there of a historical, economic, cultural, and military kind. The path of politics is the basic means of realizing those interests contained in the "theses." However, if there is a threat, we will undertake measures in accordance with international law. That is why Russian forces are present in trouble spots near our borders with Central Asia and the Caucasus. I want to stress that in none of those cases has Russia used military force to protect its interests. Our forces are not involved in those conflicts on any particular side. They are performing peace missions. From that angle, the former remain in the Russian sphere of interest.

[Rozdzynski] What about former socialist bloc states?

[Manilov] If military force was previously used to subordinate the states belonging to the Warsaw Pact, which in theory had a "defensive" character, then protecting Russia's interests has an entirely different meaning now. It amounts to the statement in the "theses" on establishing equal, truly partner-like relations based on confidence and mutual advantage, irrespective of the size and potential of each state. That is discussed in the preamble to the "theses."

[Rozdzynski] Could you state more precisely what the "theses" say about Poland and the states of Eastern and Central Europe?

[Manilov] They do not mention Poland as such. On the other hand, the "theses" accord the region of Central Europe a priority status. It comes second after the CIS countries.

[Rozdzynski] What do the "theses" say about hindering those states from realizing their sovereign intentions, such as, for example, joining NATO?

[Manilov] We do not intend to return to the language of the past in any form: ultimatums, threats.

[Rozdzynski] Perhaps it has now been replaced by "the language of secret letters"? For example, the letter from the Russian president to the U.S. President about admitting Moscow's former satellites to the Warsaw Pact.

[Manilov] The language of letters is always better than the language of guns and tanks. I think that there is no real basis for fears that Russia will create obstacles of some kind for those states—including Poland—to prevent them from making sovereign decisions. The one case that we would find unacceptable would be one in which the expansion of any military-political bloc would occur in a way that would harm Russia's interests, would be a threat to Russia and signify the preparation of aggression against Russia. If, on the other hand, any military bloc expands in order to stabilize security, then we would have no reservations.

[Rozdzynski] Does that mean that Poland should not fear what the "theses" contain?

[Manilov] It should not.

[Rozdzynski] But from what you say, it appears that Russia is still aspiring to the role of a great power.

[Manilov] That depends on how one understands that. In view of its scale and potential, our state is a great power. However, the "theses" talk about building a new

form of Russian statehood, a new active role in foreign policy, about really safeguarding territorial integrity as well as development in the social, economic areas and using new methods; about partner-like relations with other entities in the international arena.

[Rozdzynski] Partnership is one thing, but Russia still possesses an enormous military arsenal. Can those two elements be reconciled with each other?

[Manilov] Russia, as the "theses" state, supports the practical fulfillment of all treaties in the nuclear disarmament field and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons of all kinds in the longer term. There are plans to reduce our nuclear potential to the essential minimum for preventing a potential aggressor from invading Russia and its allies.

Today, we do consider our nuclear weapons to be a political factor, not an instrument of warfare. The very knowledge that we have such weapons should prevent any potential enemy from making plans to attack us.

Security Council Official Comments

LD0311173493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovsky, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] Russia's military doctrine confirmed by the Security Council on Tuesday [2 November] is the first document of this kind which expresses positions of the state as a whole and not that of separate power departments, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Valery Manilov said in an exclusive interview with Interfax. That is why, he continued, the doctrine establishes the state's means of reaction to any threat to Russia's independence and integrity or to its citizens.

According to Manilov, regional conflicts and local wars, the number of which has increased by 30 times over the last 5 years and currently accounts for about 70 "hot spots", present the major source of threat to stability in the world. The doctrine stipulates that one of the main purposes of Russian armed forces is to localize hearths of tension and create the premises for peaceful settlement of any armed confrontation.

The doctrine especially emphasizes that, in accordance with the Russian Constitution, the armed forces and other Russian forces (interior, frontier and security forces) cannot be used in the interests of separate groups and individuals, parties and public associations.

The document states that the Russian government is responsible for the state of the Russian armed forces and that the defense minister is directly responsible for the command of the forces. This provision of Russia's military doctrine, Manilov underlined, fixes the democratic principle of armed forces command on the part of supreme bodies of civil authorities. As he said, this model meets the course aimed at the creation of a democratic society in our country.

At the request of Interfax special correspondents V.Terekhov and B.Grishchenko, Manilov made comments on the doctrine's section devoted to military-technical and economic problems. The top-ranking representative of Russian Security Council drew attention to the task which is specially emphasized in this document, namely the need to rationally use the country's industrial-defense potential. The doctrine stresses that this potential should not be a burden to society.

The document depicts the model of Russia's industrial-defense complex's activity under the system of market relations. According to the authors of this doctrine, the competitive basis of arms design and development should rule out damaging duplication in the process of creation and production of various kinds of armaments. This should result in rational spending of funds.

At the same time, Manilov underlined, priority should be given to high quality technical equipping of the Russian army. The Russian army should be armed with the most advanced and modern military equipment, says the doctrine. The doctrine mentions as an obligatory provision that the Russian army's weaponry should correspond to world standards. In particular, for the first time Russia's military doctrine provides for development of systems and means to ensure individual security of every soldier.

The doctrine, Manilov said, consists of three main sections: the doctrine's political principles, military principles and technical and economic principles. This statement was made by the deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council and head of the council's commission for the doctrine's finalization, Valery Manilov, in an interview with Interfax today. He said the document was laid down on incomplete 24 pages.

As Manilov pointed out, the doctrine provides a definition of the vital interests of Russia's security in a radically new manner. They are determined according to the principle of not affecting the interests of other states in the world and regional security systems. Russia's relations with other states are to be built on the basis of equal rights and mutual benefit.

Manilov said the first, political section stated that Russia had no potential enemy. The political principles stipulate that the doctrine's supreme goal is the prevention of wars and armed conflicts and the preservation of the country's sovereignty, integrity, independence and natural resources. Russia is supposed to cooperate in this fields with the CIS states in the first place and Central and East European countries.

The same section stipulates that Russia observed the principles of peaceful settlement of territorial disputes and non-violability of state borders. Russia treats no state as its enemy. The country will never use force except when it or its allies are attacked.

The chapter also classifies external sources of military threat. The document points out: "Though the threat of world war has not been eliminated yet, it has considerably reduced by now. The main current source of danger is local wars and regional conflicts. This danger is constantly growing."

According to the second, military section, Russia's goal is to prevent the escalation of conventional armed conflicts into a nuclear war or use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Russian nuclear complex is considered only as a deterrent means against attempts to unleash war against Russia or its allies.

Manilov said that for the first time the pace and scale of construction of Russia's armed forces and other troops was aligned with the actual situation in the world and capabilities of the Russian Federation. Now the military and industrial complex ceases to be the society's heaviest burden.

Regarding the internal security threats, the document states that the armed forces and other forces of the Russian Federation may be involved according to the military doctrine only in the following cases: intensification of hostilities by nationalist and separatist groups which represents a threat to Russia and its integrity; attempts to undermine the constitutional system by force; attacks on nuclear power or chemical installations; creation of illegal armed groups.

Security Council Secretary Comments

PM0311185793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov by Vasiliy Kononenko; place and date not given: "Russia's Military Doctrine Contains No Obligation To Refrain From Being First To Use Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] The Basic Guidelines of Russia's Military Doctrine, adopted 2 November at a sitting of the Russian Security Council and ratified by President Boris Yeltsin, contain many surprises. One of them is that the text of this document does not contain the obligation, which the leaders of the former Soviet Union declared in their political statements, that Russia will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Our correspondent Vasiliy Kononenko spoke to Russian Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov.

[Lobov] Work on the military doctrine began back in April. But the approaches have changed. For instance, events in Moldova, Tajikistan, and Georgia, certain changes in Ukraine's stance on nuclear weapons, a change in the situation within the country, the conversion program—all these required specific amendments to the doctrine. Of course the October mutiny forced us to speed up work on this document. All Security Council members made their proposals and signed the document.

[Kononenko] Which provisions were the subject of the main differences of opinion?

[Lobov] The experts' analysis on the question of Russia using nuclear weapons proved to be the most lengthy. The basic approach here is that nuclear war in the present conditions is senseless. Even if you do not use nuclear weapons you can destroy nuclear reactors, and huge areas of the world will be in the nuclear destruction zone.

Russia advocates the elaboration of a system of collective security which would guarantee the prevention of war—both nuclear and conventional. But if such a war is nevertheless unleashed against Russia and its allies, then we will have the right to use all the resources we have at our disposal to protect our vital interests. This approach was elaborated collectively.

[Kononenko] When conflicts have emerged within the country, the Army has repeatedly found itself in an ambiguous position. Have its role and functions been defined at long last?

[Lobov] Yes, the cases in which the Armed Forces can come into operation in internal conflicts have been defined. Proceeding from the premise that the security of Russians and the state as a whole comes first, the doctrine presupposes the use of Army subunits, Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, Border Guard Troops, and other troops in cases when all other material and human resources have been exhausted. For example, in Tajikistan, to which we are tied by the relevant treaty, there have proved to be insufficient border guard troops, and other Army subunits have been put into operation. Troops can also be used in the event of the threat of a terrorist act in respect of a nuclear electric power station, major chemical enterprises, or main transport routes. The president can adopt such a decision.

An important aspect of the doctrine is the state's responsibility for the social protection of the Armed Forces and the serviceman as an individual. This must be stipulated by Russian Federation laws.

As far as cutbacks in the Army are concerned, then the document outlines this. Furthermore, the Armed Forces should be mobile, equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and hardware. Means of individual protection and combat should be provided for every serviceman, including a reliable bullet-proof vest, a night vision apparatus, and effective weapons. This is state policy. Specific programs should follow in its wake.

[Kononenko] The military doctrine that has been adopted is only one element of the extensive and strictly secret work which is being conducted in the structures of the Security Council. The Former Supreme Soviet repeatedly called into question the competence of this organ's decisions. To what extent is it nevertheless legitimate?

[Lobov] Let us start with the basic document which is called the Russian Federation Law on Security. It says that the objects which the state is called upon to protect are the individual, his rights and freedoms, society, its material and spiritual assets, and the state and its constitutional system and territorial integrity. Amendments concerning the status and purpose of the Security Council have also been included in the draft of the new Constitution by the Constitutional Conference Working Commission. Thus, this organ is constitutional both according to the old Basic Law and the new one. [Lobov ends]

Following O. Lobov's appointment as Security Council secretary, its apparatus has been reorganized. Ten interdepartmental commissions have been formed. Before, there were five. These commissions are the basic working organs of the Security Council, and they ensure that strategic problems are considered and resolved in the sphere of military, economic, environmental, and information security, health protection, the fight against crime and corruption, and public security.

Moscow Military District Commander Did Not Disobey Order

PM0411103193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 1

[Report by Colonel Vladimir Guryanov of Moscow Military District Press Group: "There Were No Plans For Aerial Bombardment of White House"]

[Text] Recently some Moscow newspapers have been citing a so-called "reliable source" and saying that Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov, commander of Moscow Military District, refused to carry out Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's order to use missiles fired from helicopters against the White House 4 October.

The Moscow Military District Press Group is empowered to state that the District commander received no such order from the Russian Federation defense minister. District aircraft were not involved in the events of 3 and 4 October at all.

Economic Issues

Soskovets Interviewed on Reform, Industrial Policy

LD0311221493 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1505 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Interview with First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; from the "Vesti" newscast—live or recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Oleg Nikolayevich, I would like to hear your impressions of the Council of Ministers meeting. At that meeting the economy was described as being in a state of fragile balance, wasn't it? How long will this situation last? Is there a chance that the economy could somehow be sorted out in the near future?

[Soskovets] First of all, I would like to note what the president, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, said in his speech. He made the following assessment of the government's work. In spite of individual criticisms and, of course, some questions, which have not yet been resolved, a general trend towards positive work in the government is visible, the president said. His arguments in support of this conclusion were quite substantial and justified.

The actual report by the chairman of the government demonstrated a very balanced approach and a sober assessment of the situation, which actually stands in the economy at the moment. The fairly acute problems which, unfortunately, still prevent us from achieving stability, were not bypassed. In referring to this phrase "fragile balance," I have to say that, in my view, the main stage of reform has already been completed. There can, of course, be no going back now. There is only one issue at stake, to mold the kind of production relations that will be accepted by the market, first and foremost, to mold our own market in Russia and the CIS countries, to ensure that world levels of product quality are achieved to the greatest extent possible.

[Correspondent] You speak of state management of the economy, even though we are all moving with gigantic strides toward the market.

[Soskovets] I understand very well what state management of the economy means because, when I used to work in the old system of rigid planning and strict control over the activities of enterprises, I basically had to report back every day. I had to report back to the ministry every 24 hours via various structures and services. I would never like to repeat such a form of so-called management. So, of course, there must not be any direct state management or interference with the activities of enterprises. The system of legislation must be arranged in a way that ensures that the activities of enterprises definitely do not harm the economic development of a given region or the state itself, ensures that they are beneficial. That is what we are working towards. We are seeking to define what constitutes effective work by an enterprise, to define the nature of the market in which it operates nowadays, to define the tax system. This tax system must definitely be progressive and not discriminatory as far as production is concerned. These are the main areas in which I envisage state involvement in the activities of enterprises and industry.

[Correspondent] You have drawn up a program for Russia's industrial policies, haven't you? The Council of Ministers adopted it. Will this program help enterprises?

[Soskovets] The main processes that should undoubtedly put the economy and state system in order, are those conditions under which so-called motivation will take place in manufacturing. Unfortunately we have yet to create those conditions although the awareness of heads

of enterprises and state management has altered sufficiently in regard to privatization, and I have to say that that is the most consistent work.

But having said this, the bank system is not working at all in relation to mutual payments and in relation to the possibility of giving loans to manufacturing and it ruins the prospects of many positive steps or positive declared intentions by heads of enterprises or joint stock companies to make investments or produce new goods or tackle military conversion matters or create new technologies or develop new scientific and technical programs. Unfortunately, the main trends that will allow for the economic civilization, toward which we aspire, have for the time being not been reached and we are working on it. Our industrial policy emphasizes these fundamental trends that we need to work on today.

[Correspondent] Well, based on the experience you have acquired from your tours of large enterprises and conversations with their directors—I myself recollect how they would be always saying: We are being choked by taxation, give us loans...

[Soskovets interrupting] To toughen the policy today in relation to increasing revenue toward the federal budget through taxes would in practice be inexpedient and shortsighted. Therefore, the main part of our work is to expand reproduction of capital, increase productivity, and increase goods production. But for the time being, to one degree or another, we are keeping silent.

To say that increasing the volumes of goods output is an end in itself without analytically evaluating the financial results of the work would be wrong. Therefore, the federal budget's losses linked to the reduction in the volume of manufacturing for various reasons—the inability to produce goods or manufacturing with low productivity and high expenses, especially on energy, which is most of all apparent now, the impossibility of selling goods—something that now, more than anything else, is slowing down reproduction of capital and the organization of production, these, then, are our main failings now. Therefore, when people start talking about some tax percentage or other, I think that general concern about the economy should begin with concern about manufacturing, about who is responsible for manufacturing today.

[Correspondent] We have more or less got through 1993. Now 1994 is approaching. Now there will be nobody to lay the blame upon. The old parliament is gone and now we are to have a democratic parliament. Everyone is going to work in a single team. But to what extent is the government ready, to what extent is the national economic complex ready, to meet 1994?

[Soskovets] The president, in his speech, had also pointed out that political obstacles that, in one way or another, impeded the work of the government in the past have now been removed and, of course, the responsibility for what is happening now in Russia as a country rests fully with the executive power. This is why no final decision was taken regarding the resolution of this government's sitting. Substantial amendments were made to its text by the heads of administrations and republican government leaders with the view of presenting it in more concrete terms. The president personally made suggestions, generally expected, to indicate the main areas for implementation of the economic reform.

[Correspondent] So, how will we live now?

[Soskovets] We will live normally. But in order to achieve this, we should all, of course, work hard. Everyone has already seen it for themselves, and enough has already been said by heads of state and government to the effect that the independence of Russia and the improvement in the quality of life should depend on the citizens of our country themselves. The realization that we ourselves should and can provide for our livelihood is gradually beginning to enter the minds of our citizens and, thank God, our government leads the way.

[Correspondent] In whom do you personally place your hopes for the revival of Russia, its economy and industry—in the new parliament or the new government?

[Soskovets] No, my own hope lies in the president's work. I do not hope that the new parliament will bring any substantial change into our life and the economy. They should first sort out their status and the Constitution and find their place in the present structure of Russia's life.

[Correspondent] Speaking of the forthcoming elections to the new parliament and participation of some members of the Cabinet of Ministers, Oleg Soskovets recalled that 12 ministers of the various branches of industry and chairmen of the committees, as well as him personally, have refused to put forward their nominations for the Federal Assembly.

[Soskovets] Undoubtedly, each person is free to make his own decisions and there can be no collective approaches or decisions of any kind that would demand compulsory participation in the elections. Although the president has issued a decree stating that members of the government may nominate themselves as candidates for the deputies' seats and can be elected, I realize what a distraction from one's work the election campaign must be. I myself had the experience of taking part in the elections as a people's deputy of the former USSR. This is an enormous distraction from the industrial activity and takes a considerable amount of one's time, as well as physical and moral strength. To work as a member of the government and carry out such a campaign at the same time today is, in my opinion, not an entirely realistic option, because one's everyday chores and routines have already been fixed and they demand one's full involvement in the life of industrial collectives, in taking decisions on the questions connected with the economic or industrial problems which, I believe, are the most important tasks at the moment.

Therefore, the industrial bloc of ministers adopted this decision. It was a conscious decision, it was not some sort of collective decision. As for those of our colleagues who are standing as deputies to the new parliament, I would simply wish them success in their election work. This is indeed a very responsible stage of work. It is necessary to establish oneself, it is necessary to demonstrate that the program of a particular party or movement will be accepted today by the people, and naturally, it must be implemented. I also hope that their work during the elections will be very positive and that they will become deputies. But I do not see myself combining my work in the government with work in the duma or in the parliament. I prefer to stick with what I am capable of or at least with what I know.

Gaydar Comments on Taxes, Budget

LD0311183793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1120 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Russian First Vice Premier and Economics Minister Yegor Gaydar has declared that the Russian government considers stabilization of the national budget, tax regulation and liberalization of foreign economic activity as its priority tasks for the time being. On Tuesday [2 November] evening he addressed a sitting of the public club Reforms via Interaction.

Gaydar reported that the government, in particular, is developing a draft of presidential decree to introduce changes into tax legislation providing for reduction of the number of tax benefits, increase of independence of local budgets and reduction of possibility to evade taxes. According to the first vice-premier, it is also necessary to develop and adopt a decree on integration of extra-budget funds into the budget "in the near term." This document provides for introduction of highway transport fund and fund of employment, earlier under control of the parliament, into the state budget.

Gaydar views the reduction of subsidies allocated to separate branches of industry and regions as a separate stage to pursuing a tough monetary credit policy. The government also intends to issue medium term securities for the population to ensure non-emission financing of the budget deficit. He underlined that currently the Council of Ministers was debating the idea of exempting from taxation funds spent for the procurement of state securities.

Russia's government, says Gaydar, intends "to adopt a number of measures" to increase investment in the Russian economy by foreign investors. In particular, it intends to start several large projects with the involvement of foreign firms.

In an exclusive interview with Interfax Gaydar, in particular, mentioned the project providing for oil and gas extraction in the Sakhalin shelf Sakhalin-2.

"We await that the government and consortium MMMSM [McDermott, Mitsui, Marathon, Shell, and Mitsubishi], which has won the tender to prepare the project, will come out as counteragents in the self's development," declared Gaydar. In his opinion, final negotiations between the Russian party and the consortium on provisions to develop the deposits can result in signing of an agreement in January, 1994.

Finance Minister Assesses Fiscal Policy

AU0311170793 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 1 Nov 93 p 12

[Klaus C. Engelen/Bernd Ziesemer report on interview with Finance Minister Boris Fedorov in Ebenhausen, Germany; date not given: "More Reforms in 1993 Than Last Year"]

[Text] Ebenhausen—"Despite the parliament's vehement obstructionism and numerous political setbacks, in the restructuring of the Russian economy along market economy lines more progress has been made in the year 1993 than in 1992." Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov struck this surprisingly positive balance in an interview for HANDELSBLATT.

"I can mention at least 20 decisions that we pushed through against enormous resistance and which are permanently changing stability and the people's living conditions, but also the institutions, in accordance with the reforms," said the Russian finance minister, who has a good chance of becoming the president of a reformed Russian central bank after a favorable election result for Yeltsin's camp.

"It is imperative for us to take another 20 important steps before we can talk of normal economic policy conditions that are in line with the market economy." Fedorov attended a special conference on the stage of the Russian reform and monetary policies organized by the Foundation for Science and Politics and the HANDELSBLATT in Ebenhausen near Munich.

This year the further liberalization of the prices of coal, oil products, grain, and bread has been very important for the desired macroeconomic stabilization. In this way, it has been possible to reduce the waste of resources. As important raw material prices are brought up to the world market level in the Russian Federation, one can effectively counteract "the dumping of resources by exports to foreign markets." Since virtually the whole of the retail trade is meanwhile in private hands, one cannot talk of a supply crisis any longer, he said.

Even though inflation is still on an extremely high level, it has been possible to stop the further decline in prices. "I proceed on the assumption that we will be able to reduce the rate of price increase of 15 to 18 percent per month at the beginning of the year to 1 to 3 percent in December 1994," said Fedorov, who, however, "prefers to go to into the free market economy if the inflation rate is still at 5 to 7 percent per month at the end of next year." The finance minister regards it as another piece of good news that interest rates, which increased from 80 to

210 percent per year from March to October, "are increasingly tending toward the desired positive real interest." Since the annual rate of interest, calculated on a monthly basis, is about 600 percent, the distance to the inflation rate of 1,000 percent has been reduced.

As "it will only be possible to obtain all loans of the individual economic sectors that are not directly raised via the budget at drastically higher interest cost in the future, the demand for loans has already been curbed." Thus, one is going "to put a stop to massive loan subsidies via interest rates that are not in line with real market conditions."

The termination of the so-called "technical granting of loans" or "automatic loans" by the Russian central bank for other CIS republics covers another aspect of inflation. One cannot talk of a "ruble zone" because each of the other republics is responsible for its own currency. As the finance minister, he has to take care that the Russian central bank sticks to the money creation limits that have been set for it and does not covertly finance loans via technical help for the emergency equipment of individual CIS republics, he said.

However, the new fiscal policy course is critical. It is true that Russia's budget deficit of $15 billion for the current year is still about 10 percent of the national product, instead of 5 percent of the national product, which is desired by the IMF. As compared to last year's budget, which was concluded with a deficit of almost 25 percent of the national product, the budget deficit that is beginning to show for 1993 is so far a clear improvement as "numerous special budgets are included this time." However, the budget reform, which was initiated this year, will be of critical importance. It should result in more transparency regarding revenues and expenses in the central budget on the one hand, and shifts part of the revenues and expenses to the 89 regional public budgets in the Russian Federation, on the other. Certain elements of revenue equalization are established by means of this first fiscal reform. About half of the regional bodies show deficits and have to get a compensation. The introduction of new state financing instruments, that is, treasury bonds, gold certificates, and loans in small denominations for the masses of savers, is also part of the fiscal reform, he said.

In this way, it will only be possible to finance 5 percent of the state deficit this year and possibly 30 to 50 percent next year. Fedorov, who is acting for the second time as finance minister in Moscow, is particularly proud of the fact that he "was able to prevent bad things and continued to be steadfast" regarding subsidies for the agricultural sector. Here he succeeded "in maintaining the budget approaches despite major political pressure." However, the Russian agriculture sector continues to be the "black hole" where state subsidies amounting to billions of rubles may disappear very quickly. Fedorov places his hopes in the 250,000 new private agricultural enterprises, which are newly motivated by the opportunity created by a decree of Yeltsin to acquire real estate of their own.

The government has also made progress in the stabilization of exchange rates. The abrupt fall in the value of the ruble has come to a standstill. Today it pays to change over from the dollar to the ruble for several months and to get a real interest of 22 to 25 percent for several months. It is a positive signal that firms and private persons are holding today $18 billion in dollars and other hard currencies in the Russian banking system, as compared to only a few hundred million last year. Completely in accordance with its restrictive budget policy, the government has ensured that the assigned foreign exchange for hard currency imports is also reduced. Fedorov: "We had originally planned $6.5 billion for grain, meat, and similar centrally controlled imports in 1993, but we will be able to do with $2.5 billion. As of November, we will only reduce central imports of baby food or medical products so that we should be able to manage with $500 million next year."

Fedorov's message to the West: "Russia is too large for Western help to be decisive. Only if Russia sets the right course will the train of reform be able to continue on its way and speed up."

Finance Ministry Tightens Tax Policy Toward Regions

MK0211114093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 73, 2 Nov 93 (signed to press 1 Nov) p 3

[Yelena Kolokoltseva report in the "Taxes" column: "The Government Intends To Use Economic Sanctions Against the Regions"]

[Text] The Russian president's edict on applying economic sanctions against republics and other territorial formations as part of the Russia Federation for failure to pay taxes to the federal budget is a logical continuation of a series of steps by the Russian executive branch to limit the republics' and autonomies' aspirations toward sovereignization. The edict in particular empowers the Russian Federation Government in the period from 1 November to 31 January to suspend the financing of enterprises and establishments on the territory of formations that do not pay taxes into the state budget of the Russian Federation; to withhold quotas for foreign economic activity; reduce deliveries of state resources, including imports; and also regulate, depending on the volume of underpaid taxes to the republican budget, the size of centralized state credits. For its part the Russian Central Bank has been instructed within this period to write off the sums due to be remitted to the federal budget from the operation accounts of the republics and other territorial formations as part of Russia.

No doubt, this measure is necessary. The tax immunity proclaimed by Tatarstan, Yakutia, and Bashkiria has cost the federal budget 250 billion rubles in the first half of 1993. State budget VAT and profit tax revenues have

fallen by 600 billion rubles; overall in the first nine months of 1993 the budget has lost 800 billion rubles as a result of a decline in tax payments by the regions to the federal budget. In September 1993 Altay Kray, Belgorodskaya, Voronezhskaya, and Yaroslavskaya Oblasts announced their decision to cut payments to the treasury. The oblast leadership cited short supplies of financial resources on centralized credits by the center as the main reason for their nonpayment. This reproach, it should be noted in fairness, is often justified because the Finance Ministry, in "adjusting" the quarterly state budget deficit, has a habit of moving the payments from one quarter to another. It was with the remaining credit resources for the third quarter in September 1993 that the government Commission on Credit Policy decided to allocate to the State Committee on Northern Territories 200 billion rubles above the established limit of 900 billion rubles. The same source was used to provide resources to Altay Kray, Chita Oblast, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast.

At the same time the Finance Ministry's forceful tactics, combined with the changes in the political situation, are yielding their results step by step. Tatarstan and Bashkiria have agreed in principle to repay their debt to the federal budget. The situation with Yakutia in somewhat more difficult. Several days ago INTERFAX reported a decision, allegedly agreed with the Finance Ministry, to grant Yakutia the right to retain the tax revenues to finance all federal programs on its territory. It appears dubious, however, that the Finance Ministry should have wanted to set such a precedent.

Central Bank Chairman Gerashchenko Denies Resignation Rumors

LD0311220193 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1630 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Report by M. Sarbaa, including recorded remarks by Viktor Gerashchenko, chairman of the Central Bank; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Viktor Gerashchenko, chairman of the Central Bank, gave a news conference today. He devoted his opening words to the analysis of the country's financial and credit policy and to the Central Bank's place in the system. At present the Russian Central Bank is engaged in putting into order the system of payments and accounts, inter alia hard-currency ones. No concrete explanations were given in this respect. As for rumors about his resignation, Gerashchenko replied:

[Gerashchenko] The president himself complained yesterday that draft decrees were being put on his desk all the time which are more appropriate for a state of emergency and not for a situation when the law must be observed. Under the law nobody can relieve me of my duties before the [Federal] Assembly has been elected.

[Sarbaa] The rumors about his resignation were connected with the accusations that the Central Bank had given money to parliament. Gerashchenko replied that he has already given appropriate explanations to the government. The procedure of giving money was not broken on 22 September since the government resolution had been prepared in secret and nobody told the Central Bank about it.

He could not avoid revelations either.

[Gerashchenko] It is interesting that on the same day by an instruction of the Finance Ministry, 300 million rubles were credited to the parliament's account.

Comments on Disagreements With Government

MK0411091093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 1

[Ivan Zasurskiy report in the "Money" column: "Gerashchenko Agrees With President About the Manageability of Reforms and Emergency Rule"]

[Text] Yesterday at the Russian Central Bank [RCB] Viktor Gerashchenko held a press conference envisioned as a briefing on current matters related to RCB activity. In light of the high passions around the bank and the figure of its chairman, the most interesting questions were those about the RCB head's possible resignation and his assessment of government policy. Viktor Gerashchenko used quotations from the president's speech at the Council of Ministers meeting the day before yesterday, not ruling out his resignation prior to the convocation of the Federal Assembly (although this, under Edict 1400, is illegal), and confirmed his old arguments about the impermissibility of some "side effects" of financial stabilization. The banker's position remains unchanged: one of proximity to moderate leaders in the government in the standoff between the Finance Ministry and the RCB, where Gerashchenko's role is minimal. Thus, in response to provocative questions about the accusations made in the press against the RCB, the head of the Russian Bank got away with observations that are already well known to attentive watchers: The RCB did not know that funds may not be provided to the Supreme Soviet (the government decree came in later while shortly before that the Finance Ministry remitted 300 million rubles to the Supreme Soviet's account).

The theses about the differences in interpreting the reasons for the unceasing inflation, in spite of the actual observance of the norms worked out jointly with the IMF, are no news to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA readers, either. What is news is that as of now, with IMF approval, certain amendments are being prepared to the May agreement between the government and the RCB with respect to money and credit policy.

Noteworthy is Mr. Gerashchenko's slip of the tongue when he said that there "were" instead of "are" chances for the creation of a new-type ruble zone. According to the RCB head, this problem remains more political rather than economic.

Regional Leaders Back Privatization Program

LD0311191193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1227 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Russian regional leaders supported the government privatisation programme which aims to create "a wide stratum of private owners", but bans privatisation of the subsurface, the forest fund, water resources, resources of the continental shelf and the historic and cultural heritage of Russia.

The document discussed at a meeting in Moscow on Wednesday [3 November] also aims to "involve into the privatisation process the maximum wide strata of the population", but does not regulate privatisation rules for housing and land.

A list of state enterprises which can float capital only according to a presidential decree or a government resolution has been compiled. It includes state information agencies and tv networks. The agencies include ITAR-TASS and RIA.

Officials Cited on Barriers to Land Speculation

PM0411102393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 3

[Veniamin Vylegzhanin commentary: "Will It Be Possible to Speculate in Land?"]

[Text] The decree "On the Regulation of Land Relations and the Development of Agrarian Reform in Russia" signed by the Russian Federation president continues to disturb people. How could it be otherwise? After all, it envisages the free sale and purchase of land. Very many people are worried about whether our peasants will be enslaved by Russian and foreign businessmen who will buy up the best land in Russia.

In the opinion of Aleksandr Kalinin, chief of the Russian Government's Agroindustrial Complex Department, and Valeriy Alakoz, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Committee for Land Resources, this will not happen. Land in our country will not be sold to foreign citizens at all. They will only be able to lease it for up to 50 years. Barriers will also be put in the way of Russian "money makers."

For instance, if land is used for agricultural production, homes cannot be built on it. Only the oblast or kray administration has the right to alter the designated purpose of a tract of land that has been bought. Nor will it be easy to make a mint when you resell the land. Valeriy Alakoz stated that taxes will be one measure to prevent land speculation. The figures are as yet provisional (they are currently being finalized) but impressive. If you sell the land within a year, the tax will amount to 70 percent of the land's market value, dropping to 50 percent for a sale after two years, and to 30 percent for a sale after three years. The price of land is as yet unknown. But it is expected to range between $100 and $1,000 per are in Moscow Oblast.

If a former kolkhoz member wants to sell a plot of land, then his neighbor, a local private farmer, or the Committee for Land Resources will have preferential rights to buy.

Thus it transpires from the edict that land will not be subject to speculation but will be transferred to efficient owners. The document provides a normative legal basis for the development of market relations in the agrarian sector, legally protects the right to own land, and defines the market mechanisms for its redistribution.

Economist Views Agricultural Issues

LD0311222893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2138 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vitaliy Gordiyenko]

[Text] Moscow November 4 TASS—The overwhelming majority of Russian landowners will not sell their land, according to Russia's leading economist Pavel Bunich.

In an interview with the weekly ROSSIISKY FERMER (RUSSIAN FARMER) published on Wednesday [3 November], Bunich said he believes in the necessity of the development of Russian farm agriculture. In seven to eight years "we will have enough farms," Bunich said.

He stressed the need for reducing taxes on agricultural produce. "It has been recognised in the whole world that the smaller the tax rate, the bigger its mass," Bunich said. He believes credits should be granted to agriculture on preferential terms through special banks. There are several such banks in Russia. "The government should subside them in order that they could provide farmers with preferential credits," Bunich noted.

Speaking about latifundia, Bunich stressed that they would be "highly unprofitable: they are ungovernable." They do not exist in other countries. "As a rule, there are no restrictions on the amount of land to be purchased," Bunich said, adding that the only restriction is economic efficiency. "But I have met other restrictions concerning the use of land, its fertility. There is a punishment for the exhaustion of land," he said.

Deputy Economics Minister Describes Reorganization Plans

LD0311191593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1239 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Ivantsov]

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Valery Fateyev, appointed recently to the post of deputy minister of economics, has described the reorganisation, started at the ministry, as the putting things in order at one's own home. Speaking at a press conference today, he pointed out that structural changes, due to take place at the ministry, would be the first step in the radical reforming of authorities of the executive branch for purposes of improving their efficiency in the implementation of the economic reform.

According to Fateyev, the first stage of the reorganisation, which should be completed before mid-December, envisages dramatic reductions in the number of departments and the personnel. Instead of 60 departments with the personnel of 2,000 making up the central administration of the ministry, some 40 departments will be left, which will employ about 650 specialists. The number of senior officials will also be dramatically reduced. The departments in charge of individual industries will be the first to be removed.

A strong analytical and forecasting department will be the core of the ministry, Fateyev continued. It will give short-term and long-term forecasts of the country's economic development. The department in charge of the defence industry will remain part of the new structure of the ministry during the transitional period.

A department in charge of the economic development of the regions will be a new one in the ministry. Regional policy will become one of the main spheres of work of the ministry after the reform, because the balanced combination of macroeconomic processes on the national scale and the taking into account of the characteristic features and interests of individual regions will be, in the opinion of Fateyev, one of the key problems in the reform strategy.

The emergence of new structures in the ministry, which will manage investment processes and regulate economic mechanisms reflect the need for adjusting to new economic conditions in Russia.

Unemployment 'Risk Factors' Increase 'Sharply'

PM0411100793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Risk of Unemployment Increasing"]

[Text] "The number of risk factors that could lead to a growth in unemployment across a number of Russian Federation regions is increasing sharply," Federal [Employment] Service Director Fedor Prokopov said at a meeting with journalists within the framework of the All-Russia Conference of Employment Service Leaders.

He announced that we may be entering a phase of bankruptcies—for example, this year will see the first closures of unprofitable coal mines, and all this will have an effect on the level of unemployment.

October Inflation Figures Detailed

LD0411052993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2155 GMT 3 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] News about inflation. Its level during October in the whole of Russia was 14.1 percent. The highest pace of price increases was recorded this time in the far eastern and west Siberian areas and in Moscow. Experts at the center for the economic situation under the Russian Government note that the steepest rises were in charges for public services—which were 9 percent on average in Moscow, following fare rises, they were three times as high. Inflation in St. Petersburg stood at 3.3 percent. That is somewhat lower than the average Russian level. On the whole, prices have grown by 6.5 times since the beginning of the year.

'Blank Spots' in Socioeconomic Statistics Noted

PM0311151393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the general heading "What Are Ministries 'Producing'? We Continue Our Reports on Election 'Gifts' to Russian Citizens From Officials": "State Committee for Statistics: All Well, But Only Moderately So"]

[Text] Our central statistical organ has drawn up another handbook analyzing the economic and social situation in the country in the first nine months of this year. Unfortunately, readers can sadly note that "blank spots" are again appearing in our statistics. It has long been noted that averaged indicators describe reality with the same degree of accuracy as an average temperature in the hospital. Yet this is precisely the method that the researchers are sticking to.

Let us look, in particular, at the "Social Sphere" section. From it we learn that the minimum living wage in September was 30,000 rubles [R]. While the average wage was around R80,000. All seems to be well—live life to the full and enjoy yourselves! However, if the social differentiation of the population is taken into account, it is easy to grasp that these figures mean absolutely nothing. We are combining the multimillion-ruble incomes of entrepreneurs with the minimal wages of modest employees in the budget sphere, and we get this impressive "average" amount.

Of course, in order to assess the living standard of different social strata of the Russian population and to determine which section of it is on the poverty line we need a breakdown of these statistics. The most surprising thing is that in previous handbooks that was what we got. For instance, in the statistical handbook for January-April 1993 we find a table breaking down the country's population by per capita income. There are 19 steps in the table. Each step indicates the number of people on the relative income level. This table allows us to easily conclude that around a third of Russian citizens have incomes that are no greater than the minimum living wage.

What about now? The real picture of the impact of economic reform on social processes has been watered down by these averaged indicators. This kind of gift is hardly likely to please either economists—who will have to do their own calculations—or ordinary readers.

Yeltsin Edict Sets Up Fund for Gas Enterprise

LD0311194893 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] An edict by President Boris Yeltsin set up a unified fund for the stabilization and development of Rosstroygazifikatsiya, the Russian state enterprise for the organization of gas use and gas supply. The relevant decree is directed at ensuring a balanced development of gas use under state regulation of natural gas prices. This was reported by the presidential press service.

Gold Mining Industry in 'Critical' Situation

LD0311210193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1558 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Ivantsov]

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—Representatives of the Association of Gold-Mining Industrialists of Russia described present-day situation in the industry as critical at a press conference here on Wednesday [3 November].

One of the most important sectors of state economy is under a threat of being thwarted because of government's chronic indebtedness in terms of payments for the extracted precious metal and a continual rise in fuel prices.

Prospectors' associations are in especially difficult position. According to the participants in the press conference, 200 prospectors' associations working throughout Russia's north contributed 60 per cent of a total of over 130 tonnes of gold delivered to the state in 1992.

Despite the fact, prospectors' associations remain outcasts in the state gold-mining system. Because of an unfavourable taxation system and a lack of a definite legal foundation prospectors are forced to forgo developing new deposits and move on to other types of production activities.

According to Konstantin Tsidlidze, chairman of the "Sayany" prospectors' association, one of the largest in Russia's north, his collective had to pay an absurd 85 per cent profit tax for the extracted gold, which left them without any profit at all.

Such treatment of prospectors makes them leave Russia in search of an employment beyond the border. Some 60 prospectors' associations have been forced to leave Russia's gold mines to date, he said.

Election Issues

Filatov Interviewed on Elections, Parties

LD0411000593 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2035 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Interview with Sergy Filatov, presidential chief of staff, by Lyudmila Telen; place and date not given; from the "Election Marathon" program—recorded]

[Text] [Telen] Sergey, at present there are at least two problems that are giving rise to many arguments and about which there are differing opinions within the president's team as well. The first of these is the problem of the coming presidential elections. The president has scheduled these for 12 June. Today, there is increasing talk that these pre-term elections should be abandoned in view of the change in the political situation. What would you, personally, advise the president to do?

[Filatov] Well, first of all, I advised the president that elections should not be held on 12 December. I consider that this is a very dangerous step that is quite unnecessary.

[Telen] You mean presidential elections?

[Filatov] Yes, I am referring to presidential elections. Second, holding the elections on 12 June was a forced step. The president was forced into doing this by the opposition. By the way, they were not being honest in their demands that there should be presidential elections, because when the president set the date for the elections and explained why it should be 12 June, this did not disconcert the opposition in the slightest. So, evidently, the point was not that a date should be set for elections, but there was the hope that the president would not dare to take this decision. Nonetheless, for the sake of society, for the sake of maintaining accord, he took this step. I consider that this was a forced step and it must be regarded as such. And, in so far as it did not promote accord and did not make it possible to resolve the problems that had pushed us into the need to take such a decision, then, in general, such a decision should be rescinded. But I know that the president will not do this. Therefore, one must simply place one's hope in the State Duma and the Federal Assembly that, evidently, will examine this question as a separate issue.

[Telen] Are there any people in the president's team who would not share your point of view and would consider that the president should proceed with the elections on 12 June?

[Filatov] There are.

[Telen] Could you give us their names?

[Filatov] No, I will not name them.

[Telen] All right. Sergey Aleksandrovich, the second acute problem is the question of the so-called presidential party. As is known, Russia's Choice initially laid claim to becoming the presidential party, but at the last moment the president did not go to the founding congress and did not directly link his name with that party. What would you advise the president to do? What do you think? Should he link himself with that party or not?

[Filatov] You know, I consider that the president was right not to speak at that congress at the start of the election campaign. It seems to be that in preparing for future contacts with the State Duma, he must take care that these contacts not be with just one faction but, evidently, with a coalition of them. Therefore, I think

that the president's contacts and his speech should take place at the end of the election campaign.

[Telen] At a Russia's Choice Congress, or are you linking this with...?

[Filatov, interrupting] I think it should be at a congress of democratic forces; I would put it that way. When the situation is clarified, when the disposition of forces becomes totally clear, after that it will be possible to convene a congress of democratic forces, and then it will be possible for the president to address it. That is my opinion.

[Telen] Does it not worry the president that people from his team have found themselves in different pre-election blocs? You, for one, are in the Russia's Choice bloc, and Sergey Shakhray heads the Party of Unity and Accord.

[Filatov] We must proceed from reality. The reality is that at present—this can be seen from the voting results at the referendum—more than a third of the population has voted for the reform policy of Yeltsin and Gaydar. We know that about 20-22 percent are actively opposed to the reforms—numbers can vary, but this number of non-supporters is definite. There is also an intermediate group that we regard as indifferent to both of these attitudes, but apparently it has certain nuances. For example, some people in it think that the emphasis should be on adjusting social aspects, others think that a more hardline approach should be preferred, and yet another section believes the reform should be more liberal, and so on. Therefore, these nuances we have within the democratic forces—it seems to me that their role is to urge those who are not giving firm support to either side to take part in the elections. So, I think in this sense it should help to increase the number of participants in the elections. And only then the next task will arise—I have mentioned this before—to form a coalition that would be responsible for the legislative policy in parliament.

Campaign Strategy, Goals of Democratic Reforms Movement

PM0311175793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 2

[Aleksey Loktionov article: "Some Prefer To Fight Alone. The RMDR for Instance"]

[Text] During election campaigns political parties and movements quite commonly unite in major blocs. Strong and weak parties find allies so as to be stronger in combination with others. But some prefer to conduct an election campaign on their own. One such brave soul is the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (RMDR).

Why Is the RMDR Embarking on the Elections Independently?

According to the latest polls, the movement enjoys the support of 10-17 percent of Russian citizens. Aleksandr Kiselev, chairman of the movement's executive committee, believes that this number of votes for the RMDR would be quite sufficient for it to be an influential force in the Federal Assembly. That is why there is no point in the RMDR's uniting with others in order to gain extra votes. The current elections will be a trial of strength for the emerging multiparty system. The main task of all parties and blocs will be to demonstrate their identity, goals, and abilities, to reveal the real disposition of forces in society, and to find their electorate. That is why the RMDR does not want to miss this opportunity by hiding its identity behind some nine-day-wonder electoral bloc. Any hastily formed electoral bloc, often lacking clear-cut guidelines, is doomed to subsequently break up and engage in infighting to carve up deputies' seats jointly won. The RMDR is trying to avoid this prospect by speaking out independently at the election with its own platform, symbols, and leaders.

The Leaders of the RMDR

The movement's central board has allowed the federal list to be headed by well-known figures—Anatoliy Sobchak, Svyatoslav Fedorov, and Oleg Basilashvili. RMDR leader Gavriil Popov has made a responsible decision (something that many of our current politicians are incapable of) not to run for the State Duma.

Regional Support

The RMDR has its own centers in most Russian regions. On the basis of these the movement is also launching its own campaign. The RMDR is using the principle of assigning regional leaders to specific districts. This will ensure the maximum return from their campaigning. One place the RMDR is happy about is Moscow. Its influence is at its greatest there and needs no additional campaigning. The RMDR's standing in other parts of Russia—such as Nizhniy Novgorod, Kaliningrad, Samara, Stavropol, Yekaterinburg, Kemerovo, and Chita—is almost equally high. RMDR candidates are running from single-seat districts not only for the State Duma but also for the Federal Assembly's Federation Council.

RMDR in the New Parliament

RMDR candidates have a great deal of potential for legislative activity in the new parliament. The movement already has experience in preparing major legal documents—apart from the well-known draft Russian Federation constitution (Alekseyev-Sobchak), a package of documents on ownership relations has also been elaborated at the RMDR's initiative. The RMDR intends to form a strong and cohesive parliamentary faction, one of whose first proposals will be to reduce the life of the current Federal Assembly from four years to

two. This is required in order to ensure that simultaneous elections to all organs of state power can be held on the new legislative basis.

Election Campaign

The RMDR has signed a contract with an advertising firm to provide backup for its campaigning.

It has a whole range of measures—from advertising spots to a poster campaign, from developing symbols and emblems to handing out leaflets.

Rivals

The RMDR's main rival is the "Russia's Choice" sociopolitical bloc. There is a danger that it could monopolize television, radio, and the central press. We would like to believe that the principle of equality in granting equal airtime to the participants in the election campaign would nonetheless be observed.

Assessing the RMDR

In little over a year the movement has turned into a popular and prestigious political organization with a clear-cut program, specific businesslike proposals, and a practical approach to solving statewide problems. That is why a considerable number of Russian voters are pinning their hopes on the RMDR.

Civic Union Members Hold News Conference in Moscow

LD0311195393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1449 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] The Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs approves the reports by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin at yesterday's extended government meeting.

The statement was made at the news conference in Moscow on Wednesday by the Union's President Arkadiy Volskiy, who also heads the election bloc known as "Civic Union for Stability, Justice and Progress."

He has said the fact that the president spoke of socially-oriented free market reforms, of sustaining business, the need for unity in the government, of wretched people near the White House, "instills hope."

Another participant in the news conference who is also nominated by the Civic Union, the former Supreme Soviet people's deputy Fyodor Burlatskiy, has said that the bloc approves reasonable moderate reforms, is against revolutionary leaps and shock therapy and in favor of a gradual transition to a market- oriented democracy.

Volskiy said that the bloc's 100,000 signatures would be verified within the next two days. For reasons of morality, his bloc did not collect signatures for money, he said.

Volskiy said that the government ministers should stop discord with the use of the mass media, because the confrontation transfers immediately to the regions. He also approved the actions of Vice- Premier Sergey Shakhray, who made public the declaration about his incomes and said that candidates from his bloc would follow Shakhray's example.

"By his ideas Shakhray becomes our ally," said Volskiy.

The bloc's 270 candidates include 78 directors, 38 civil servants, 35 entrepreneurs, 32 scientists, 29 heads of unions of industrialists and businessmen and 15 trade union leaders.

Volskiy said that 70% of directors are prepared to be deputies to the State Duma.

Russia's Choice Leads Popularity Poll

LD0311184293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1630 GMT 3 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] While accusing sociologists of incompetence or tendentiousness is now in vogue, whether to believe sociologists or not is something that every Russian citizen has to decide for himself. However, we can vouch for the poll conducted by the sociological service of our TV and radio company—this study was carried out with all necessary rules properly observed.

According to the results of the poll, the trust of the citizens of Russia in pre-election blocs is distributed in the following way: Russia's Choice comes first—44 percent of those polled place their confidence in it; the August bloc led by Borovoy holds second place with 26 percent putting their trust in it; the Shakhray-Shokhin bloc is favored by 19 percent in our poll; and the communists are trusted by no more than six percent of those polled.

However, it should be pointed out that the poll has revealed that not all of those who voiced their preferences will actually turn out at the polling stations. Many said they refuse to take part in the elections.

Communists Collect Signatures To Run for Parliament

LD0311213093 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Excerpt] The Russian Communist Party has collected about 100,000 signatures in its support which gives it the right to run for the future parliament. This was disclosed at a Moscow news conference by the Deputy Chairman of the Party, Valetin Kuptsov. [passage omitted]

Zhirinovskiy Sees Need For Authoritarian Leader

BR0411113593 Milan PANORAMA in Italian 7 Nov 1993 p 95

[Interview with "Liberal Party" leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy by Francesco Bigazzi; place and date not given; "In Search of a Leader"]

[Text] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is the leader of Russia's Liberal Party [as published]. Considered a superficial, blustering braggart by his opponents, Zhirinovskiy came third in the 1991 presidential elections, thanks to his anti-Semitic rhetoric. He could prove a tricky opponent for President Boris Yeltsin in the elections due to be held 12 December.

[Bigazzi] In your view, what are the root causes of Russia's political crisis?

[Zhirinovskiy] The so-called "democrats" supporting Yeltsin kidded themselves that they could erase 70 years of Communism in the twinkling of an eye. They do not realize that this process will take many years. If we try to cut corners, there will be further bloodshed and violence, as happened in Moscow. The Russian people are sick and tired of being used as guinea pigs for political and economic experiments, be they communist or liberal.

[Bigazzi] What does the country need?

[Zhirinovskiy] An authoritarian leader capable of putting an end to the chaos and the improvised reforms. We do not need a new czar or a new Communist Party secretary, we need an honest and firm president. A leader capable of taking the best from both communism and capitalism.

Baburin Confident of Union's Election Chances

LD0411125093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] A news conference has been held in Moscow by the leaders of the Russian All-People's Union [Rossiyskiy Obshchenarodnyy Soyuz]. Roman Babayan has the details:

[Babayan] Sergey Baburin, Ivan Fedoseyev, and Ravkat Chebotarevskiy took part in the meeting with journalists. Sergey Baburin told those assembled that there were 220 people on the electoral lists of the Russian All-People's Union at the point when they were submitted to the Central Electoral Commission. He added that during the campaign to collect the required number of signatures, the Russian All-People's Union collected over 100,000 signatures in 40 regions of the Russian Federation.

Sergey Baburin said he is confident that the Russian All-People's Union will be represented in the State Duma by its deputies. According to him, the Russian All-People's Union is willing to cooperate with parties such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Agrarian Union.

Unnamed Firm Wants To 'Buy' Political Party

PM0411102193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "Organization to Buy... Party for State Duma"]

[Text] A major commercial organization is prepared to buy a political party that is fighting for seats in the State Duma. Its representative asked the "Information for Business" Association to select a "suitable" party, that is, sufficiently promising, but with no financial magnates or rich sponsors in its ranks and therefore "compliant," Association Vice President Vladimir Dobrynin told observer Lyudmila Yermakova. He did not name the firm, but he did say that it is in the top 20 in Russia. So the rather nice price that was proposed for the service would not have ruined it.

The association refused to broker such a peculiar deal. By the very nature of our activities—collection and analysis of commercial information—"we naturally possess some 'delicate' information on parties," Vladimir Dobrynin said. The association is normally contacted by entrepreneurs wanting it to check on the reliability of their partners, but "we do not intend to trade in information for political purposes," he stressed.

But presumably people wanting to buy a party will be able to find less fastidious brokers. Demand creates supply, as we know. So it is not inconceivable that some farsighted businessmen wanting to invest capital in politicians in the hope that the latter will provide a "dividend" from their lofty seats in the State Duma could find an appropriate paerty and people to help them.

Commenting on this, Aleksandr Bukhvalov, head of the Central Electoral Commission press service, announced that after the elections all the candidates who participated in them, irrespective of the results, will have to submit a financial report to the central or district commission. It will show the sources of the election fund revenue and the outlay on election campaigning. The reports will be studied by experts who "will be able to arrive at conclusions concerning possible abuses," the press secretary explained. The normal procedure for spending funds is contained in the Statute on the Election of Deputies to the State Duma approved by the Russian Federation president. The form of the report and the procedure for reporting will be determined by documents currently being prepared by the Central Electoral Commission.

Regional Affairs

Election-Related Developments in Regions Noted

PM0311141793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Diary"]

[Text] **Krasnodar**

Krasnodar Kray Administration Head Nikolay Yegorov has decided to run for the Federation Council. The "A Rich Kuban Means a Rich Russia" voters' association formed by the Kuban Commodity Producers Union, the kray Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises, the Kuban Youth Union, and other public organizations has put him forward as a candidate for deputy in the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly in Krasnodar Electoral District No. 23. Nikolay Yegorov made his decision after an amendment appeared to the Russian Federation president's edict "On the Possibility of Combining the Post of Head of the Executive of a Federation Component With a Deputy's Seat in the Federation Council."

Gorno-Altaysk

The "Altay's Choice" public political association has been formed in this republic. More than 120 people participated in the founding conference in Gorno-Altaysk. The association has put forward three candidates for a single seat in the Russian State Duma: the lawyer Faina Yakshimayeva, Sergey Pekpeyev, chairman of the board of "Altayenergobank," and Aleksandr Manzyrov, representative of the Republic of Altay Government to the Russian Federation president. The names of the Valeriy Chaptynov, chairman of the Republic of Altay Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Vladimir Petrov, chairman of the republic government, have been put forward as candidates for two seats in the Federation Council.

Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk

Yuzhno-Kurilskiy Rayon Mayor Nikolay Pokidin did not wait for instructions and reminders from the district electoral commission in Sakhalin. He confirmed the precinct commissions' chairmen by decree.

Selection of Local Candidates Criticized

PM0411095593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Yuriy Shatalov report under the "Elections" rubric: "Chosen Again in the Inner Circle"]

[Text] Vladimir Oblast—In spite of pessimistic forecasts, the election campaign in Vladimir Oblast has started and is proceeding in a dynamic fashion. The parties, movements, and unions are hurrying to present their candidates for deputies in the State Duma and Federation Council so the voters can judge.

Even a quick analysis shows that there are various sorts of contenders for seats as elected representatives of the people—from Oblast Administration Head Yu. Vlasov, a convinced democrat and associate of the Russian president, to former Russian Federation People's Deputy F. Tsan-kay-si, whom you cannot suspect of having any particular sympathies for the executive branch of power.

For the moment representatives of opposition forces such as former Oblast Soviet Chairmen G. Kondryukov, who was forced to stand down after August 1991, V. Kalyagin, who lost an elevated position after the Oblast Soviet's recent dissolution, the notorious I. Andronov, and local communists, are keeping in the background.

However, Vladimir's democratic circles think that "they will not give in without a fight" and will attempt, if not to win at the elections, then at least to use their platform in the election campaign to once more demonstrate their uncompromising stance and particular views on the present authorities' policies. The Agrarian Union, which represents the great army of rural workers, has also not shown its hand. The political orientation of Vladimir's representatives in the new parliament will depend to a great extent on who it backs.

It is also evident today that it is the democratically oriented parties, movements, unions, and organizations united in the regional section of the "Russia's Choice" bloc which are setting the tone in the election race. It was this bloc which put forward the following as candidate deputies: Yu. Vlasov, head of the Oblast Administration, N. Yegorov, the president's representative in Vladimir Oblast, S. Shamardanov, president of the oblast Union of Entrepreneurs, L. Girin, director of the Oblast Administration State-Legal Department, V. Alyakrinski, general director of the "Tekhnika" Production Association, who is also chairman of the board of the Vladimir Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises, and other well known people in the oblast who have burdened themselves with the responsibility of carrying out the economic reforms.

However strange this may seem, this fact put a certain section of the electorate on their guard. They ask the entirely reasonable question: Why delegate to the country's new parliament people who, though they are dedicated to the idea of reforming Russia, are invested with exceptional power and absolutely overloaded with work out in the provinces? We are, after all, talking about a future professional parliament which will work on a permanent basis.

The city newspaper MOLVA [Rumor] was clearly expressing the opinion of this section of the electorate when it wrote with some annoyance the other day: "In this situation the choice of 'worthy, competent, intelligent, and educated candidates' is more akin to applying pressure to get your own people, the right people, on the list."

"When we met and began to think about whom to nominate from the bloc of democratic forces, we became horrified," Mikhail Buyanov, an active participant in the democratic movement in Vladimir and editor of the independent oblast newspaper PRIZYV [Call], told us. "It has emerged that in two years 'Democratic Russia's' members have not only failed to create a social base for

their movement but have also not prepared authoritative new leaders whom the people might follow."

To be honest, since August 1991 they have been in a state of euphoria and have wasted time in fruitless discussion. So Vlasov and Yegorov had to be persuaded to agree to participate in the elections. And to bar the way to the diehards who would once more turn the State Duma and the Federation Council into an arena for political battles!

This is the bitter truth: The election campaign has caught the "Democratic Russia" movement in the Vladimir region unawares, and it has now been forced to basically go into the elections on the shoulders of striking representatives of the executive branch of power and the business world.

However, in the search for a fail-safe formula in the election race, representatives of the democratic forces are again making annoying mistakes which bear witness to their very specific conception of democracy. It is difficult here not to agree with MOLVA. It turns out, for example, that it was by no means the "Russia's Choice" bloc which put forward the bloc's candidate deputies for the future State Duma and Federation Council, but its coordinating council acting alone. It nominated them within the inner circle, so to speak, without any preliminary discussion of the candidates involving the public at large and without studying their popularity among the voters.

I predict objections of the kind: How can we have time for a wide discussion when the lists of candidates have to be at the Central Electoral Commission on 7 November?

We really have not been given much time, but not so little that we cannot call a congress of the oblast's democratic forces and approve the candidates at it, possibly those named within the inner circle. A formality? Hardly. It is one thing when, for example, the little known members of the "Russia's Choice" bloc coordinating council support Yu. Vlasov, but quite another matter when all the democratically oriented people in the oblast come out solidly behind him. We are, however, not just talking about Vlasov. New names might "surface" at the congress who in time could provide serious competition fo. today's politicians. It is worth working to this end.

Yuzhno-Kurilsk Rayon Prepares for Elections

OW0411083893 Vladivostok Radiostantsiya Tikhiy Okean Maritime Network in Russian 0815 GMT 28 Oct 93

[From the "Pacific Ocean" Program]

[Text] Nikolay Posedin, mayor of the Yuzhno-Kurilsk rayon, did not wait for directives and reminders from the Sakhalin district election committee. His decree ratified the chairmen of district commissions in all settlements on Kunashir and Shikotan Islands. The commissions have also been created, as has the rayon headquarters for conducting the election campaign. Yevgeniy [Belagitskiy], an ITAR-TASS correspondent, reports on this from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

Lists of voters are being compiled on the islands, but as the oblast radio notes, all these exertions are exacerbated by the lack of funds. The residents of the South Kurils have not received a single ruble for carrying out the whole complex of pre-election measures. Serious difficulties in their implementation in the Kurils might also arise due to catastrophically poor communications—for example, it is not easy to telephone even from Kunashir to Shikotan.

Khabarovsk Kray Communists To Participate in Elections

OW0411083793 Vladivostok Radiostantsiya Tikhiy Okean Maritime Network in Russian 0815 GMT 28 Oct 93

[From the "Pacific Ocean" Program]

[Text] The Khabarovsk Kray organization of the Russian Communist Party announced an initiative to create a popular block of political forces in the kray and participate in parliamentary elections. Leonid Golub, secretary of the kray communist party committee, commented on the decision and stated: We must utilize all legal possibilities to inform the populace of the truth about the real situation in the country and the truth about events in Moscow on 3-4 October. Ultrademocrats—namely, representatives of the Russia's Choice block and its regional candidates— must be prevented from forming the majority in parliament. We must juxtapose sober-minded people to the ultraradicals. We consider it advisable to come out in a united block of kray patriotic forces against the ultrademocrats. The leader of the Amur region communists expressed his hope that a majority of the populace would vote for the sober-minded people irrespective of what movements or parties they represent. At the same time, the communists are unanimous in their disapproval of a referendum on the constitution, and call on the Amur region to vote against the basic draft law.

Poll Shows Democratic Russia Front-Runner in Moscow

MK0311103393 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 2

[Unattributed report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Moscow"]

[Text] The "Public Opinion" foundation has conducted an opinion poll among 430 Muscovites to gauge the popularity of various political parties and movements. According to the poll, Democratic Russia, which has joined the "Russia's Choice" bloc, is the front-runner in the capital—its activity was approved of by around 40 percent of those polled. The only centrist organization that can compete with the radical democrats is Civic

Union's city branch headed by Nikolay Gonchar. Pollsters do not rule out that the competitiveness of Moscow's Civic Union is largely attributable to a high approval rating of Gonchar himself, who adopted a balanced stance during the October events. Nearly 80 percent of the respondents approved of the creation of an economic union of the CIS countries, and one-third supported Gonchar's idea of holding a referendum on the subject. Presumably, once political passions subside, the idea of an economic alliance will seem the most productive one to a new generation of politicians.

More on Yeltsin's Attitude to Ural Republic

MK0411110093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 4

[Vladislav Dorofeyev, Valeriya Ochinyan report under "The Center and Regions Have a Showdown" rubric: "The Ural Republic Gets Boris Yeltsin's Support"]

[Excerpts] In meetings yesterday and the day before between the country's leaders and leaders of Federation components, Yekaterinburg's initiative to create the Ural Republic received seemingly unexpected support from the president. In other words, KOMMERSANT-DAILY's version that Boris Yeltsin will use the idea of the Ural Republic in his own interests which, as it transpires, transcend the boundaries of the government's regional policy, has been confirmed. Yesterday the president also indicated that he opposes the sovereignty of ethnic republics. [passage omitted]

Yesterday some details of the 2 November meeting between the president and the government with leaders of the Federation components became known. Talking about relations between the center and the regions, Boris Yeltsin stressed that in spite of the desire by certain Moscow politicians to preserve full powers, it is necessary to separate the powers of the federal government and the regions. The president followed that up by saying that the regions have to deal with their own problems on their own, by, among other things, raising their own status because the government has no coherent regional policy. After Boris Yeltsin's statement, according to eyewitness reports, Viktor Chernomyrdin deleted part of the text from his report, while during the break the regional leaders rushed to congratulate Eduard Rossel: Sverdlovsk Oblast is the only one among the krays and oblasts that has proclaimed the upgrading of its status to a republic. Therefore the president unequivocally supported his native city of Yekaterinburg.

The situation cleared up even more after Anatoliy Grebenkin, chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet, in yesterday's interview with KOMMERSANT-DAILY's correspondent disclosed his intention to sue Mr. Medvedev over his rude condemnation of the Urals authorities' action. Later on, however, Mr. Grebenkin gave up that idea. He also explained that Sverdlovsk Oblast was called a republic because there is no other notion in the Russian Constitution that would allow giving the oblast equal rights on a par with the existing ethnic autonomies. And if the general notion "guberniya (land)" is included in the new Russian Constitution, the Yekaterinburg authorities will be ready to rename the Ural Republic the Ural Guberniya or Land.

This confirms KOMMERSANT-DAILY's version to the effect that the president is determined to use the Ural Republic to exert pressure on the ethnic republics that are claiming their rights to sovereignty, i.e., the right to a legitimate secession from Russia—which is actively opposed by Boris Yeltsin, who stated on 3 November in the Kremlin that he is against the republics' sovereignty. In this context the logical conclusion is that the president is inclined toward an absolute leveling up of the Federation components' rights. It is not ruled out that Boris Yeltsin will again bet on the regions—with the aim of limiting the ambitions of "some Moscow politicians." Furthermore, the president is probably preparing a new cadre basis for the upcoming reshuffle in the government and in his entourage.

'Oblast Separatism' Will Not Bring Prosperity

PM0311142593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 2

[Viktor Khatuntsev report: "How Can the Border Between Asia and Europe Be Altered?"]

[Text] The Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies has adopted the Constitution of the Ural Republic, elections to a legislative assembly have been scheduled, and it is the governor who will be the head of state and the supreme official. However rich in political events the month of October may have been, what has happened in Yekaterinburg cannot be written off as of secondary importance. Is it not the case that the sovereignization not of the autonomous entities but of the administrative-territorial formations of Russia is beginning, and that its fabric will crumble like a patchwork quilt being torn into tiny pieces?

The true colors of oblast separatism have long been on show: First they fought against the dominance of the center, and later, abandoned to the whim of fate, they undertook to find a solution alone. Of course, visions of setting up a Far East Republic, various Siberian conglomerates, and other industrial-regional associations can be put down to the vanity of local authorities, storming out from under Moscow's grip toward emancipated dominion. However, this interpretation is highly superficial if you consider that the population in the provinces is also morally prepared for any kind of reformation and land partition if it means that life might become just a little easier. And one thing which is characteristic is that politicians argue in unison that the acquisition of independence will allegedly afford a kray or oblast a virtually self-sufficient existence, whereby it buys in anything which it does not have or does not grow. Of course, topping up store shelves with bananas and

kiwi fruit is no problem, but what if there is no market for "Uralmash" products or output from the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant?

In terms of its production potential Sverdlovsk Oblast, with a population of 4.7 million people, has a head start over virtually all other Federation components, and it will at least get by, if only by means of barter, but you know, experience shows that there is no such thing as a sovereignty satisfied with concerns over its daily bread. An appetite for political separateness inevitably emerges, customs posts and border detachments are set in place, and laws are reshaped to their own convenience and advantage. The structure of Russian statehood has become so fragile and vulnerable that the temptation for territorial metamorphosis was bound to be acted on sooner or later—in fact it happened right away in both Europe and Asia, and in the present case there is a border already separating those involved along the Urals. All we need now is for a chain reaction of state demarcation along the contours of rivers, mainline railroads, and coal fields...

So far there has been no inkling of the "higher-up" reaction to the decision by the people of Sverdlovsk, but highly contradictory views already abound. For instance, N. Medvedev, chief of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration Administration for Working with the Territories, believes that the oblast soviet's expression of will "clearly underscores yet again the irresponsibility of these outmoded organs of power, their political ambition, and their blatant shortsightedness." This is as it may be but, you know, it was also quite possible to predict that the supreme injunction to dissolve the soviets would be thrown back over the Kremlin walls like a boomerang from somewhere or other in precisely this kind of zigzagging manner—a declaration of sovereignty in the very center of Russia, and reproaches that Sverdlovsk's inhabitants have been unable to familiarize themselves fully with the new constitution can be reiterated on a broader scale applicable to the entire Russian constitution, which has still not been published even though there is no time at all left before 12 December.

In its nigh on two-year existence it seems that the CIS has learned one truth, and learned it well. The key to prosperity and well-being lies neither in status, nor in exclusivity, nor in political separateness. It is easy to smash and break things up, but then it is difficult to realign the fragments. Or are people in the Urals banking on surmounting the crisis abyss with their cheers?!

Tatar President Asserts Republic's Sovereignty

LD0311201493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1421 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melnikova, Gennady Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow November 3 TASS—"Russia is a federation of states which should be formed and renewed," said Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaymiyev in an interview with ITAR-TASS on the eve of the meeting between Russian President Yeltsin and heads of administrations of Russia's territories, oblasts and autonomous entities on Wednesday.

"One should not fear that national-territorial and administrative-territorial entities have different statuses," he said.

In his opinion, the new draft russian constitution at its present form is "a constitution of an unitary state".

Tatarstan "has always been and will be a sovereign state based on (its) constitution and the results of referendum, preserving thereby integrity of the Russian Federation", he concluded.

Government Adopts Regulation on Refugees in Moscow

LD0311190893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1120 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Interfax has learned that as part of the state of emergency in effect in Moscow in early October the Russian government adopted a resolution "On Measures to Regulate the Temporary Stay of Refugees in Moscow," dated October 13.

The document stipulates that persons with refugee status will be re-settled from Moscow refuges to military cantonments "for temporary residence." For this purpose it is envisaged to finish construction of accommodation throughout the whole of Russia in the near term.

The foreign ministry has been commissioned to negotiate with foreign states to conclude agreements regarding "voluntary return of this category of persons and compensation for expenditures caused by their receipt and accommodation."

In addition, the interior ministry, security council and foreign ministry have been charged with solving the issue "to simplify the procedure and issuance of foreign documents to those people who are not Russian citizens and who have no grounds to further stay on the territory of Moscow and Moscow region so that they can travel abroad."

The federal migration service reconfirmed to Interfax that there exists such a document which is still in effect, despite abolition of the regime of the state of emergency.

Gaydar Refuses 'Material Help' for Moscow Car Plant

PM0411101193 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 30 Oct 93

[By S. Milyanchikov and Yu. Ivlev from Moscow's Lenin Komsomol Automobile Plant; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Yegor Gaydar was not the first VIP to visit the Moscow Automobile Plant, and like the others, he did not promise the workers any money.

The first vice premier was shown the Lenin Komsomol Automobile Plant's promising new car models, which are built to meet Western standards. In principle these vehicles could be driving on Russian highways right now, if the unit for the production of AZLK engines were ready, that is. These engines surpass Ford engines in a number of specifications. However, the plant needs around 37 billion rubles to settle accounts with the suppliers of equipment for this production unit. They also asked Gaydar to write off the debts which have built up of late. The plant simply cannot pay them. There is no money. At the same time the factory yard is full of finished output which is not selling because of excessively high prices exceeding the prices of secondhand foreign cars.

Naturally, the plant's workers were hoping that Yegor Gaydar would show understanding for their position and offer material assistance. However, the vice premier's stance was unequivocal: The state cannot, in addition to everything else, maintain industrial enterprises. It is necessary to identify additional reserves and to cut prime costs. And, in the event of overstocking, simply reduce prices. The market is the market. Nor did he agree to write off debts, although he promised to defer them. While refusing material help, Yegor Gaydar did promise assistance in finding investors and dealers and helping to restore normal operations. If none of this helped, it would be necessary to bring in receivers. This was bound to reveal untapped reserves.

President's Representative in Sakhalin Starts Work

OW0411092293 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Teleradiokompaniya Sakhalin Television Network in Russian 2005 GMT 21 Oct 93

[From the "As of This Hour" Newscast]

[Text] Viktor Nikolayevich Komornik, Russian Federation presidential representative for Sakhalin Oblast, has taken up his duties.

[Komornik] I was born in 1948 in Zagorsk, Moscow Oblast. It is an old city and everybody probably knows that it is the site of the Holy Trinity St. Sergius Monastery. I have lived in Sakhalin since 1965. As far as my road through life is concerned, I can say that I graduated from the Sakhalin Maritime Navigation School in Kholmsk after which I worked in production and completed the All-Union Correspondence Law Institute as a correspondence-course student. I then worked for a long time in various posts in the procuracy organs, the last of which was chief of the Sakhalin Oblast Procuracy General Supervision Department. More recently, I have been working as chief of the Sakhalin Territorial Antimonopoly Administration, since it was established in 1991. Now I have been appointed presidential representative.

You know I have been directly on the job practically only one day, since of course I had to turn over my affairs in the previous job, but I have already felt the tense and tight situation involved. There is a lot of information which I must study and analyze, particularly since, as you know, the preelection campaign is beginning and naturally I am obliged to participate in it and promote its better organization. So I agree with you that the present situation is very tight and tense.

In view of my responsibilities, I am obliged to and will try to promote the implementation and realization in the oblast of those economic and political reforms which the president is pursuing. I must say that I am a complete supporter of the president's line and hope that in my relations with oblast organs of power and administration we will be able to find a common language, and we are simply obliged to do so. I am a champion of common sense and constructive cooperation.

Chechen Opposition Urges Treaty With Russia

LD0311194393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1343 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Groznyy November 3 TASS—The Chechen Government of Popular Confidence opposed to Dzhokhar Dudayev, which is headed by Yaragiy Mamodayev, has suggested the resumption of the negotiating processes between Russia and Chechnya, interrupted early this year.

A message, sent today to Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin, says that the Chechen Republic, which has existed de-facto for more than two years, and the Russian Federation "have common economic, political, geopolitical and other interests, which make it necessary to conclude a mutually advantageous and equitable treaty between the two sides."

The Chechen Government of Popular Confidence admitted that Chechnya is facing some domestic political problems, but assured the Russian leadership that those problems are temporary and that "they will be resolved soon with the help of the will of the nation."

The growing activity of the government headed by Yaragiy mamodayev, which is not recognised by Dzhokhar Dudayev, is probably the result of the heightening of tension inside and outside the Chechen Republic.

At present the main occupation of the cabinet of ministers, headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, is to intimidate the population of the republic with some military threat ostensibly coming from Russia.

Chechnya Invasion Claim Dismissed as 'Fabrication'

PM0311145993 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 1

[Leonid Krutakov report: "'Hand of Moscow' Once Again Worries Dudayev"]

[Text] Yesterday the Chechen Foreign Ministry circulated an official statement to the effect that "a secret session of the Russian Security Council has decided on a military incursion into the Chechen Republic." Threatened with this "monstrous" action, Chechnya sent the UN Security Council an "appeal to prevent an incursion."

The "appeal" trick is eccentric to the point of being banal and is reminiscent of someone playing to lose. It has long been noticed that as soon as Dzhokhar Dudayev has internal difficulties—when his people's dissatisfaction with his regime exceeds a critical mass and opposition rears its head—an external threat immediately arises, from Russia of course.

This time Yaragi Mamodayev, former vice premier and head of the government of people's confidence, who was given his post during the April crisis, has "reared his head." After dissolving parliament Dudayev abolished the government, thus consolidating all opposition around Mamodayev. The increase in the latter's activity was evidently what provoked the Chechen Foreign Ministry statement.

Anatoliy Krasikov, head of the Russian president's press service, called the Chechen Foreign Ministry statement a fabrication "that does not even merit a serious rebuttal."

Observers have not recorded any significant Russian troop movements on the border with Chechnya.

Groznyy Pipeline Bomb Linked to Anti-Dudayev Forces

PM0311151993 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 93 p 1

[Aleksandr Yevtushenko report: "Gasoline Burns and Inflames"]

[Text] A stretch of gasoline pipeline has been blown up in Chechnya near Groznyy. Around 150 meters of pipeline have been seriously damaged. The surrounding area has been flooded with blazing gasoline.

In the opinion of law-enforcement organs, this terrorist act has clearly political overtones and is designed to kindle anti-Dudayev sentiments in neighboring republics and Stavropol Kray, which receive Chechen gasoline. The gasoline pipeline was the latest in a recent series of explosions in Chechnya. Power substations had earlier been the object of the terrorists' attentions.

Cash-Flow Crisis Halts Production at Cheboksary Plant

PM0411100993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Plant Has Come to a Standstill. Everyone Has Gone on Leave"]

[Text] For the first time in its long history, Cheboksary Components Plant has stopped working: The labor collective of this enterprise in Chuvashia, which comprises many thousands of workers, has gone on compulsory leave for a month.

The reason is the extremely grave financial situation at the plant, which manufactures spare parts for agricultural machinery: Consumers owe it 10 billion rubles, including money owed for products which the component manufacturers delivered to peasants without prepayment in time for the spring sowing and harvest campaign at the request of the Russian Government. And now they themselves are on the verge of bankruptcy: Owing to a lack of circulating capital they are in no position to buy raw materials.

Trailer Plant Loses Army Orders, Updates Output

PM0311165693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 2 Nov 93

[By Pavel Guskov from Stavropol; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The production program of the Stavropol trailers plant, compiled mainly on the basis of orders from the army, guaranteed the builders of trailers for the KaMAZ trucks a stable demand for their output. This year no trailers were ordered by the military and many previous clients are insolvent. But it seems the enforced smoking break has ended and the plant's conveyor belt is coming to life again. As we can see the range of the Stavropol trailer plant has been considerably updated. Its conveyor belt is already producing not its two customary models but almost 10 new ones: A 27-tonne trailer [words indistinct] has been adapted for the powerful European and American trucks. They have also increased the load carrying capacity of this semitrailer, which has been made longer. There is no shortage of people anxious to buy this mobile store and these additions to an ordinary automobile, two-wheel trailers with a carrying load of 300kg and the Sokol trailer for 1.5 tonne loads, are difficult to buy even in Stavropol, and all this has been created by the designers here and assimilated in just a few months.

Caucasus Peoples Confederation Seeks Legal Status

MK0411094093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 3

[Igor Terekhov report under the "Kabardino-Balkaria" rubric: "Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus Intends To Register, and It Supports Yeltsin's Reforms With Reservations"]

[Text] The Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus (CPC) intends to register with the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice as a mass public-political movement of the peoples of the Caucasus. This decision, as has been advised by Khauti Sheriyev, CPC administrator of

affairs, was passed in Sukhumi at a joint session of the Presidential Council and parliament of the confederation. Noteworthy is the fact that the decision was made in the absence of the organization's top leaders—CPC President Musa Shanibov and Parliament Chairman Yusup Soslambekov. The session in Sukhumi was chaired by CPC Vice President from Dagestan Denga Khalidov, known for his constructive stance on cooperation with the Russian Federation's official structures.

The CPC session in Sukhumi also passed a decree "On the Situation in the North Caucasus Region in Connection With the Reforming of the Bodies of Power of the Russian Federation, of its Components, and the Drawing Up of a New Constitution of the Russian Federation." The decree in particular states the need for wider rights and powers for North Caucasus republics which are components of the Russian Federation. Considering this fact, the CPC stated its conditional support for President Yeltsin's reform course.

The CPC voiced a protest in connection with massive violations of the rights and infringement of dignity of citizens of the North Caucasus region in Moscow and other cities in Russia that have been taking place in recent times. The CPC simultaneously called for allowing no similar retaliatory actions against the Russian-speaking population in the North Caucasus.

International Affairs

Kravchuk Urges Supreme Council To Consider START Treaty

LD0311202093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1449 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Ukraine cannot follow step by step with other states in its economic development as it has its own peculiarities, its own industrial structure, and its scale of agriculture, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk declared after his visit to the exhibition Ukraine-America-93 which opened in Kiev. In his opinion, the republic is "characterized neither by administrative paths of development nor by liberal ones." "Ukraine will follow a third path," he underlined.

Commenting the reaction of the Supreme Soviet to the president's several decrees on economic reform, Kravchuk said: "I knew that they would be subjected to criticism but I did not know that the criticism would be so unprofessional." He rejected accusations by several deputies that these decrees did not correspond to acting legislation.

Late October-early November Kravchuk issued decrees "On Privatization of Sites of Uncompleted Construction" and "On Issuance of Government Trade Bonds." The first one provides for selling of sites of uncompleted construction together with the land on which they are located at auctions. The second one covers the sale of government trade bonds under guarantee of state property.

According to the president, at present the government should compile a list of enterprises which are to act as a guarantor during the procurement of bonds by foreign firms. "Ukraine has not discovered anything new, this practice exists world wide," he noted. As Kravchuk said, his major task is to draw foreign investors' funds to Ukraine, at the same time "we know quite well that these enterprises will be built on our soil."

Kravchuk also reported that he had handed over a single package of documents on nuclear disarmament, consisting of documents on ratification of the START-1 Treaty, NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] Treaty, and Lisbon Protocol, to the parliament. In his opinion, the Supreme Soviet should consider this document as a single package. "If not," he said, "the parliament should first of all consider the START-1 Treaty and then all the other documents."

Politicians Back Adherence to START I Treaty

LD0311175393 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev [no date as received]—A sitting of the intersectoral commission for ratification of the START I Treaty will take place on 5 November, at which it is planned to examine the issue of Ukraine receiving political guarantees and the economic and financial aspect of this problem. Valentyn Lemish, chairman of the commission of the Supreme Council of Ukraine for issues of defense and state security, said in an interview with an UNIAN correspondent that the sitting of the commission on START I will also be about certain technological problems connected with the elimination of missile-nuclear complexes and about the possible ecological consequences of this.

Valentyn Lemish stressed: "It is our duty to ratify START I before the coming elections." Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of a commission of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, also supported the view that it is necessary to accede to this treaty in an interview with an UNIAN correspondent. He believes that Ukraine needs to limit itself to 36 percent of the nuclear weapons. "The remainder should remain on its territory until a treaty is signed with the nuclear states on the inviolability of Ukrainian borders," noted Dmytro Pavlychko. He was also in favor of more efficient utilization of nuclear weapons by Ukraine.

U.S. Envoy, Durdynets Hold 'Frank, Friendly' Meeting

WS0411145693 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Vasyl Durdynets, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, today received U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine William Miller, at the latter's request. They discussed a number of issues that are of great interest and concern to the both sides. The focal point of the discussion was the political and economic situation in our country, as well as draft bills that are to be addressed by the Supreme Council before the end of the year. It was emphasized that the most important among them are the draft program of government activities in November, December, and next year, as well as the draft budget and program for socioeconomic development in 1994, the draft constitution, and a new electoral law.

Also discussed were relations between legislative and executive authorities in Ukraine, as well as their cooperation, without which a way out of the crisis and into normal and civilized development is not possible. Reform of judicial authorities and ways of combating crime, including organized crime, were also discussed. Additionally, the two officials touched upon issues connected with preparations for the ratification of START I by the Supreme Council. The conversation was carried out in a frank and friendly atmosphere.

Further on Tarasyuk Call for Compensation for Warheads

LD0311224093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1630 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] Chairman of the National Disarmament Committee, Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk, told the Ukrainian parliament's newspaper that two nuclear warheads that were in a dangerous state had indeed been moved to Russia. He added, however, that none of the disabled SS-19 warheads had been, nor would they be, taken away until Ukraine and Russia or, in a trilateral agreement, Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. solved the issue on equitable compensation for the tactical weapons removed last year. This also could not be done until the Supreme Soviet gave its ok; this applies to all kinds of missiles, he said.

IF Note: Vice Premier Valeriy Shmarov who is in charge of the defense industries said on October 21 that Ukraine would move to Russia the nuclear warheads whose service life had ended or was about to end.

Tarasyuk said that the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher resulted in a compromise and shifted the accent from nuclear problems to political, economic, technological and trade cooperation.

Other important results of the visit, Tarasyuk said, was an increase of the U.S. aid to $330 Mn, the desire on the part of both countries to have U.S. nuclear rockets retargeted from Ukraine, an understanding on the conventional weapon reduction treaty and the U.S. willingness to act as a mediator in Ukrainian-Russian relations.

Speaking about security guarantees for Ukraine by nuclear powers, Tarasyuk said that currently the Ukrainian deputies were unlikely to be satisfied with types of declarations the five nuclear states were likely to make. "We demand a proper legally binding document, something nuclear powers are trying to dodge," the chairman of the National Disarmament Committee said.

Tarasyuk Sums Up Results of Talks With Christopher

AU0411090993 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 2 Nov 93 p 4

[Interview with Borys Ivanovych Tarasyuk, deputy minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the National Committee for Issues of Disarmament, by Volodymyr Savtsov; place and date not given: "It Is a Difficult Road, but We Must Overcome It"]

[Text] [Savtsov] Borys Ivanovych, what do you think about the results of W. Christopher's visit to Ukraine? There are different opinions on it in the world. In particular, there is an opinion that the visit did not please the Ukrainian side, because the secretary of state did not bring either guarantees for our security or any real assistance in dismantling weapons. On the other hand, W. Christopher has no reason to be content either: He left Ukraine without procuring a specific promise that START I will be ratified or that Ukraine will join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

[Tarasyuk] What has the Ukrainian-American meeting achieved? First, since the new U.S. Administration came to power, not a single one of its representatives of such rank has visited Ukraine. The very fact of dialogue at such a level is an encouraging phenomenon. Second, the visit has contributed to the process of building our relations: The accents were, to a certain extent, shifted from "nuclear" problems to prospects of political, economic, scientific and technological, and trade cooperation. In particular, the road for Ukrainian exports to the United States has been opened. Third, financial aid has been increased to $330 million. Fourth, the United States has announced its readiness to continue working on the problem of guaranteeing our security. Fifth, a mutual desire was expresed to consider the prospects of retargeting American nuclear weapons away from facilities in Ukraine. Sixth, certain accords have been reached regarding the treaty on the reduction of conventional weapons. Finally, seventh, the United States expressed its readiness to mediate in complex questions of Ukrainian-Russian relations, in particular, regarding nuclear weapons.

At the same time, we cannot ignore the problems that you have listed. As is known, however, politics is an art of compromise. W. Christopher's visit has become precisely a compromise between what was expected by the United States and what Ukraine wanted.

[Savtsov] What is the situation regarding the problem of security guarantees?

[Tarasyuk] This question was first raised at the Supreme Council session in April 1992. Since that time, Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked hard first with the United States and then with other "nuclear" powers. At the beginning of the current year, we had drafts of corresponding statements at the highest level from all the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Our report to the leadership of the parliament showed that guarantees in such a form are not acceptable. In this connection, a demand was voiced that guarantees of national security be obtained in the form of a juridically binding document. So far, "nuclear" powers have avoided the elaboration of such a variant. I would not express too much optimism, but we do count on positive developments.

[Savtsov] There has lately been increasingly much talk about our cooperation with NATO. Incidentally, W. Christopher also spoke about this. What are the actual prospects here?

[Tarasyuk] First of all, we must decide for ourselves: What are we and where we are going? So far, nonparticipation in military alliances has been Ukraine's fundamental political principle. How can one raise the question of membership of NATO in such conditions? In order to be consistent, we must first change the above principle, and then speak about formal membership in NATO. Next—what do we expect from NATO? Like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe—security

guarantees. As follows from contacts with the United States and other NATO members, however, the alliance is not prepared to expand them.

[Savtsov] There has appeared information to the effect that the withdrawal of nuclear warheads to Russia has started. What is your comment on this?

[Tarasyuk] I heard reports that two warheads that were in a dangerous state have been withdrawn. Regarding the deactivated SS-19 missiles, however, not even a single one of their warheads has or will be withdrawn until the question of fair compensation for the tactical weapons transferred last year is resolved between Ukraine and Russia or among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States. This applies to any class of missiles in general.

The road toward understanding and cooperation is difficult and time-consuming. However, it must be taken.

[Savtsov] Thank you for the interview.

Continued Nuclear Status, U.S. Assistance Viewed

WS0311150993 Kiev UNIAN OHLYADY, KOMENTARI, PROHNOZY in Ukrainian No 22 1 Nov 93

[Article by Serhiy Kyselyov: "Ukraine Has Almost Agreed With Clinton Regarding Its Missiles. Next, the Issue Must Be Discussed With Yeltsin"]

[Text] In December 1992, the United States promised to earmark $175 million for eliminating Ukrainian strategic nuclear missiles. At that time, Ukraine declared that this sum was insufficient, but the United States maintained that there could be no bargaining over the sum. What made the United States reconsider its decision in less than a year and grant Ukraine $330 million, including $175 million for dismantling 136 nuclear SS-19 missiles and $155 million for supporting economic reform?

Probably this decision was primarily prompted by the experience of the October mutiny in Moscow, which testified to the fact that a hungry state full of nuclear weapons is a grave danger to the world and it might be cheaper to grant Ukraine additional funds than wait until a missile armed with a nuclear warhead flies out of a silo over a misunderstanding or because of someone's evil intentions. Western experts' opinions about our nuclear reactors are unanimous—they are way behind accepted world levels of security.

Warren Christopher's visit to Kiev was preceded by the Ukrainian legislature's decision to lift the moratorium on building nuclear reactors and to continue operation of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Unfortunately, Ukraine has again found itself in a situation very unfavorable for its international prestige. A similar situation occurred at the beginning of the 1970's, when the Communist-nuclear lobby adopted a resolution to build the first nuclear power plant in the Republic. However, when the fourth reactor of that station exploded, it turned out that there was no one to punish.

If something of the kind occurs at one of the newly built Chernobyl reactors, who will be responsible for that: The legislature, which will have been disbanded by that time, or the "nuclear" bosses who will take any risk to protect their parochial interests? It seems that most likely there will be no one to blame.

Perhaps, this is why the U.S. secretary of state proposed that Ukraine receive the additional $155 million for supporting economic reform. It is hard to say if Ukraine will be able to mend all its economic holes with this money. According to Western observers, Ukrainian lawmakers behaved as if Warren Christopher was a petitioner; however, one must keep in mind that the United States undoubtedly does not give up its money easily.

Ukrainian lawmakers openly indicated that they will ratify START I by the end of 1993, but refrain from ratifying the Lisbon protocol. Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Supreme Council Foreign Affairs Committee, pointed out that the Supreme Council's actions will depend on Moscow's foreign policy, adding that Ukraine needs security guarantees from the United States. Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch explained that Ukraine will need $3.6 to $5 billion to buy fuel for its nuclear power plants.

Finally, President Kravchuk promised to help speed up START I ratification by the legislature. He hinted that this issue might be discussed as early as November, although the deputies will be free to decide when and if to ratify the treaty.

What was Warren Christopher's reaction to these firm declarations? While talking to Ukrainian journalists, he said that... the Ukrainian leadership had demonstrated resoluteness to make Ukraine a nonnuclear state.

It would be naive to believe that the United States is ready to put up with the fact that another nuclear power is emerging in the world, intending to keep nuclear arms on its territory for 10 or even 20 years. There are 46 advanced SS-24 solid-propellant intercontinental missiles in the Pervomaysk division of the 43d Missile Army, capable of carrying up to 10 warheads with an aggregate explosive potential of 550 kilotonnes. The Republic is also going to preserve a couple of hundred nuclear bombs stored in its Air Force depots.

According to Western experts, the Republic is capable of creating a closed cycle of nuclear production in a year or two and servicing the SS-24 missiles, the more so since these are Ukrainian products.

The code charts for controlling strategic nuclear missiles deployed in Ukraine are currently located in Moscow, but Western experts believe that the Republic will be able to break the codes and establish its own operational control over these missiles. There are grounds to believe that active efforts are being made to achieve this goal,

which is not an impossible task given the fact that these charts were produced in Kharkiv.

It is very likely that the United States hopes that Russia will exert serious political pressure on Ukraine regarding the latter's nuclear arms. The first "round" was played in Massandra, where the Russian president's stance was firm with regard to both the Ukrainian portion of the Black Sea Fleet and the redeployment of all Ukrainian nuclear arms to Russia.

The October mutiny in Moscow hindered further development of events. After suppressing the putsch, Boris Yeltsin and his team are facing one primary task: preparing for parliamentary elections in December. If the elections end up successfully for the current Russian leadership, the latter will start campaigning for presidential elections. Resolving the issues of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and the Black Sea Fleet's subordination to Russia would become an important trump card in Yeltsin's election campaign. Russia has a mechanism for exerting pressure on Ukraine by cutting its oil and gas supplies, which are so vital for Ukrainian economic survival, especially in winter.

Lawmaker Discusses National Security, U.S. Support

WS0411101993 Lvov MOLODA HALYCHYNA in Ukrainian 23 Oct 93 p 2

[Interview with Ihor Derkach, member of the legislative commission for defense and state security, by Olena Hutsul; place and date not given: "Talking About Secrets Without Any Secrets"]

[Text] [Hutsul] Was the decision to include the issue of national security on the agenda of the Supreme Council session prompted by any extraordinary situation or is this a routine discussion of a routine issue?

[Derkach] This issue is both urgent and important. However, I am afraid that in Kravchuk's presence, and given the fact that Kravchuk is commander in chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces, discussion of this issue has turned into a farce. Ukraine's security and defense potential is constantly decreasing and it is very sad that the president himself has been contributing to this destructive process. The Dagomys and Yalta agreements have led to a situation where Ukrainian servicemen in the Black Sea Fleet are, in fact, subordinated to Russian command. Technical control over the use of nuclear arms is not being maintained; a military district is not being formed in the east of Ukraine; the merging of the Air Defense Forces with the Air Force is progressing very slowly. Who is to blame? Unfortunately, it is the president himself. He is neither controlling the Armed Forces efficiently nor safeguarding Ukraine's combat readiness.

[Hutsul] Can we hope then that the discussion of national defense issues at the session will change the situation?

[Derkach] Problems may only be posed and directions for future actions outlined. The commander's retinue is too conservative; too many hardliners occupy too many high posts to hope for a change. For example, the Armed Forces must be reduced and their efficiency enhanced. However, Ukraine needs a program for this undertaking. The U.S. attitude toward Ukraine is currently more favorable with regard to granting funds. The Pentagon is easier to cooperate with. These factors must be taken advantage of. Ukraine needs a team of like-minded people for its government. However, people currently occupying government posts have no idea what might happen tomorrow. Reform in all areas remains the main task, be it the economy or the military.

[Hutsul] Thus, we have arrived at early Supreme Council elections again.

[Derkach] Absolutely. Sometimes, even the defense minister cannot do anything, because he is subordinated to the commander in chief, while combat readiness and state security can only be achieved through cooperation of a large group of ministers. However, we are still continuing to follow the old pattern. The economic structure is unchanged; a lot of military enterprises are closing down due to a lack of funds, caused by a stalemate in the privatization process. It is unclear what will be the fate of the expensive equipment of military enterprises, not to mention the thousands of unemployed people. These, too, are factors determining Ukraine's security.

[Hutsul] Are there conflicts within the Supreme Council regarding the issue of Ukraine's national security?

[Derkach] There are very strong conflicts and diametrically opposed viewpoints regarding this issue. Some deputies want Ukraine to integrate into Europe and join NATO; others want the Republic to become a member of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Command. There exists another viewpoint, which advocates suggesting that Ukraine stay neutral and not belong to either the West or the East. In my opinion, this is an erroneous idea, because Ukraine is not able to independently protect its sovereignty. We should efficiently cooperate with Central and West European states, this being the only guarantee of establishing a mechanism of security. Like it or not, "friendly" Russia is the main source of danger. It is clear that no other state in the world can enslave Ukraine or seize a part of its territory. Russia is undermining Ukraine's security on a daily basis, using its television, economy, and intelligence.

[Hutsul] There exists an opinion that after Foreign Minister Zlenko's recent visit to the United States, this superpower began to treat Ukraine more favorably—it granted us monetary assistance and minimized its pressure regarding the ratification of START....

[Derkach] There is no pressure of which to speak concerning the issue of START. Not long ago, I visited the Pentagon, met members of the U.S. military and the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. All these people

favor close cooperation with Ukraine. Why? Newspapers in the United States have written that Russia is heading toward dictatorship and that Yeltsin's next steps are unpredictable. The total admiration of Russia has gone and been replaced with the understanding that Ukraine is a more stable state pursuing a constitutional policy. A compromise between the president and the legislature exists in our state and tanks do not shell the parliament. This is why Ukraine has been granted $300 million, why U.S. Secretary of State Christopher pays us a visit, and why Kravchuk and Clinton are going to meet in Washington and Kiev. I felt that Ukraine is being treated more favorably. Pro-Ukrainian sentiment is growing in Washington. By the way, Ukraine's principled stance on the nuclear issue contributed to this. Influential political forces in Ukraine demanded that the withdrawal of nuclear arms be halted. This helped create the image of a persistent state. Americans overtly say that if Ukraine had given up its nuclear arms, it would have long been forgotten and nobody would have paid us any visits. If only we had not redeployed our tactical nuclear weapons that easily! American diplomats feel sorry that we did this, because Ukraine is currently viewed as a buffer against Russia and a guarantee that Russian imperialism will be banned.

Impact of Christopher Visit on Nuclear Issue Viewed

AU0411004693 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 29 Oct 93 p 2

[Olena Hubina report: "It Looks Like Talks of Nuclear Missiles Whet Some Peoples' Appetites"]

[Text] At any rate, the last of the three agreements signed in Kiev between Ukraine and the United States was concluded during the festive lunch that President Leonid Kravchuk gave in honor of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. This agreement is referred to as a "framework" one, that is to say, a very general agreement, which envisages a future concretization of actions. This is not accidental, because a delicate question is dealt with here—providing assistance to our state in eliminating nuclear weapons. Until now, Ukraine's vacillation regarding the discussion and ratification of START spoiled the appetites of more than one Western politician, because refined gourmets believe that it is only wine and Swiss cheese, which cannot be spoiled by mold, that become better in the course of time. Missiles, like perishibles, tend to have expiration dates beyond which they become hazardous. That is why our partners may increasingly lose sleep and not just appetites.

The framework agreement that has been signed indicates that we can, after all, reach agreements with the Americans—despite the fact that, on the eve of Mr. Christopher's visit, some press agencies reported, from the words of an irresponsible journalist, that Ukraine may, allegedly, revoke a nuclear-free status. The information did not correspond to reality. Soon, the figure of U.S. aid to Ukraine was announced in Kiev. It amounted to $330 million, out of which $175 million was intended for nuclear disarmament and the rest for a stabilization of the economy. Besides, the secretary of state stressed that the aid may be increased if our country takes certain steps and goes ahead with economic reforms.

The framework agreement does not stipulate a timetable for removing and destroying the missiles. Nor does it specify the type of missiles or the procedure for compensation. New agreements must be concluded for that. However, the parliament must have its say by getting down to START ratification. The Ukrainian president repeatedly stated deadlines for the parliament to approve this historic decision. However, the parliament seems to have its own timetable for lunch and for dinner, a timetable that does not coincide with that of the president. That is why the Americans wish us a good appetite and raise their wine glasses to prospects. After all, without waiting for START ratification, the warheads are on their way to Russia, as Russia itself is saying. At least two of them are now sitting on railroad platforms, as reported by the Russian side, although it is not clear on whose territory—ours or theirs. Perhaps, the process is under way, even though we do not notice this.

Mr. Warren Christopher will deliver the agreements concluded in Ukraine to the American continent. Meanwhile, a telegram from that same continent reached Ukraine. It was sent by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali who asks Ukraine to support this international organization's stringent sanctions against Haiti. By mentioning sanctions, the United Nations may spoil the appetite of our politicians, because it is known that sanctions against Yugoslavia cost us $4 billion. Besides, we may, perhaps, hardly expect a compensation, especially considering that we are unlikely to make a proper use of that money. At best, it might, as before, be spent on immediate needs.

Debt to Russia Estimated at $2.5 Billion

PM0311135593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Oct 93 First Edition p 2

[UNIAN report: "Ukraine Recalculates Its Debts"]

[Text] On the instructions of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, a commission headed by Vice Prime Minister Valentin Landik is checking Ukraine's total debt to Russia.

According to preliminary information, this sum amounts to $2.5 billion. The definitive total of the debt will be determined on a clearing basis.

Crimean Party Urges Peninsula To Join Russia, CIS

MK0311142593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "NEGA Reports" rubric: "Crimea"]

[Text] The second congress of the Republican Party of Crimea [RPC], which has just ended, adopted resolutions "On the Political Situation in the Republic of

Crimea" and "On the Elections for the Presidency of the Republic of Crimea." Yuriy Meshkov, chairman of Crimea's republican movement and the RPC, who is also a deputy in the Crimean Supreme Soviet, noted that after the first congress the economic plight of the peninsula's residents has worsened, which he attributed to the fact that the chiefs of the autonomous republic "have put the Crimean economy under the Ukrainian economy's avalanches." In Meshkov's view, it is essential to hold an all-Crimean referendum on independence and to restore the constitution adopted by the Crimean Supreme Soviet on 6 May 1992, whereby the peninsula was not part of Ukraine. Yuriy Meshkov described the peninsula's citizens as "a single people of Crimea regardless of ethnic origin." As for the upcoming elections for the Crimean presidency, Yuriy Meshkov said that all the republic's political organizations "standing for a Crimea within the Russian Federation and for the Republic of Crimea's independent development" need to join forces. The RPC gave its backing to Igor Kasatonov, first deputy commander in chief of the Russian Federation Navy and former commander of the Black Sea Fleet (the latter, however, has not yet given his consent to run for the office). The party is to make a definite decision on the subject at its emergency congress to be held in three weeks.

Delegates approved the key provisions of the RPC platform, which is also to be adopted at the emergency congress. In particular, the delegates praised the soviets "as organs of genuine people's power." The party will seek the Republic of Crimea's joining the CIS and also political, economic, and military alliances within the Commonwealth.

The congress also adopted a resolution "On the Status of the City of Sevastopol." It says that "Sevastopol is an inalienable part of the Republic of Crimea and a base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet."

Russian Envoy Summoned Over 'Great White Brotherhood'

LD0311231393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] On 3 November, Leonid Smolyakov, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Ukraine, was invited to the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ukraine. His attention was drawn to the fact that among the participants in illegal actions carried out in Kiev by the so-called Great White Brotherhood there were many citizens of Russia who stayed here in violation of the passport regime. It was also pointed out that the literature circulated in the capital of Ukraine was printed and delivered from the Russian Federation as well.

Concern was expressed in connection with the fact that along with fanning up religious fanaticism and hysteria, the leaders of this illegally established sect called upon the believers to carry out mass actions of civil disobedience and oppose the state and law enforcement bodies. It was emphasized that this could lead to a destabilization of the internal political situation in Ukraine. Attention was also drawn to certain bias in the coverage of the events around the White Brotherhood by certain mass media in Russia. A memorandum on the illegal activity of the White Brotherhood participants in Kiev was handed to Russia's ambassador. At the same time he was requested to relay a proposal to the leadership of relevant bodies in Russia to take necessary measures so as to prevent the arrival of the White Brotherhood members in Kiev and prevent their activities in Ukraine.

Lithuanian Official Explains New Visa Regulations

AU0311142093 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 30 Oct 93 p 5

[Interview with Edminas Bagdonas, first secretary for consular issues at the Lithuanian Embassy, by Dmytro Komarenko in Kiev; date not given]

[Text] **On 1 November 1993, the decree adopted by the Lithuanian Government "On Introducing Visas for Citizens of the CIS, Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan Republic, and Moldovan Republic" goes into effect.**

[Komarenko] What does this mean?

[Bagdonas] It means that citizens of the listed countries may only enter Lithuania with passports valid abroad in which visas will be registered.

[Komarenko] Is this a paid service? How much will it cost?

[Bagdonas] Yes, it will be necessary to pay for the visa. A regular visa will cost $5 and the transit one $3. The same sums will have to be paid by every person in the case of a collective visa.

[Komarenko] What will be the charge for citizens of those countries that are not mentioned in the Lithuanian governmental decree?

[Bagdonas] This price is somewhat higher! A regular visa for citizens of other countries and persons without citizenship will cost $20, a transit visa $5, and a collective visa $10. I would also like to add to this that in exceptional cases, when visas are issued directly at the Lithuanian border, the consular charge will be $2 higher for citizens of the CIS, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and $10 higher for citizens of other countries. The extension of the visa in the former case will cost $3, and in the latter case $10, and making corrections $2 and $5, accordingly.

[Komarenko] Excuse me, Edminas, did the Lithuanian Government take into account the fact that, in Ukraine, even the average salary does not exceed $10?

[Bagdonas] Yes, it did. That is why the government adopted a decision that, by 1 June 1994, an invitation to come to Lithuania will be equivalent to a visa.

[Komarenko] Therefore, if someone is going to Lithuania on a commission, he will have to bring dollars to pay for the visa?

[Bagdonas] No, if someone goes to Lithuania to participate in an official meeting organized by a state institution, for charity purposes, or in order to grant assistance to Lithuania, visas will be issued or extended free of charge. The same applies to children under 16 and representatives of international organizations.

[Komarenko] We cannot avoid dealing with a strictly humanitarian question: If someone goes to see a seriously ill relative, attend a funeral, or visit the graves of dear ones, what is the practice then?

[Bagdonas] For such persons, we issue visas valid for 24 hours free of charge. Of course, provided there are corresponding documents.

Hungarian Paper Interviews Yevtukhov During Visit

AU0411121193 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Oct 93 p 3

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister for Questions of Industry and Construction Vasil Yevtukhov by Antonia Radi in Budapest; date not given: "The Left-Wing Experts Have To Be Kept On"]

[Text] The chairman of the Federation of Ukrainian Entrepreneurs wants to lobby in defense of private property and for the interests of entrepreneurs. He can do this more effectively than his Hungarian colleague because Yevtukhov is also a deputy prime minister in Ukraine. The high-ranking official, who was in Budapest as a guest of the East-West Symposium of European entrepreneurs, gave an interview to NEPSZABADSAG on the difficulties of Ukraine's economic transformation and the search for the way to progress.

[Radi] Although our countries neighbor each other and we have similar problems, we only have a superficial knowledge of Ukraine's economic life. Can you please tell us about your organization.

[Yevtukhov] The Federation of Ukrainian Entrepreneurs is a huge collective organization with about 10,000 members. Any industrialist or private enterprise can join us if they pay the membership fee. The only condition is that our members cannot join another organization at the same time. Cooperation among our member organizations is excellent. At the same time, it is a problem that Ukraine does not have a law on the activities of trade unions; therefore, we do not have a general negotiating basis and the employers do not know how far they can go during negotiations. Although a trilateral interest coordination council has been set up following the Western example—you also have one—it does not function well, precisely due to the lack of legal provisions. In the West, the trade unions also take responsibility for not allowing their members to work while under the influence of alcohol. This is still unimaginable in Ukraine. What is much more important, our trade unions still have not accounted for their assets. Do not misunderstand me, I do not wish to talk against the trade unions; all I would like is for the experts of employers to have a bigger say in legislation. As a member of the cabinet, I do all I can to achieve this.

[Radi] Privatization is accompanied by a lively social debate in Hungary. How is the change of ownership seen in Ukraine?

[Yevtukhov] Privatization is progressing much slower than it should. We give preference to the ownership share of employees and normally we only put out the bids after settling this side. However, there are very few offers in response to these bids. Foreign capital is showing less than expected interest in our country. However, in my capacity as an enterprising citizen, rather than as a government member, I can confidently state that it is not political reasons that cause the problems of privatization, and we have not even had any corruption scandals. Nevertheless, people tend not to have confidence in the change of ownership. The older generation experienced the 1917 changes, the consequences of which the whole country is suffering. This is why the current economic leaders have great responsibility: It has to be proved that, in the given circumstances, the best possible decisions are being made on a professional basis. This also means that, sooner of later, we will have to stop talking about the past of former communists. A strata of experts has evolved in the past few years and it would be a crime to part with them for ideological reasons. I feel that this problem is common to our whole region. I have spoken to the Czech and Polish presidents. They both admitted that they are now sorry that they signed laws that limited the economic role of former party members.

[Radi] For us, Ukraine is a particularly important partner, because it connects us to the huge market of Russia. What are the chances of further bilateral cooperation in your view?

[Yevbtukhov] Since we are struggling with similar problems it is logical to seek the way out jointly. Even together, it will not be a simple task to make money out of nothing. However, many things will have to be resolved quickly: Money transfers should be simplified, because this makes business deals rather difficult. We are actually making an increasing number of business deals with each other. This event, where we will probably sign an official cooperation agreement, is an example of our good relations.

Plan To Produce Tanks With Pakistan Viewed

WS0311150693 Kiev UNIAN OHLYADY, KOMENTARI, PROHNOZY in Ukrainian No 22 2 Nov 93

[Article by Alevtyna Kukharchuk and Andriy Starostin]

[Text] Efforts by People's Deputy Oleksandr Charodeyev, who has passionately been opposing Ukrainian high-ranking officers' attempts to sell tanks to Pakistan, have not been successful so far. As is known, in the 1 September issue of ZHYZN, Oleksandr Charodeyev presented angry tirades against Oleksandr Skipalskyy, head of Ukraine's General Staff Military Intelligence Department. In particular, he had in mind a letter sent by the head of the intelligence department to Deputy Prime Minister Vasyl Yevtukhov, in which the former demanded permission to sell a huge shipment of modern high-tech tanks to Pakistan. Charodeyev insisted that this should not be done, since Pakistan is "an imperialist state with aggressive tendencies." However, as early as the previous day, as has recently become known, Pakistan had tested Ukrainian T-80UD and T-84UP tanks. The Pakistani side was very satisfied with the testing, and one of the state leaders stated that Pakistan would be interested in the "independent production of tanks and equipment in Ukraine, should an agreement be signed." Moreover, as UNIAN has learned, the Pakistani side, apparently out of fear that Russia would undertake measures to prevent the sale of Ukrainian tanks, came out with a proposal to begin a joint-venture production of a Ukrainian-Pakistani tank, as well as to organize production of T-84 tanks and to modernize Chinese T-59 tanks in Pakistan. The proposal also envisioned deliveries of Mango missiles and other steps.

So, while Charodeyev was voicing opposition and throwing accusations, the caravan kept proceeding. Pakistan is interested in our tanks. They were tested in the Tar Desert, in 50 centigrade temperature and incredible dust. The Ukrainian machine not only confirmed its supertank reputation, but also proved that it is able to withstand any conditions in any climate. Ukraine is also interested in Pakistan as a trade partner. So, it is not strange that most of the reliable sources have assessed the successful testing of Ukrainian tanks in Pakistan as a significant achievement in the state's foreign politics.

Ukraine's success depends on three factors. First of all, not many countries in the world, due to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, would have as many specialists able to work on a T-80 tank and to modernize it according to local conditions. It was proven during summer testing that took 26 days instead of the 45 as had been initially planned. Given this relatively short period, Pakistani crews so sufficiently familiarized themselves with the technical aspects, that they themselves conducted a great deal of the running and gun tests, supervised only by experts from the Kharkiv Design Bureau at the Morozov Machine Factory.

Secondly, despite unpredictable reactions of the entire Muslim world, Ukraine can still count on support from Turkey and the Arab monarchies, which are definitely not happy about Iran's "tank superiority" developed during the Soviet era. Pakistan's previous experience shows that those countries will not limit their money: Almost 40 percent of Pakistan's military expenditures have been financed by Arab subsidies.

Finally, the possibility of using Pakistani T-80 tanks by Tajik anticommunists cannot be perceived by the Ukrainian military complex as a factor for effective pressure on Russia, which is persistently trying to take control over the Ukrainian tank-building industry in order to monopolize the former USSR markets. This way, deliveries of modern tanks to Pakistan would mean an entry into arms trading and would be a deciding factor in the competition with the former empire.

No wonder that Ukrainian representatives, according to UNIAN sources, have assured the Pakistani side that, in case a contract is signed, Ukraine would be able to ascertain the fulfillment of the contract. Moreover, according to POST-POSTUP, negotiations on cooperative tank production are being conducted with Israel.

Nevertheless, one should consider an external threat to breaching the agreement, as well as an internal one. "The United States has opposed China's sale of tanks to Pakistan," warns Charodeyev backed by a group of "peace hawks" and "people's defenders." They emphasize that Pakistan borders with countries that are members of the CIS Security Council (it does not matter to them that Ukraine neither participates in this bloc nor intends to do so).

It is obvious that these comrades have been disappointed by the fact that Ukraine has refused to support the Tajik communist regime, and has turned its attention to a country that cannot be so easily controlled by the ex-empire. However, the pressure from the "hawks" and "defenders" may ease in the near future, since a breach of such an important military agreement, followed by layoffs of thousands of voters, could hardly be called a success on the eve of the forthcoming elections.

National Affairs

Kravchuk Issues Decree on Privatization

LD0411143293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0900 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev [no date as received]—On 2 November Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk signed a decree "On the indexation of the nominal value of privatization property certificates." As UNIAN had forecast, the decree sets a coefficient for the indexation of the nominal value of certificates and the size of their general emission—35, and a nominal value for every certificate—1,050,000 karbovantsi. Residual funds in Ukrainian citizens' privatization deposit accounts which had not been used up by 1 November and residual funds of privatized deposit accounts in accounts not included in the balance of purchasers' societies and financial intermediaries are to be increased by the indexation coefficient.

The portion of the purchasing price of privatization facilities not paid with the certificates, that have been valued without taking into account the indexation of fixed capital; the statutory funds and the nominal value

of shares of joint stock companies, whose size of statutory fund were determined without taking into account the indexation of fixed capital and which have a portion of shares in state ownership are also subject to compulsory indexation.

Commenting on this document Mykola Shcherbyna, head of the privatization sector of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, noted that the decree will enable the effect of inflation to be reduced and will stimulate the population's interest in privatization. In the words of Mykola Shcherbyna, almost 400,000 certificates have been used in Ukraine and, if by the end of the year documents for transforming 300 planned enterprises into corporations will be prepared and the decision to privatize them will be adopted, this figure will grow at least to 1.5 million.

In his opinion this will also be facilitated by the expected decree of the Ukrainian president on the simplification of the system of privatizing enterprises that have been transformed into joint stock companies [korporatyzatsiya].

Further on Kravchuk Decree on Foreign Exchange

LD0311172993 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev [no date as received]—Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, adopted a decree on 2 November "on additional measures regarding improving currency regulation," in which the Cabinet of Ministers, with the participation of the National Bank of Ukraine, is charged with elaborating a system of measures within a month for putting monetary and credit policy into order, encouraging production for export, and introducing limitations on the import of certain groups of goods into Ukraine.

In accordance with the decree, the Cabinet of Ministers should review within 10 days all concessions previously granted to residents regarding exemptions from compulsory sale of revenue in foreign currency on the interbank currency market with the aim of reducing concessions as much as possible and suspending them.

By means of the decree it is proposed that the National Bank of Ukraine puts into order the regulation of the official currency exchange rate of the national monetary unit within a week. By means of the decree, trading at the Ukrainian Interbank Currency Exchange has temporarily been suspended and conducting transactions of buying or selling foreign currency at other exchanges or in credit and financial establishments has been banned. Authorized banks are allowed to carry out the purchase or sale of currency, which is not subject to compulsory sale at the expense of their own funds only in accordance with applications by customers and in accordance with the procedure established by the National Bank of Ukraine.

It is also recommended that the National Bank supplements the official currency reserves by buying out 10 percent of currency revenue, which is subject to compulsory sale, and also that it reviews the expediency of issuing individual licenses to residents to open currency accounts in foreign banks. The decree allows nonresident legal entities to sell foreign currency to authorized banks according to the procedure established by the National Bank of Ukraine and cancels any limits on their opening current currency accounts in Ukraine's banks.

Servicemen Banned From Writing to Mass Media

LD0411054093 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev [no date as received]—As a UNIAN correspondent learned from the circles close to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Colonel General Vitaliy Radetskyy has issued verbal instructions to units and establishments within the Ukrainian Armed Forces banning servicemen from writing letters and articles to the mass media. The press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine must track down all the publications signed by officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and privates and immediately report to Radetskyy. Failure to fulfill these instructions may result in a dismissal of regular officers from the Army.

The pretext for issuing such instructions was the article by Major General Oleksandr Rol in the 13 October issue of the newspaper VECHIRNIY KYYIV, "Who Needs Commercial Aviation?", in which he criticized the leadership of the Defense Ministry's Main Staff for the absence of a program to reform the Ukrainian Armed Forces and which publicized instances of abuse committed during commercial use of military transport aviation.

Commentary Examines Replacement of Kozhyn, Morozov

AU0411110693 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 29 Oct 93 p 2

[Volodymyr Prytula report from Sevastopol: "Why Has Admiral Kozhyn Resigned?"]

[Text] Former commander of Ukraine's Naval Forces Borys Kozhyn was the first and, for a long time, the only admiral in Ukraine's entire Armed Forces. For some time, he was even the only serviceman in the young Ukrainian Fleet. I will not speak about the difficult political and economic conditions in which Ukraine's Naval Forces are being built. It is, first an foremost, to the credit of the person who was, at that time, commander of Ukraine's Naval Forces that, over half a year, a foundation for the fleet could be created. That is why the known presidential edict on appointing a new commander came a great surprise to many, despite the fact that talk on this in military circles had circulated for a quite a while—ever since the Russian Defense Ministry agreed, in April 1993, to transfer Vice Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy to the Ukrainian military department.

Our newspaper already wrote that he is considered to be a specialist of extremely high qualification, for, before he returned to Ukraine, Vice Admiral Bezkorovaynyy had commanded for several years an elite formation of the Russian Fleet—a flotilla of strategic atomic submarines. His colleague Vice Admiral Kozhyn, before he was appointed commander of Ukraine's Naval Forces, had been commander of the Crimean Naval Base for just a few weeks and, therefore, he objectively has less experience in managing such a large mechanism as Ukraine's Naval Forces and had to acquire these skills during his service as commander of the Ukrainian Fleet. It stands to reason that the leadership of the Defense Ministry has given preference to Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy, candidate of military sciences, who is more experienced and known in the circles of specialists. This reason seems to be the principal one; at any rate, many military specialists both in Sevastopol and Kiev maintain just this. It may also be asserted that yet another important reason for Vice Admiral Kozhyn's resignation was pressure on the part of the command of the Black Sea Fleet and a part of the leadership in Sevastopol and in the Crimea. In their opinion, Kozhyn's position with regard to the Black Sea Fleet issue was too uncompromising and he could not find a common language with the Black Sea Fleet command. Besides, as has become known from reliable sources, corresponding services of the Black Sea Fleet elaborated a special program for discrediting the Ukrainian commander and succeeded in implementing it. Perhaps, this also influenced the decision on replacing the leader of the Ukrainian Fleet. At the same time, the majority of local observers believe that the resignation of Colonel General K. Morozov from his post as minister of defense was only a pretext and not the reason for introducing cadres changes in the command of the Ukrainian Naval Forces. Whatever the reasons behind the replacement of the commander, the revival of the Ukrainian fleet will be associated in history precisely with the name of Admiral Kozyn.

Guided Anti-Tank Missiles Recovered in Luhansk Oblast

AU0411123093 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 2 Nov 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "The Missiles Did Not Take Off"]

[Text] The three-month search for the guided anti-tank missiles that had been stolen from a military unit of a Luhansk Garrison have ended successfully. The dangerous munitions have been located and lifted by sappers from the bottom of the Luhan River.

Three criminal groups have been charged with a criminal offense. It turns out that the weapons were meant for so-called "hot spots." They were returned to their lawful owners.

Thefts of Army Trucks Said Widespread

WS0411115293 Kiev UKRAINA MOLODA in Ukrainian 22 Oct 93 p 1

[Article by Ivan Krayniy: "A Truck Goes for a Bottle of Vodka"]

[Text] Under different circumstances, this extraordinary event would cost many officers their stripes. The CIA would probably classify a report on it as "for official use only."

During the past year, 200 ZIL, HAZ, and UAZ trucks have disappeared from the 38th Army units.

This is an appalling fact, not only because of the magnitude of the thefts in the Army. This criminal case is being stifled with a military-like directness and decisiveness, despite the reports on truck thefts that have been voiced by People's Deputy S. Volkovetskyy at the Supreme Council, and the Office of Attorney General has promised to establish a special investigation team. Meanwhile, the army trucks remain where they have been driven.

The Army has not received a kopek from the illegal sale of the 200 pieces of military equipment worth between 90,000 and 300,000 karbovanetses each at 1992 prices. It seems that the most splendid lootings are the simplest ones. The go-getter boys with cute faces and stars on their epaulets find a civilian customer and hand over to him a truck in exchange for cash. Sometimes they were sold for peanuts. One ZIL-131 truck was sold for half a liter of vodka. At the same time, high-brass officers would designate the trucks for "demobilization." The signatures under such orders even originate from the headquarters of the Ciscarpathian Military District. No wonder any serious measures undertaken by the investigation authorities are halted by a "red light." The criminal case has enveloped not only influential army officials but also solid businessmen from the militia, particularly from the Ivano-Frankivsk Traffic Inspection, where forged documents were cleared.

Now, it is quite possible that the case will be hushed. Some of the stolen trucks have found their way to Zakarpatska, Chernivtsi, Khmelnytskyy, and Vynnytsya Oblasts. Engine and chassis numbers have been changed. Lieutenant Colonel Chernyshov, former head of the 38th Army Auto Service, who could say much about the case, currently resides in Moscow, meaning out of the zone of competence.

Meanwhile, day by day the outlines of this case are being diluted, and traces on those involved are disappearing.

Political Link, Threat From Missing Chernobyl Fuel Denied

WS0311154893 Kiev KYYIVSKYY VISNYK in Ukrainian 28 Oct 93 p 1

[Interview with Mykola Sorokin, director of Chernobyl nuclear power station, by Viktor Demenyev; place and

date not given: "From the Chernobyl Station, 129.6 Grams of Uranium-235 Disappeared. Who Stole It and Why, Under Investigation"]

[Text] The mass media have reported that two heat-emitting elements, tvels, which were part of one of the heat-emitting "assembly," TVZ [sborka], have disappeared from the Chernobyl nuclear power station. What happened? In the central control room of the No. 3 nuclear unit, our correspondent interviewed Mykola Sorokin, general director of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, about this disappearance.

[Demyenev] When and how was the theft discovered?

[Sorokin] It was noticed during procedural work in the fuel- preparation and storage room where the same "assemblies" are located. They consist of two parts—a top and bottom, both 3.5- meters long. So two tvels were neatly cut out. (M. Sorokin is pointing to zirconium pipes encircling the carrying rod [nesuchyy sterzhen] containing nuclear fuel, uranium-235. The pipes look very nice, flashing all colors of the rainbow.) I must say that the dissembled TVZ was made in 1982 and was at the station even before the meltdown. The cassette (the short name for the TVZ used by atomic experts) was not used in the reactor because of a design flaw—clearance between the top and bottom parts of the TVZ are too narrow.

[Demyenev] Do you think that the tvels present any radioactive or nuclear threat, whether in the station or outside it?

[Sorokin] They present no nuclear threat because two tvels contain very little uranium-235; only 129.6 grams. The experience of activating reactors shows that at least 20 cassettes must be loaded into a reactor to reach the critical mass. Since each cassette contains 36 tvels, you would need 720 tvels to initiate a chain reaction in—let me repeat this—specially created conditions. As for radiation, we are now standing beside several TVZs. The radiation level here is the same as in the central room of the unit. Danger from radiation is only posed by a cassette irradiated in the reactor. Let me emphasize that again—the stolen cassette was never loaded there.

A special commission was set up at the station investigating the accident in conjunction with the Ukrainian Security Service and other law enforcement agencies. I cannot tell you anything else about the investigation because, until its completion, it is considered a state secret. After it is over, we will immediately make the findings public.

[Demyenev] This incident occurred just before the Ukrainian Supreme Council decided to continue operation of the Chernobyl station. Do you not think that this was a provocation of those who actively oppose that decision?

[Sorokin] I have no grounds to think so. I believe it has nothing to do with supporters or opponents of the station's continued operation.

[Demyenev] The fuel-preparation and storage room is strictly controlled and encircled with several security cordons. This prompts a suggestion that someone who had permanent access to this room is involved in the theft.

[Sorokin] I would not like to cast a shadow over all the station's personnel, especially those who work with the fuel. Let us not jump the gun. The investigation will show who is responsible for the theft, and hopefully, no such accident will ever happen again at the station.

Socialist Party Chief Criticizes Rukh, Explains Platform

AU0411125493 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 2 Nov 93 p 2

[Statement by Oleksandr Bozhko, first deputy chairman of the Political Council of Ukraine's Socialist Party, SPU, and chairman of the Central Electoral Organizing Committee: "We Will Not Allow the 'Moscow Variant' To Recur"]

[Text] In his recent televised speech, Z. Chornovil, the leader of Rukh [Ukraine's People's Movement for Perestroyka], stated that Rukh is ready to win in the elections.

As regards statements by Rukh representatives, let this remain on their conscience. However, I think that they will not succeed in deceiving the people of Ukraine again. Everyone has seen for themselves to what the Rukh program for so-called "state building" has led. The people have assessed this explicitly: "Rukh has only wreaked havoc!"

As far back as in 1992, the Socialist Party declared its opposition to all power structures. I believe that, since that time, preparations started not only for elections to the Supreme Council, but also to local representative organs.

Today, the SPU is represented in every town and rayon of Ukraine. The SPU Central Electoral Organizing Committee and electoral committees of party structures have been created. Methodological materials and tactical and strategic approaches to elections have been elaborated and a draft pre-election platform has been formulated. This material is published by our newspaper TOVARYSH, so that party organizations and the general public can familiarize themselves with it and discuss it. The program will be adopted by the third SPU congress in December. Candidates for the Supreme Council people's deputies are being nominated. Normal and quiet work is under way.

The thesis advanced by the Rukh members who claim that, today, Communists are in power is naive and meant for simple minds. It is correct that former CPSU

members are at the head of almost all parties affiliated with Rukh and Supreme Council commissions and they hold high posts in the state. It is correct that they now profess the national bourgeois idea, adopt extortionist laws, and squander the national wealth.

Those who were Communists by conviction have united in the Socialist Party.

"How we will act at elections is a technical matter—as a bloc or on an individual basis. Incidentally, some people expect us to create an official single block of left-wing parties prior to elections. Wishful thinking! In such an event it would be easy to use the "Moscow variant." A bloody provocation and the ban on the alliance of left-wing forces is our opponents' dream. We are aware of this, dear sirs! That is why we will "forge ahead" by different paths and with a single ultimate goal in mind. It is clear that the left-wing forces will coordinate their activity. The future will show what forms this will take.

As regards predicting the election results in Ukraine, the SPU will contribute to the victory of left-wing forces. The program for the emergence from the economic crisis proposed by the SPU is the only way to maintain Ukraine as a state and to protect the population from extinction and enslavement, from the division of the people into serfs and landlords, from the devastation of culture, and from the corruption of the young people.

If the SPU program is implemented, it will be possible to create a model for Ukraine's development that, on the one hand, does not restore barracks socialism but, at the same time and on the other hand, will not allow to draw it into the abyss of the "wild" market thereby transforming it into a raw-materials base for other states. The goal of Ukraine's Socialist Party is to ensure the building of a socially equal, economically independent, and universally developed country.

Belarus

Party Congress Calls For Early Elections

WS0311122393 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 26 Oct 93 p 1

[Report by Larysa Klyuchnikava]

[Text] The Party of People's Accord [PPA] held its Second Congress on 23 November in Minsk, devoted mainly to preparations for elections. The congress was attended by 141 party delegates as well as guests from the Belarusian Scientific and Industrial Congress [BSIC], the Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions, the Belarusian Social Democratic Assembly [BSDG], the Free Trade Union of Belarus, and the Union of Entrepreneurs.

The political address to the congress was delivered by PPA Chairman Gennadiy Karpenko, who underlined that the crisis in Belarus had been caused by a lack of reforms, and "our outspoken stabilization is secured only at the expense of Russia." Having expressed the need for new elections in the spring of 1994, he supported the idea of holding elections on party rolls, this scheme being preferable to all parties. Gennadiy Karpenko also urged the need for forming a coalition government of the people's confidence.

According to People's Deputy Viktar Hanchar, there is no legal basis for a coalition government's functioning at present. In his opinion, the adoption of a new Constitution and the electoral law is a primary political goal. However, he believes that "in light of the fact that adoption of a new Constitution is unrealistic in practice, it is necessary to issue a constitutional law on the highest government bodies." There is a need for a union of political forces in the Republic, stated Viktar Hanchar, to create normative conditions (constitutional and legislative) for holding new elections.

The resolution adopted by the congress puts forward such party tasks as striving with other political forces for scheduling new elections for April 1994, and for holding consultations on adopting a new electoral law. Also, a need for nominating party candidates was expressed, as well as for considering the possibility of forming a centrist bloc (the most likely allies are the BSIC and the BSDG). The final document of the Congress also proposes holding direct local elections in January 1994.

The congress introduced some amendments into the party charter and appointed Gennadiy Karpenka chairman for the next term.

Trade Unions Demand Early Supreme Soviet Elections

WS0411113393 Minsk BELAPAN in Russian 1200 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Unattributed report: "Belarusian Trade Union Federation Insists on Early Supreme Soviet Elections"]

[Text] The Belarusian Trade Union Federation [BTUF] has sent a letter to the Supreme Soviet demanding setting a date for holding early elections to the highest organ of state power. The letter states that the BTUF demand is supported by ordinary BTUF members: The poll has been conducted and its results show that 738,000 people back early Supreme Soviet elections (it is known that 350,000 votes are required to hold an all-Republican referendum). A BELAPAN correspondent has learned from the BTUF organizational section that if the Belarusian Supreme Soviet refuses to fulfill BTUF demands, the BTUF will undertake the most determined steps including the holding of an all-Republican strike.

'Democratic Forces' Form Coalition 'Spring 94'

WS0411113693 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 22 Oct 93 p 1

["Text" of statement issued by "the democratic forces' coalition 'Spring 94'"]

[Text] The political, economic, and social situation in the Republic is advancing to a critical point, the life of people is constantly being aggravated. Responsibility for the state's destiny demands social activity from its citizens. We are sure that the power of people, the market economy, and national independence are the only conditions for the revival of Belarus. Therefore, we are creating a coalition of political parties, movements, public, professional and religious organizations, creative unions, and individuals.

The aim of the coalition is to create political conditions for a civilized transfer from a totalitarian system to a law-governed democratic state.

Our coalition is created on the following principles:

—The buildup of a sovereign state, nonnuclear status, and nonentrance of Belarus into military blocs;

—Priority of human rights over the interests of the state, national and social groups;

—Transfer of a command economy into a market economy;

The immediate tasks of our coalition are:

—The creation of a coalition government of people's confidence for the implementation of decisive economic methods;

—Early Supreme Soviet elections on the basis of a new democratic law on elections no later than the spring of 1994.

We are doing everything to facilitate the exit of the Republic from a crisis through reforms and a solution of economic and social issues.

We do not speak in the name of people but demand that people's rights are resolved through democratic elections.

The statement was signed by: A. Dabravolskiy, chairman of the Belarusian United Democratic Party; A. Trusaw, chairman of the Belarusian Social Democratic Assembly; Ya. Luhin, chairman of the Belarusian Peasant Party; A. Shakalaw, chairman of the executive council of the Republican Trade Union "Confederation of Belarusian Labor"; M. Lyutsko, chairman of the Belarusian Association of Entrepreneurs; H. Shtykhaw, president of the Belarusian Association of Victims of Nazi Repressions; M. Apeyka, deputy chairman of the Christian Association "Kuropaty"; Writer S. Aleksievich; Honored Artist H. Asvyatsinski; Professors I. Nikitchanka, U. Downar, M. Kavalew, B. Zheliba, P. Heizler; H. Stelmakh, deputy of Minsk City Executive Committee; V. Karneenka, deputy chairman of Gomel City Executive Committee; S. Kalesnik, deputy of Borisov City Executive Committee; A. Staravoytaw, chairman of the Union of Liberals "Young Belarus;" Ya. Hrib, general manager of the productive association "Krosny"; K. Yarmolenka, chairman of the directorship of the Belarusian Union of Farmers; Farmer B. Sakolnikaw; Yu. Lawrenaw, deputy of Vitebsk Oblast Executive Committee; deputies of Vitebsk City Executive Committee: Kh. Zhelyanow, K. Halavina, N. Shur, M. Pryshchepaw, A. Myshlenak, V. Piwulskaya; deputies of Minsk City Executive Committee: A. Dranitski, Ul. Dranitski, P. Stetska. Ya.Kushmar, A. Zavadski; T. Belavokaya, chairman of the Belarusian Committee "Children of Chernobyl"

Moldova

Snegur Urges Gagauz Leaders To Participate in Vote

LD0311204493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1449 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Moldovan President Mircea Snegur on Wednesday [3 November] met with the president of the self-proclaimed Gagauzian Republic, Stepan Topal, and the chairman of the city council of Komrat (administrative center of Gagauzia), Sergey Volkov.

Interfax has been told by sources from the Moldovan president's entourage that the two sides discussed economic and financial issues as well as resolving the conflict between Chisinau and Komrat by granting special legal status to the areas populated by the Gagauz.

During the talks, Snegur said that the solution would be a matter for a new parliament and the result would largely depend on the outcome of the elections. In view of this the president has urged that the Gagauzian representatives ensure that the Gagauzian population take part in the elections. He believes this will help strengthen Moldova's integrity, adopt a new Constitution and other legal acts with due account of the views of the republic's entire population.

Central Election Commissions Formed; 26 Parties Register

LD0311202393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1449 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] The Central Election Commission was formed in Moldova on the midnight on November 2. According to the resolution on early parliamentary elections yesterday was the deadline for submitting candidates to the Central Election Commission. As many as 26 political parties and public movements registered the day the resolution on elections was adopted and allowed to take part nominated their candidates.

Interfax has been told by the commission's chairman Nicolae Timofti that the committee consists of 16 representatives of political parties and movements and 7 members of the Moldovan Supreme Court. He said that the Gagauzian People's Party nominated its candidate to the commission, thus showing its desire to run for a new Moldovan parliament. Earlier the leaders of the self- proclaimed Gagauzian Republic repeatedly said that the Gagauzian population would not take part in the elections.

Parliamentarian Favors Joining CIS, Economic Union

LD0211201793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1746 GMT 2 Nov 93

[By Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] In his exclusive interview with INTERFAX deputy chairman of the Moldovan parliament Viktor Puscasu announced that Moldova's joining the CIS and Economic Union would have positive results for the republic's economy.

In his opinion, the non-ratification of the agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth this August "resulted in 40-billion losses to the republic and deprived Moldova of traditional markets in the East and of an opportunity to earn money to procure necessary energy and fuel resources and raw materials which the republic sharply needs."

Puscasu believes that "having considered the socio-economic situation in the republic in August, the parliament has only partially solved the existing problems as the economy still remains restrained and has failed to receive political support." In his opinion, the parliament also made a serious mistake "by actually closing all economic borders of the republic." This resulted in several enterprises coming to a standstill and overstocking with agricultural products as additional excises and taxes had been imposed on them in CIS countries, and they (the enterprises) have lost competitiveness. Minding this, the parliament's presidium took the responsibility and approved the president's decision to join the CIS and Economic Union," [quotation marks as received] emphasized Puscasu.

He believes that thanks to this Moldova would be able to cooperate with the former Soviet republics as an equal partner, force abolition of excises and VAT imposed on Moldova's goods, and participate in implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements within the CIS.

Regarding the judicial implications of the resolution adopted by the parliament's presidium, Puscasu said that it creates a legal basis for Moldova's participation in implementation of all agreements and documents in the framework of the CIS and Economic Union. At the same time the vice speaker underlined that the question concerns only the economic part of the documents within the CIS because Moldova has signed about 250 out of 400 documents and will not participate in consideration of political and military problems.

Puscasu underlined that the decision of the parliament's presidium is an interim one and deputies would consider the issue on its ratification this December. He rejected opinion of mass media representatives who say that the parliament would not be convened until new parliamentary elections. In his words, the last plenary sitting of the session will be held in December to discuss the issue on ratification of the agreement on the CIS and Economic Union. The vice speaker is convinced that this time the parliament will adopt a positive decision on these issues.

IF Note: This August 162 deputies voted for the ratification of the agreement on the CIS and 4 votes more were needed to pass a positive decision. Later on the parliamentary majority collected 174 votes and authorized the president to sign a treaty on economic union.

Puscasu spoke in favor of strengthening bilateral relations with Russia. He called sharp anti-Russian statements by Moldova's former Foreign Minister Nicolae Tsu voiced on October 8 in the United Nations as "unthinkable."

IF Note: Addressing the session of the UN General Assembly on October 8, Tsu urged the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the 14th Russian army from Moldova and accused Russia of pro-empirical behavior and intervention in Moldova's internal affairs. Both Moscow and Chisinau expressed a negative reaction regarding these statements of the former minister.

According to Puscasu, "although from the theoretical point of view Tsu's statement was right, it was inconsistent from the diplomatic point of view." "He voiced this statement without consideration of the negotiation process underway between Moldova and Russia and has inflicted great damage to bilateral relations," underlined Puscasu. He expressed hope that these relations would undoubtedly improve and Moldova's joining the CIS and Economic union would facilitate this process.

14th Army Denies Giving Weapons to Dniester Separatists

LD0311210793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1632 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Kholodyuk]

[Text] Tiraspol (Moldova) November 3 TASS—Lieutenent-General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the 14th Russian Army stationed in the Moldova's rebel Dniester region, denied media reports about the alleged transfer of weapons from the Army to the Armed Forces of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic.

Lebed told reporters on Wednesday [3 November] he considers erroneous the opinion voiced by Dniester region's Deputy Interior Minister Viktor Katana that the 14th Army plays destabilizing role in the region.

"The (14th Russian) Army guarantees peace and stability in the region. As long as it stays here no aggravation of the situation will take place," the general said.

Further Lebed Comment

LD0311221093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Officials and the media in Moldova have been busy talking about the subject of the destablilizing role that they say is being played by Russia's 14th Army in the Dniester region. They claim that the handing over from Army depots of weapons to Dniester armed formations, to whom some military outposts abandoned by Russian troops are also being handed over, is continuing. General Lebed denies these claims.

[Begin Lebed recording] [passage indistinct] The remaining 14th Army units in the Dniester region are living a normal life and are engaged in planned combat training and preparing for winter. It is perfectly obvious that the statement about the Army's destabilizing role is connected not so much with any specific actions as the actual fact of the presence of Russian troops on Dniester soil. The 14th Army, which is the only real force in the region, clearly makes any attempt at a military settlement to the Dniester problem foolhardy. But this is clearly not to the liking of some politicians. [end recording]

Azerbaijan

Karabakh Leaders Urge Meeting With Azeri Counterparts

LD0311182193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1120 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] The Foreign Minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Arkady Gukasian has told Interfax that the leaders of his country and Azerbaijan should meet in the near future. However, he did not name the date or venue of the summit.

He said that the leaders of Karabakh and Azerbaijan discuss various matters almost daily by telephone, including the idea of a top-level meeting.

Speaking of a new CSCE schedule for a settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the minister said the document was not devoid of shortcomings. According to him, Stepanakert disagrees mainly with the timing of the planned steps. Nevertheless, Gukasian said, Nagorno-Karabakh is ready to discuss the schedule.

Commenting on the claims by Baku that the new schedule is unacceptable because it links withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan with the lifting of the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, the minister pointed to the UN Security Council resolutions No's 822 and 853 demanding the restoration of communications and an end to hostile actions, among them the blockade.

Gukasian said: "It is our opinion that if we are to meet each other halfway, compromise steps should be made."

The minister turned down Azerbaijan's proposal to include in the list of territories to be left by Armenian formations the Lachin region of Azerbaijan and the town of Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh. Before the conflict Azeris constituted the majority of the population in the town several kilometers away from the capital Stepanakert.

"We will never agree to include the questions of Lachin and Shusha in any document," Gukasian said. Lachin is a separate issue and the Karabakh authorities are convinced that any mention of it is absolutely unacceptable before the convocation of the Minsk conference for Karabakh.

"As for Shusha, it might be reasonable to simultaneously raise the issue of the return of Armenian refugees to Baku, Sumgait, Kirovobad and other towns and villages in Azerbaijan," the minister said.

He also thinks that the time is ripe for settling the conflict by peaceful means. There is a certain balance of force between the conflicting sides. However, peace will be largely impossible without a decision on the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Official Says Political, Diplomatic Efforts To Continue

NC0311171593 Baku TURAN in English 1246 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 3 (TURAN)—The Azeri diplomatic delegation could not participate in the first sitting of the CSCE Minsk Group in Vienna for technical matters, because of the delay of the maiden trip.

On reporting this to TURAN news agency, the official in the Azeri Foreign Ministry said, Baku intends to continue the active consultations on regulation of the Armenian-Azeri conflict within the framework of the CSCE.

As a high-ranking official in the presidential team told TURAN news agency, the foreign policy of the Azeri leadership will be built in the strict coordination with the statement of G. Aliyev and the recent decree of the Committee of Defense of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan keep counting on the political regulation of the conflict.

But, to his words, Baku understands, that only if the political and diplomatic efforts are backed by the necessary military force, they will be effective.

Russia Seeking Coastal Zone, Peacekeeping Presence

PM0411165793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Sokhbet Mamedov report: "What Azerbaijan Will Demand in Vienna"]

[Excerpts] Baku—The meeting of the CSCE Minsk Group resumed in the Austrian capital on 2 November. During its work it is planned to discuss the sides' comments and proposals regarding the redrafted and refined schedule of urgent measures to settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict proposed by the Italian diplomat Mario Rafaelli. [passage omitted]

As the newspaper ZERKALO writes, citing TURAN, in the process of the talks currently being conducted between Baku officials and representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense Azerbaijan has been given to understand that Russia wishes to obtain Baku's agreement to the introduction of a 10-mile coastal zone in the Caspian Sea and the commitment of Russian troops to the conflict zone as peacemaking forces of disengagement.

Aliyev Looks to Turkey for Military Assistance

MK0411093093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 3

[Aydyn Mekhtiyev report under the "Azerbaijan" rubric: "Geydar Aliyev Looks to Turkey for Assistance, Issues Edict Setting Up Defense Council"]

[Excerpts] Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov, who arrived in Ankara on 2 November on a

brief working visit, handed to Turkish President Suleyman Demirel a personal message from Azerbaijani leader Geydar Aliyev. The content of the message was not made public, but the Turkish press, citing diplomatic sources in Ankara, reported that the letter explicitly asked Turkey to provide effective assistance to Azerbaijan in bolstering the republic's defense capabilities. There has been no reliable information on the Turkish side's reaction to the request. [passage omitted]

Presumably, if the new Azerbaijani president is unable to take steps to halt the Armenian troops' offensive deep inside Azerbaijani territory, yet another round of destabilization in the republic will be hard to avoid. Being aware of this, Aliyev has been taking decisive measures to boost the country's defense capabilities. His edict appointing Nadzhmeddin Sadykhov, who has experience of combat operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, as chief of the general staff may signal a beginning of a purge in the armed forces' command. Although technically Surat Guseynov supervises the power structures, the president, as commander in chief, is entitled to make decisions on military matters on his own. Under another presidential edict, a Defense Council has been set up, and this decision, according to official sources, "was prompted by the extreme worsening of the military and political situation in Azerbaijan, which has been caused by the Armenian troops' occupation of new territories in the republic's southwest." The setting up of this body in itself is unlikely to change the course of events, for it is well known that the creation of the first Defense Council in the spring of 1991 in accordance with an edict by the first president, Ayaz Mutalibov, did not prevent the Azerbaijani Army from suffering further crushing defeats. The body was soon abolished. [passage omitted]

Iranian Official, UN Envoys Inspect Refugee Camp

LD0211135593 Tehran IRNA in English 1019 GMT 2 Nov 93

[Text] Parsabad-e Moghan, Ardebil Prov., Nov. 2, IRNA—A senior official at Iran's Interior Ministry inspected the process of relief work at Imilshi refugee camp in the Republic of Azerbaijan, Monday.

A delegation comprising a number of representatives of U.N. offices in Iran including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), accompanied General Director for Refugees Affairs Ahmad Hoseyn in the inspection tour.

Speaking after the inspection, Hoseyn said Iran would not save any effort to rescue the Azeri refugees and meet their demands.

Underlining Iran's support for the refugees, Hoseyn said Iran would continue its relief supplies and would not leave the refugees alone.

An Azeri official who was also present, praised Iran's outstanding relief supplies to Azeri refugees and added that such efforts had saved the lives of tens of thousands of Azeri refugees threatened by cold weather and hunger.

In another development, head of the Azeri committee for refugees Irshad Aliyev lauded Iran for being the greatest help to the helpless Azeri refugees. He told IRNA in Imishli that the Islamic Republic, by offering the larger amount of relief supplies proved to the world that it was the sole supporter of the Azeri Muslims.

At present, the Azeri official added, there are about one million Azeri refugees, out of whom some 670,000 have not been settled yet and are living in a miserable condition. He noted that 23 percent of the refugees were students while 20 percent others were aged people mostly above 60 years old.

Aliyev said that due to the growing number of Azeri refugees economy of the republic was almost paralysed and agricultural products suffered a 2.5 percent drop compared to the previous year.

Iranian Official Comments

PM0411132793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 3

[ITAR-TASS report: "Iran Helps Azerbaijani Refugees"]

[Text] Tehran, 2 Nov—Ahmad Hoseyn, head of the Iranian Interior Ministry Council for Refugees Affairs, said in an interview with Iranian journalists that to date around 50,000 Azerbaijanis fleeing southwestern Azerbaijan as a result of Armenian formations' latest offensive have moved across Iranian territory into secure regions in eastern Azarbayjan. Another 5,000 refugees from Zangelan are on the Azerbaijani bank of the Aras River waiting for a chance to cross the border.

According to the Interior Ministry spokesman, who recently visited Azerbaijan as head of an Iranian delegation with a view to finding places to build new refugee camps, half of the 50,000 refugees with whom his country has concerned itself have already been resettled in the Imishli and Saatly (names as transliterated) camps, while the rest are waiting for work to be completed on equipping tent encampments.

Tehran radio pointed out that Ahmad Hoseyn has criticized international organizations for their "indifference to the Azerbaijani refugees' fate."

Aliyev Decree Names New Ganja Executive Chief

NC0311175593 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Azerbaijan president issued a decree on the appointment of Ibrahimov as chairman of the city of Ganja's Executive Committee: The decree states:

Ilsever Elekber ogly Ibrahimov is hereby appointed chairman of the city of Ganja's Executive Committee.

[signed] Azerbaijan President Geydar Aliyev, Baku;

[dated] 3 November 1993.

Communist Party Holds Congress, Elects Leader

LD0211132993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1209 GMT 2 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sevindzh Abdullayeva and Viktor Shulman]

[Text] Baku November 2 TASS—The Azerbaijan Communist Party held its first congress since it was abolished in September of 1991, in Baku. The congress marks the party's official return to existence.

The congress' press center informed ITAR-TASS that once again communists are being registered in Azerbaijan, and party organisations are being renewed on the local, regional, town and district levels.

The congress called on all Azerbaijan communists to "be active in politics and party life", and to "assist the rejuvenation of the Communist Party".

The congress elected Doctor of History Sayad Sayadov general secretary of the party. Until recently Sayadov led the Party of Revolutionary Revival.

Georgia

Update on Situation in Poti; Black Sea Troops Land

Life 'Returning to Normal'

LD0311181593 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0900 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Life is gradually returning to normal in Poti. However, there are difficulties with the water supply to the population. Poti has not been supplied with drinking water for eight days.

Various armed groups have been moved out of the town. At the moment, Poti is controlled by Interior Ministry forces and Mkhedrioni [paramilitary group].

The crime situation has improved to a certain extent. There are still occasional incidents of looting. The administrative building of the Interior Ministry in Poti has been attacked by 50 armed criminals in military uniform. They acted with extreme cruelty. They disarmed and wounded department officers, took away automatic weapons, Makarov pistols, raided the building, tore up all documents and then escaped. Operational measures are being taken to arrest the attackers.

Russian Troops Fired On

LD0311213693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1743 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Supporters of Georgian ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia on Wednesday [3 November] fired at Russian troops guarding the railway outside the west Georgian town of Poti, a Russian general said.

General Vasily Belchenko, deputy commander of the Russian Russians had dispersed the attackers by return fire. [sentence as received] The assault caused no casualties on the Russian side, he said.

Belchenko said Russian forces remained in control of the railway linking Poti to Senaki, although a nearly 30-km-long stretch of it was under a constant threat of attack from Gamsakhurdia's rebels.

The general denied reports that Russia's Black Sea Fleet planned to land troops in Poti.

He said that on Wednesday there had hardly been any fighting at Khobi, a town Georgian government forces had been attacking for nearly two days.

The Georgian Defense Ministry's press center, however, told Interfax that attacks on Khobi had continued on Wednesday though government troops had been unable to take the town.

The press service of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze, who has been in the war zone for several days, told Interfax that the mutual releasing of POWs had taken place on Tuesday, the government forces releasing 11 POWs and the rebels 9. More were due to be released on Wednesday.

The press center of Georgia's Interior Ministry said Gamsakhurdia had moved from Zugdidi to the village of Achigvara in the Gali District of Abkhazia.

The center said a split had occurred between the ex-president and the commander of his detachments, Vakhtang (Loti) Kobalia. Gamsakhurdia replaced Kobalia with Zarandia, earlier appointed commandant of Gali by Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba.

The press center also said Gamsakhurdia's supporters shelled Senaki in the early hours on Wednesday, causing casualties among the local population. Local residents have begun evacuating from the town.

Fleet Prepares Landing Operation

LD0311231093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2007 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] In the early morning of November 4, a group of 9 vessels of the Black Sea Fleet will launch a landing operation near the port of Poti situated in western Georgia. The port is currently entangled in hostilities between the government troops and supporters of ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

The Black Sea Fleet Commander, Admiral Eduard Baltin, will direct the operation. The landing will be carried out in two stages. The first stage will start at about 02:00, while the other one at about 05:00. A battalion of marines and armored vehicles, including tanks, will be landed.

According to reliable military sources, the convoy's task in the eastern region of the Black Sea is to protect international shipping and the ports of Poti and Batumi.

The Georgian leadership will meet with the Black Sea Fleet command in Poti on November 4 to discuss handing over this city to the fleet.

The same sources told Interfax that another escort vessel, "Sderzhanny," stayed at the fleet's main base of Sevastopol ready to weigh anchor within an hour. The vessel is expected to leave for the east of the Black Sea on November 4 to reinforce the convoy situated near the Georgian coast.

Shevardnadze on Possibility of Joint Command

LD0411102493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0900 GMT 4 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Nine warships of the Black Sea fleet, carrying roughly 500 marines, have arrived in the area off the port of Poti, INTERFAX reports. The marines are expected to start guarding transport communications in western Georgia and the port of Poti. According to the agency, questions connected with the landing of the Black Sea Fleet marines will be discussed today by Fleet Commander Eduard Baltin and Georgian government leaders.

Eduard Shevardnadze does not rule out the possibility of forming a joint military command of Russian and Georgian forces, for the coordinated protection of transport communications in western Georgia. In an interview with Georgian television he also said that such joint operations may be extended in due course to routes passing through Abkhazia. However, this question is not under discussion at the moment. During his interview the Georgian leader also noted that once units loyal to ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia have been routed at Khobi and Zugdidi, numerous gangs will cause considerable problems unless the routes are defended.

Further on Plans for Landing

LD0411095693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0925 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Nov— There has so far been no landing on the Georgian coast by the group of Black Sea Fleet warships to protect transport routes, Andrey Grachev, Captain 2d Rank and deputy head of the Black Sea Fleet press center, has told ITAR-TASS by telephone.

He denied media reports that the landing has taken place and that it came under fire from supporters of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

According to the fleet headquarters, the group of eight warships of the Black Sea Fleet is in the staging area. Only one large amphibious warfare vessel came close to the port of Poti. They [as received] carry about 1,500 servicemen, including the landing party and crew members.

First 200 Marines Land

LD0411143393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] The first 200 marines of the Black Sea Fleet landed at the Georgian port of Poti today. A final agreement on the landing was reached during talks between Eduard Shevardnadze and Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Interfax was told of this by Georgian Vice Premier Avtandil Margiani. He took part in the talks. According to him, eight Black Sea Fleet vessels have called at the port of Poti.

According to informed sources in Sevastopol, on board the vessels are approximately 500 marines. It is expected that they will take over communications and the port of Poti. The vessels will also watch the situation at another Georgian port, Batumi.

Shevardnadze Meets Fleet Commander

LD0411165393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1426 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By GIA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi, 4 Nov—Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze had a meeting in Poti today with Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Baltin. The conversation concerned the defense of the port of Poti, the Poti-Samtredia railroad line and other strategic communications channels.

The head of state spoke with the crews of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet which are now in Poti. There are eight naval vessels currently at anchor on the roadstead.

Government Troops Take Khobi, March on Zugdidi

AU0311152293 Paris AFP in English 1459 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Moscow, Nov 3 (AFP)—Georgian government troops captured Wednesday the western town of Khobi, pursuing their offensive against rebels loyal to former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the Georgian news agency IPRINDA reported.

Fighting was now continuing on the outskirts of Zugdidi, Gamsakhurdia's base 15 kilometres (nine miles) to the west, the report said.

IPRINDA and Georgian radio said that Gamsakhurdia himself had been forced to flee further westward, towards the breakaway republic of Abkhazia. [passage omitted]

Capture of Khobi Denied

LD0411084993 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Major Soso Margishvili, head of the Georgian Armed Forces press service, reported from Kutaisi this morning that information made public by some Georgian and Russian media alleging that government forces seized Khobi does not correspond with the truth.

Yesterday, the former president's supporters continued shelling Senaki with Grad-type launchers.

Further Report on Town's Capture

LD0411125193 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] We have just received the news that Georgian Government troops took the town of Khobi this morning. Fighting for this town against supporters of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia lasted three days. INTERFAX learned that Zviadist formations are withdrawing towards the rayon center of Zugdidi, 25 km from Khobi.

Meanwhile, the situation in western Georgia is gradually returning to normal, the GEORGIAN INFORMATION AGENCY reports. The authorities are maintaining public order. Repair work is being carried out and electricity supplies have been restored in the towns of Senaki and Khoni and other populated localities that have suffered as a result of the hostilities.

Transfer of Gamsakhurdia Headquarters Denied

LD0411122993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1142 GMT 4 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Gudauta November 4 TASS—The Abkhazian Defence Ministry denied reports that ex-Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia had moved his headquarters from the city of Zugdidi in western Georgia to the town of Gali in Abkhazia.

The ministry said in a statement received by TASS on Thursday said that the headquarters of Gamsakhurdia remain in Zugdidi and qualified the reports about their transfer to Abkhazia as "aiming to justify a new intervention of Georgian troops into Abkhazia planned by the official Georgian circles."

In the meantime, the situation in the Georgian cities recaptured by government troops from "Zviadists" is returning back to normal.

In Senaki where a curfew had been imposed electricity supplies were resumed to the centre of the city.

Head of the city of Khoni, Guram Moniava, said it was quiet in the the town overnight.

The situation in Abasha remains stable. Electricity and water supplies have been resumed, flour and bread were delivered from Kutaisi and Samtredia.

Shevardnadze Warns Against Taking Zugdidi

LD0411164493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1200 GMT 4 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] After three days of intense fighting government troops liberated the town of Khobi today. The republic's head, Shevardnadze, said in an interview with national television that the slow advance toward the western regions is due to the heavy concentration of Zviadist forces on the approaches to Khobi and Zugdidi. Shevardnadze confirmed that Gamsakhurdia's forces are mainly made up of Chechens, Abkhazians, and Cossacks. The Georgian leader today spoke against taking Zugdidi, the former president's capital, since this will cost too much blood, he believes.

Gamsakhurdia's Supporters Shell Senaki

LD0311171193 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Zaza Bilikhodze of the Georgian Interior Ministry press center told the CONTACT news agency at 1500 that revanchists supporting Gamsakhurdia and confederates subjected the town of Senaki to indiscriminate artillery shelling yesterday. Four houses were destroyed, and one caught fire and burned down completely. A civilian was killed.

Looting and banditry have reached a peak in Senaki. Because of this, local civilians have joined police in carrying out searches of vehicles. There is no electricity in the town; Senaki obtains its electricity from Khobi which is still controlled by gangs supporting Gamsakhurdia. Bread is not being baked in Senaki and there is no water. Following yesterday's bombing, the population, especially families with young children, started leaving the town.

Bilikhodze said in his report that information has been received of a rift between Gamsakhurdia and Kobalia. Gamsakhurdia's headquarters is said to have been moved to the (Achigvara) vocational training school in Gali [in Abkhazia].

Zarandia has been appointed commandant of Gali. Zarandia was appointed as commandant of Gali previously by Ardzhinba, following the occupation of the whole of Abkhazia. There are reports that Zarandia has taken Kobalia's place in Gamsakhurdia's camp.

Shevardnadze Visits Senaki

LD0311180393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1534 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi, 3 Nov—Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgian head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, was in Senaki today. He visited forward positions and met and spoke to combatants of the government troops. As yet there are no serious changes from the military point of view.

Senaki Situation 'Controllable'

LD0411085693 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Text] Colonel Givi Skhirtladze reports from the Senaki headquarters of the Georgian Interior Ministry that the situation in the town and rayon is controllable. A curfew has been introduced, beginning today. Government forces are guarding all entrances to the town. Special squads have been established to stop looting and theft.

Electricity supplies to the town have been restored, allowing the bakery to resume operations. Beginning today, the rayon police will also be in operation.

Government, Gamsakhurdia Forces Exchange Prisoners

LD0311174793 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1100 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 3 Nov—An IBERIA correspondent has been told at the Defense Ministry press center that as a result of talks that Gamsakhurdia's supporters held with Major Soso Margishvili, head of the Defense Ministry's press center, and press center employee Koba Liklikadze, prisoners of war have been exchanged.

The government troops handed over 11 prisoners of war to the opposite side. Gamsakhurdia's supporters released 19 prisoners of war, 15 of whom are from the Shavnabada battalion and four are fighters from Zugdidi.

Gamsakhurdia's Premier Says Russians, CIS Provoke Wars

AU0411235893 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Nov 93 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Besarion Gugushvili, prime minister of the "so-called Zviadi government," by Petra Prochazkova in Zugdidi; date not given: "A War According to the Russian Scenario"]

[Text] In a windowless office with a charred door in the western Georgian town of Zugdidi, Besarion Gugushvili, prime minister of the so-called Zviadi government, gave us an interview. When we spoke, the troops faithful to Shevardnadze were 40 km from the city. Meanwhile there was heavy fighting, the front was constantly coming closer, and there was panic in the streets of Zugdidi.

Despite the very complicated situation, Prime Minister Gugushvili was in a good mood. "We are prepared for a partisan war," he said at the beginning of the interview. "If the city is overtaken by Shevardnadze, will run into the forests, and the fighting will go on."

[Prochazkova] Why have you begun retreating? You have almost conquered the two largest Georgian cities recently.

[Gugushvili] Shevardnadze called on Russia for help. Russians officially delivered military technology and weapons immediately. Defense Minister Grachev said in his statement that Russia was helping Georgia with technology, arms, reconnaissance, troops.... So, we began to retreat.

[Prochazkova] Do you have concrete evidence that Russian troops are present in the Georgian Army that is on Shevardnadze's side?

[Gugushvili] When we were advancing, we captured soldiers, and quite a lot of Russians were among them. We also captured an armored vehicle, the crew of which was completely Russian—and a Russian officer was there, too. The so-called Russian technical help is strikingly similar to that provided by the USSR to Vietnam to fight against the Americans.

[Prochazkova] Why is this Georgian war so advantageous to Russia?

[Gugushvili] Gamsakhurdia is dangerous to Russia. He wants to follow the example of the Baltic republics and establish full independence for Georgia. You [Czechoslovakia] were in a different situation, you were only a semi-colony, while we were a genuine colony. Shevardnadze wants Georgia to become a semi-colony. However, the CIS and the USSR are the same thing. The CIS has a much tougher structure than the CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. Can you see this historical similarity? When we were advancing, Shevardnadze solicited help from Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. We have the letter of invitation. How did you call your situation in 1968? You called it international help, while it actually was an occupation of a foreign country.

[Prochazkova] How would you explain the unequivocal support Shevardnadze is receiving?

[Gugushvili] The world is afraid of Russia. Since Russia is supporting Shevardnadze, the West is supporting him too. There is an elaborate Russian scenario according to which the wars in Georgia, Abkhazia, Tajikistan, and northern Karabakh are being waged.

[Prochazkova] The Tbilisi government affirms that Georgia is unable to defend its borders, and this is why it needs the Russian Army....

[Gugushvili] This is only an excuse. Would you be able to resist Germany, for example? Probably not. But, you are not going to keep Russian troops in your country because of that. Look, how many conflicts are there on the territory of the former Soviet Union? The CIS is

unable to prevent them. On the contrary, they are provoking these wars and using them to satisfy their imperialist interests.

If they wanted, they could provoke a war between the Czechs and the Slovaks.

Ajarian Presidium Appeals to Gamsakhurdia Over Bloodshed

AU0311230493 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 28 Oct 93 p 1

["Address by the Ajarian Autonomous Republic Supreme Council Presidium to (deposed President) Zviad Gamsakhurdia"; place and date not given]

[Text] The situation that has taken shape in Georgia arouses indignation and shock. Each day, the chasm among Georgians is getting deeper and resistance and bloodshed, which have already gone beyond the danger line, are increasing. It seems that the bridge has finally been destroyed and there remains no hope for the unification of the nation.

The country is being sacrificed in the struggle among political opponents; it is being ripped to pieces each day, bleeding profusely, and being mercilessly destroyed. If we are able to begin construction today, even a decade will not be enough to restore what has been ruined and destroyed. It will take centuries to restore the spiritual integrity of our multinational country. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and hapless homeless families require urgent help.

The peaceful population is experiencing a terrible tragedy. Ordinary innocent people are being exterminated as a result of genocide, people far removed from politics are living in poverty, and the country's best sons and daughters who possess great potential are leaving for abroad while, in the final analysis, all Georgia is suffering. The nation is facing a threat—to be or not to be.

Unfortunately, events are unfolding in such a catastrophic manner that they are fraught with irremediable consequences and the loss of our statehood itself.

The situation that has taken shape serves the purpose of those forces to whom it is not an advantage to have a single and strong Georgia. The main thing now is to summon the nation to show good sense. The correct choice will save us from total ruin. In this way, we will save the country from disintegration and collapse and we will avoid a second bigger and more shameful battle of Bazaleti [fought in 1626 in east Georgia between rival Georgian rulers].

Unfortunately, today, many have not understood our position with regard to the events taking place in the political life of Georgia. We have never stood on the sidelines and have actively struggled for the resurrection and well-being of our motherland, having constantly tried to restore the bridge destroyed between brothers and to contribute to the establishment of peace in the country. Ajaria was and remains today a powerful bastion of the motherland.

We would like to state for the information of those spreading sensational rumors that Ajaria will also continue to support in reality the political course aimed at the unity and integrity of Georgia.

Today, we earnestly state once more that the achievement of political aims by force of arms is criminal, as such a path is disastrous for the future of Georgia and holds no prospects. Standing on the path leading to its Calvary, physically and spiritually tormented by lengthy and serious suffering, the nation has lost faith and is in need only of peace today. This is precisely why we addressed you several times in person both through your representative and a member of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic Supreme Council prior to your return to Georgia and warned that your return to Georgia today would lead to civil war. However, all our efforts proved in vain.

We again ask you: Do not listen to instigators, those who, with weapons in hand, have made political revenge their aim. Today, we appeal to you and the political forces supporting you to do everything in order to halt the bloodshed. The interests of saving the people and unity of Georgia demand this.

Only new elections and participation of the nation's healthy worthy patriotic forces in them and their organization in the spirit of genuinely democratic principles will determine the fate and future of a new Georgia and the final defeat of the external and internal enemies of our motherland.

It is now necessary to display wisdom and perspicacity and nobility and magnanimity like those worthy sons of the people who have sacrificed their lives in order to save the nation.

Georgia without Georgians is the dream of enemies! We will not grant them such joy!

Shevardnadze Interviewed on CIS Membership, Events

NC0411114493 Yerevan SNARK in English 1039 GMT 4 Nov 93

[Interview with head of state Eduard Shevardnadze by an unidentified SNARK correspondent; place and date not given: "I'm Changing My Mind. I Make Myself Do It"—SNARK headline]

[Text] Abasha, western Georgia, November 4 (SNARK)—[SNARK] On August 14 you announced that anyone can be the author of the initiatives to enter the CIS but you. What made you change your mind?

[Shevardnadze] I am not among those politicians who follow their own principles for the sake of their principles. The situation existing at the Georgian-Abkhazian

front as well as in the region makes me change my mind. At the initial stage I was of the opinion that there's no necessity to enter the CIS, because I followed the idea of creating good neighboring relations not only with Russia but also with the other states of the former USSR. But this idea wasn't realized. And the Russian Parliament took the destructive position in this idea's realization. Georgia stands before the crisis. That's why I absolutely changed my mind and decided to enter the CIS.

[SNARK] What's your estimation of the western Georgian communications guarding?

[Shevardnadze] First, I should mention that now the railway from Georgia to Armenia and Azerbaijan which was blockaded by the Gamsakhurdia's supporters again works. This fact is very important one. Second, Georgia together with Russia made a mutual plan of guarding and the railway opening is the result of this certain action. I think, nothing bad happened in connection with the Armenian non-participation in guarding the western Georgian communications, though, saying honestly, we need her help. But when our brothers have problems, we have to understand the situation. The same with Azerbaijan.

[SNARK] What's your estimation of the today's Georgian- Abkhazian relations?

[Shevardnadze] This question is very simple for me—we should live together in Georgia. Abkhazia will have all the rights but only within Georgia.

Talks With Russia on Abkhazia To Resume

LD0211180893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1532 GMT 2 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi, 2 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Consultations with the Georgian side on settling the situation in Abkhazia are resuming in Tbilisi at the initiative of the foreign policy department of the Russian Federation. Gennadiy Fedosov, a special envoy of Russia's Foreign Ministry, arrived in the Georgian capital today on this mission. He will meet with Aleksandr Kavsadze, personal representative of the Georgian head of state and the chairman of the Committee for Interethnic Relations and the Protection of Human Rights.

Local observers relate the resumption of the Russian-Georgian dialogue on the Abkhaz issue to the changes that have taken place in the domestic political situation in Russia. Eduard Shevardnadze, for instance, has many times levelled accusations at the forces in Russia which he called reactionary, which initiated and maintain the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict—he had in mind the organizers and participants in the October disturbances in Moscow. After they left the political scene, the Georgian head of state said, new ways toward resolving many of his country's problems are opening up.

Abkhaz Council Holds First Session in Tbilisi

LD0411052193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1735 GMT 3 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS freelance correspondent Tengiz Pachkoria]

[Text] Tbilisi, 3 Nov—The first session of the Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic of Abkhazia (the Georgian administration that used to be in Sukhumi), which has started to function temporarily in Tbilisi, was held here. One should be reminded that a majority of the employees of this Council of Ministers managed to leave the conflict zone together with other refugees. The session was held with Zurab Erkvaniya, the new leader of this cabinet, in the chair. He was appointed a week ago on the instructions of the head of the Georgian state.

At the session, Erkvaniya noted that it is necessary to thoroughly investigate and analyze the reasons for the tragedy that was unleashed in Abkhazia and the reason why 250,000 civilians, mainly Georgians, were forced to leave their native land. He appealed to all Georgian politicians to refrain from ill-considered populist statements and speeches and to devote themselves more to specific deeds, and in doing so to discard personal ambitions and antipathies.

The session adopted a decision to instruct the ministries and departments of the autonomous republic of Abkhazia, which are temporarily functioning in Tbilisi, to draw up a specific plan for their activities and for the employment of refugees. It also noted the need to continue to study and clarify the facts regarding ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Georgian population in Abkhazia.

Abkhaz President Ardzinba Views Situation

AU0311233893 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 2 Nov 93 p 5

[Interview with Abkhaz President Vladislav Ardzinba by Petra Prochazkova in Gudauta; date not given: "The Abkhazians Fighting for Freedom Faced Complete Extermination"]

[Text] We first asked Abkhaz President Vladislav Ardzinba for an interview 18 km from the Abkhaz-Georgian border in the Abkhaz town of Gali. We stopped and asked him right on the road. He did not comply with our request for security reasons. However, he gave an interview to LIDOVE NOVINY two days later in his provisional headquarters in the town of Gudauta.

[Prochazkova] After more than a year of heavy fighting against the Georgian Army, you control all of Abkhazia. The troops loyal to Eduard Shevardnadze are now waging war against their internal foes, the supporters of overthrown Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Apparently, your troops are fighting on Gamsakhurdia's side against Shevardnadze.

[Ardzinba] What is happening in Georgia now is the Georgians' internal affair. We have liberated our territory; we have reached as far as the border on the River Inguri. We will stand guard here firmly, but in no way will we intervene in Georgia's internal affairs. However, if you want to know my opinion, then I have to say that the civil war in Georgia could have been prevented. Why not let the Georgian people say whom they support in elections or a referendum? Force will not resolve anything. We ourselves have fought for 14 months and we know what war is. Of course, ours was a just struggle for self-preservation. Now we are willing to discuss future relations—without tanks and submachine guns.

[Prochazkova] Would you be able to defend your border if Shevardnadze were to attempt to cross into Abkhazia again?

[Ardzinba] Since we were able to expel them, we are capable of defending ourselves.

[Prochazkova] There have been reports, however, that Russia is giving Shevardnadze military support....

[Ardzinba] According to my information, Russia is only helping to defend the railroads and the territory that will be liberated by the Georgian Government forces. I would stick to the official version.

[Prochazkova] At the moment, a blockade is in force against Abkhazia. Russia has cut electricity supplies and the borders are to be closed on 1 November. Will you try to reach an agreement with Russian representatives on forging normal economic relations?

[Ardzinba] There is no reason for the blockade. During the past year, we appealed many times to the Russian leadership to adopt effective sanctions against Georgia, which has the war on its conscience. Russia did absolutely nothing. Now it is enforcing a blockade against us. This is incomprehensible. In the wake of this terrible war, we have become a country of destroyed towns and villages, refugees, and people without a roof over their heads. And they have initiated an economic blockade.

Now we need to stabilize the situation quickly; we are beginning to establish regular bodies of state authority. We want the people to return to their homes. We have to guarantee their security and make sure that all human rights are observed. At the moment, we are not able to do this. You tried to stop me a couple of days ago on the road next to one of the strategic border checkpoints. Such checkpoints are located on all the roads so we can provide security for the people returning home. All those who did not fight against the Abkhazian people may return—Georgians, Abkhazians, Greeks, everyone. Abkhazia was a multiethnic republic, and it will remain so. No one will expel the Georgians who did not fight against us.

On the other hand, we are not yet in control of the situation everywhere. There were almost 3,000 police officers in our country before the war, now we have barely 400 people in the police force. Moreover, we are in a situation where war may break out again any minute. There can be no talk about order when there are thousands of people running around with submachine guns.

[Prochazkova] Are you trying to gain control of the weapons held by civilians?

[Ardzinba] We are. But the war may break out again at any moment. What can I do? Collect the weapons or organize a home guard? If I had political guarantees that the war is definitely over, I could concentrate on restoring order in the country. Unfortunately, there is still a risk that the fighting may flare up again.

[Prochazkova] Have you taken any steps to have Abkhazia recognized internationally as an independent state?

[Ardzinba] The country you represent has been recognized officially several times in the past and has also been deprived of its independence several times. Recognizing independence is a process. First, we have to stabilize the internal situation; we have to enable the refugees to return home. The Abkhaz parliament will discuss a new plan for our constitution soon—it should correspond to world democratic criteria. First and foremost, we have to guarantee the same rights to all the inhabitants of Abkhazia regardless of their nationality. When this is enshrined in the constitution, we will ask for international recognition for the Republic of Abkhazia.

[Prochazkova] Are you giving any consideration to Abkhazia becoming one of the republics in the Russian Federation?

[Ardzinba] Abkhazia will be an independent republic. We can cooperate with Russia on the basis of bilateral agreements. I am well aware that the world is following a path of integration. Borders are being relaxed where you are in Europe. We do not want to go against the world trend. Moreover, there are 90,000 Russians in Abkhazia and 10,000 Abkhazians in Russia. We want to create a normal, civilized border with Russia. The main thing is that everything is resolved without weapons. Unfortunately, at the moment, this is not working out.

My experience is that the large, strong states are still enforcing their will on the small states. Therefore, it is no wonder that small nations are helping each other. Thus, the people of the northern Caucasus helped us when we were facing complete extermination. The Abkhazians are a very small nation, but they will fight for their freedom. Or, in your opinion, do we have no right to existence?

Latvia

Reforms Minister Terms U.S. Trip 'Useful, Stimulating'

WS0411115693 Tallinn BNS in English 1913 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Riga, Nov 03, BNS—Latvian Reforms Minister Maris Gailis described his five-day visit to the United States as useful and stimulating.

During the trip, Gailis met American-Latvians and government officials, he told reporters Wednesday [3 November].

Gailis addressed American-Latvians at their annual political seminar on the recent political developments in Latvia.

The minister gained some new ideas on state administration after his consultations with American officials.

In addition, Gailis said he hoped that Latvian residents would support government's reform policies as eagerly as it was observed in the United States.

Heating Problems May Spark 'Social Explosion'

WS0411114993 Tallinn BNS in English 1436 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Riga, Nov 3, BNS—This winter's heating problems may spark a social explosion unless the government takes quick action to improve the country's situation, Latvia's local authorities said Tuesday [2 November].

The high prices for fuel create a major obstacle for a comfortable heating season, they said.

The heating crisis was the center of attention in a board meeting of the Latvian Municipal Leaders Association Tuesday.

The association asked President Guntis Ulmanis to mediate negotiations on heating issues between local governments and the national government.

The group also asked Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs to send five government officials to the proposed talks.

In other resolutions, the local leaders tried to forward the heating problem onto the parliament's agenda.

The heating issues are threatening here, said Juris Ozolins, a spokesman for the European Council's PHARE [expansion unknown] program in Latvia. He said he hoped that the two-way discussions would promote an understanding of the situation and would help find the best solution.

Saeima Agrees To Seek Relay of Russian TV

LD0311224893 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] The Saeima Commission on the Environment and Public Affairs today discussed the issue of relaying the two Russian television programs to Latvia next year. The commission believes that there ought to be such a relay; it is necessary for the population of Latvia to be informed about what is happening in the CIS states. The broadcasts of Ostankino and Russia's Radio, moreover, are of sufficiently high quality. The commission acknowledged that in concluding an agreement with the Russian side, the Latvian Radio and Television Council and, specifically, Zigmunds Skujins, its director, have full authority to decide how to work out the contract.

Lithuania

Minister Believes Politics Not Behind Russian Oil Cutoff

WS0411133993 Tallinn BNS in English 1711 GMT 3 Nov 93

[Text] Vilnius, Nov 03, BNS—Lithuanian Energy Minister Algimantas Stasiukynas said he does not yet see "any politics" in Russia's decision to suspend the supply of oil to the Mazeikiai oil refinery.

The minister said Lithuania has not yet received an official explanation from Moscow, but the matter was discussed Wednesday with the leadership of the Russian oil company Lucoil, which rejects any suggestion of political motivation. Vagid Alegperov, Lucoil president, told Stasiukynas that problems occurred in the Russian customs, but oil supplies to Lithuania should be resumed Nov. 3. The minister, nevertheless, doubts whether cooperation with Russian can continue smoothly in the future.

The leadership of Mazeikiai maintains that the oil supply was cut off for political purposes.

On Wednesday, the refinery received a telegram from the Russian oil transport company Transneft informing that only 100,000 tons of oil will reach Mazeikiai in November, only one-fifth of the amount contracted with Lucoil.

The oil refinery was shut down after Russia cut off the supply of oil Friday. This is the first stoppage in the past six months when cooperation with Lucoil became more stable.

Ruling Party Deputy Chairman on Unity, Strategies

WS0311083093 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 21 Oct 93 No 205 p 5

[Article by Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, LDLP, Deputy Chairman Gediminas Kirkilas: "A Year After Elections: LDLP Problems"]

[Text]

I. Creative Ferment

They have become very active writing and speaking about us, wondering, and showing indignation.... I think that they have made a mistake.... Yes, we have several hot-tempered, very strict, and maybe even more careful people among us. Nevertheless, we will find a common language. To be more exact, we will regain what we lost in the political confusion; all of us—Albertynas, Kirkilas, Petkevicius, Lozuraitis, Velikonis, and others. I do not consider myself hot-tempered. I suppose that such issues must be well considered. However, long contemplation may also lull one to sleep. Probably, many issues should be resolved more rapidly and resolutely.

The roots of our discord may be much deeper, as in the community in general. A rapid process of social differentiation is developing: **Many things have changed among us even during this incomplete year.** Some people were luckier than others. Some people have found their place in the new economic situation; others have not. This is natural. This has been programmed historically. This is what we ourselves programmed during the first Sajudis rallies, and later in the referendums, the Seimas and presidential elections. Who was debating a market economy back in 1990? Many people believed that a market economy would mean full stores, like in Sweden or Japan. All of them forgot, or maybe did not know, that a market economy means hard daily non-Soviet-type labor and ruthless competition—competition of intelligence, ingenuity, initiative, and sometimes of courage and determination.

These are the causes of this inner dissatisfaction. We are lagging behind...history is faster today than we are. Honestly speaking, not everyone has possibilities for catching up with it.... Unable to do so, we begin to accuse our neighbors and anyone else except ourselves.

In other words, we must have open discussions, clear up our positions, and think of our future work. Eventually, we must define our political lines. It is neither wonderful nor awful that there are several political views in the LDLP and its Seimas faction. The question is how to control and coordinate opinions that would lead to a tolerant, creative, and fruitful discussion rather than to the discrediting of one another and the entire party in the process.

Suppose that there are at least three groups in our party—the left radicals, the right radicals, and the moderates. None of these groups is better or worse than another. All of us, the LDLP people, who have won this "misery mandate," according to Vytautas Petkevicius, have enough responsibility for the situation. However, our views on ways of resolving the problems are slightly different. We must find a mechanism to implement all opinions and creative ideas without harming the party's unity. **We are no force without unity.** Our political opponents, who are splitting us so actively, have realized this well. This is what we must realize ourselves if we want to achieve something.

There is one more reason for why the debate has become so heated in our party. The problem is that the LDLP has no normal political opponents, either in the Seimas or outside it. The opposition—its parties and groupings—have originated from the radicals of the third Sajudis and former ambitious government officials. Their opposition is absolute, rejecting any LDDP decisions. It is discrediting rather than polemic in principle. The opposition of social democrats and liberals is slightly different and more tolerant. However, the weight of these parties in our society is still insignificant. **Thus, it is almost natural that the internal polemic has moved over to our party.**

On the other hand, the LDLP is quite large, and its social basis is varied. The variety of internal trends is also typical of large Western parties (according to the number of their members and legislative representatives). We were different and had contradicting opinions, both in the opposition and before the elections. However, we were united then by an almost total persecution of our party and the desire to win the elections, overcome autocratic tendencies, and preserve democracy.

If we analyze the current situation with caution, we will see that all existing or arbitrary trends in our party have their social basis and supporters, and can easily distribute jobs among themselves. For example, the leftist trend could assume responsibility for the stabilization of agriculture and social security. The rightist trend could take care of finances, tax policy, and economic reform. The moderates could deal with foreign policy, legal reform, and so on. This does not mean that we cannot express our views or work on other pressing issues, or that someone monopolizes one problem or another. It is important for our party and faction members to specialize in certain issues and to have priorities in their activities. Seimas deputies can do this while working in its committees.

It is only important for each trend to have ideas and envision their implementation. Personal opinions must be discussed and voted in the faction or the LDLP Council. If the faction does not make the best decision, the party (its Presidium or Council) must have the final say.

I will remind everyone that the LDLP statute reads: "Party members, whose position on tactics differ from those of the majority, can form groups and factions possessing an independent program of definite action that does not contradict the party's strategic principles. The legalization of such factions is a matter for the LDLP Council to address." Thus, let us express our views, but let us also have a definite program. If such a program exists, it can be approved at the next LDLP Council meeting, and a new group that has submitted the program can be legalized.

Currently, we are having long discussions on the implementation of the LDLP electoral program. Strange as it may seem, other parties—the rightists, the social democrats, and others—have also joined this discussion. They are trying to impose their opinion on us. I think that most of us realize that this is hardly being done with goodwill (although there are some rational proposals). I suppose that this "concern" of other parties about the LDDP program may be their desire to impose on us an internal discussion and a mistrust in our party leaders, and to actually divide us.

We must realize all this if we want to mean something in politics and really fulfill promises given to our constituents.

I am not going to accuse anyone of evil intentions in this case. I fully realize that most of us are being driven by good intentions and the desire to see results as soon as possible. **However, this desire may become both a creative ferment in our party and a poison of its division.** Certain signs of poisoning become evident when we begin publicly to accuse one another or criticize the president, the government, and our faction. This does not mean that such things are forbidden in general. Such things must exist, but they must not violate our internal ethics and statute. The LDLP statute reads: "The party's activities among the population are open. LDLP internal problems are primarily resolved with its members." No matter how we try to justify ourselves, by criticizing one another publicly, we either willingly or unintentionally find ourselves in the same ranks as the opposition! Moreover, it is very convenient to criticize the LDLP while being one of its members, because by doing this one can almost free himself of responsibility....

Both faction and party members must realize that we work under the conditions of openness, and that we are the focus of the press. **Under such conditions, the behavior of LDLP politicians and all of us must be more responsible.** Let us not forget that the press, particularly opposition publications, will always interpret our statements, speeches, and interviews in a manner that is more advantageous to them. They will always try to lay it on thick, twist facts, and mock us. This does not mean that we must avoid meeting the press, radio, or television. On the contrary. However, let our statements be politically well considered. Tact, tolerance, and logic, as well as the truth, have always been our strength. This is the most important issue. Let us tell people the truth about the situation and its causes. People will understand and help us with their proposals, ideas, and projects.

II. How To Work Today?

First of all, there is no need to set up groups or factions. I think that the emergence of V. Petkevicius' group has had a positive effect—it has distracted us from the endless daily routine and forced the LDLP and its faction leaders to take a fresh look at the accumulated problems. This event has proven once again that **in politics, victories are very few and celebrations are short.** Politics is like a fighter in the ring—if one is inattentive or if one decides to take a short break, one will find themself lying on the ground immediately....

Second I think that we have realized that unfortunately we have no allies among the other political forces. The tactics of the opposition are primitively straight—the worse, the better. No positive LDLP activities are recognized. The opposition tries to underrate or hide even our most obviously correct decisions. It fears stabilization as the devil fears holy water. We can hardly expect any coalition activities, even with the closer parties. Although we tried to include representatives of different political forces in the government, the president's office, and the Seimas leadership, their political organizations do not assess this as positive, and they are unable to use this for the benefit of Lithuania's political concord.

Third Every cloud has a silver lining. We have been holding out our hand for a year after the elections, and people will evaluate this. We have the absolute moral right to review the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers and other responsible government offices, and to dismiss those who do not want to or cannot execute the LDLP program.

Fourth The signs of social stabilization are obvious, and they are particularly annoying to our opponents. Therefore, the latter will continue to present demagogic and populist proposals (for example, concerning the indexation of savings), the adoption of which would mean a deeper economic crisis. They will also collect signatures and stage rallies and strikes. In the Seimas, they are constantly delaying the adoption of the most essential laws and decisions, and appealing to the Constitution, human rights, and so on.

They will be approved by journalists— former deputies—who have fallen low to spreading libel, and who are confident that the LDLP is guilty for their hopeless defeat in the Seimas elections....

Fifth We should not forget the intelligentsia. **The latter must have its say, get rid of complexes imposed by pseudopatriots, and assist in creating a society of citizens.** Without such a society, we will not resolve all the state's problems, no matter how much we appeal to the government. Thus, I share the opinion of V. Girdzijauskas [literary critic] (see LITERATURA IR MENAS issue of 16 October): "Through debate and consultation, we may get closer to our goal—if not to a more perfect human being, then at least to better human relations and a more humane community."

Sixth All of LDLP's problems rest on a common cornerstone—we have violated the internal party democracy and deprived the party of the prerogative of adopting key decisions, that is, those who worked and succeeded in persuading the majority of people to vote for LDLP. The key decisions must be adopted by the LDLP Presidium or Council, and, if need be, by a broader forum of party members. As long as we adhered to the internal principles of party democracy, we were successful. As soon as we deviated from them, we suffered losses. The latter can

still be corrected and offset. It is more difficult or even impossible to compensate for the moral damage.... There is only one method—to recall and go back to those values that have always united us, if we still have any spiritual strength.

Seventh, summarizing item To discuss and define the LDLP political line for the second year of the Seimas term. To review the Cabinet of Ministers and other key government offices. To restore the prerogative of decisionmaking to the party. If necessary, to reinforce and renew the party's leadership. To search for broader support among the community, trade unions, and maybe political, youth, and women's organizations. To restore the disrupted internal democracy, tolerance, and criticism.

Everyone should begin with himself.